United States v. Peters
| Decision Date | 12 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-7442,15-7442 |
| Citation | United States v. Peters, 843 F.3d 572 (4th Cir. 2016) |
| Parties | United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Spencer Peters, a/k/a Smoke, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
ARGUED: Caroline Swift Platt, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Peter Sinclair Duffey, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, Robert J. Wagner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Diaz joined. Chief Judge Gregory wrote a dissenting opinion.
Spencer Peters appeals the district court's denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). A jury convicted Peters of both conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, or "crack," and a related firearms conspiracy. Given the quantity of cocaine base attributable to Peters, the district court applied the maximum base offense level for drug-trafficking crimes under the Sentencing Guidelines. Peters ultimately received 480 months of imprisonment.
After Guidelines Amendment 782 increased the minimum quantity of cocaine base associated with the maximum base offense level to 25.2 kilograms, Peters moved for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2). The district court denied the motion, concluding that "the quantity of controlled substance in the offense of conviction renders the defendant ineligible for a reduction of sentence." J.A. 748. On appeal, Peters argues that the district court erred by failing to explain its eligibility determination in sufficient detail and by finding him responsible for at least 25.2 kilograms of cocaine base. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We first set forth the general statutory framework for deciding sentence reductions. Ordinarily, of course, a sentence is final. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2012). Recognizing a discrete exception to the general rule of sentencing finality, section 3582(c)(2) allows reductions to a defendant's term of imprisonment to give the defendant "the benefit of later enacted adjustments to the judgments reflected in the Guidelines." Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 828, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) ; see§ 3582(c)(2). Section 3582(c)(2), the Supreme Court has explained, permits "only a limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence and not a plenary resentencing proceeding." Dillon, 560 U.S. at 826, 130 S.Ct. 2683. This court has noted that § 3582(c)(2) does not allow "a do-over of an original sentencing proceeding," in which the defendant is "cloaked in rights mandated by statutory law and the Constitution." United States v. Legree, 205 F.3d 724, 730 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Tidwell, 178 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1999) ).
To decide whether to reduce a defendant's sentence under § 3582(c)(2), courts conduct a "two-step inquiry." Dillon, 560 U.S. at 826, 130 S.Ct. 2683 ; United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 253, 257 (4th Cir. 2015). First, a court must determine the defendant's eligibility. Section 3582(c)(2) permits a reduction only if (1) the defendant's "term of imprisonment [was] based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission," and (2) the reduction "is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." § 3582(c)(2). Second, the court may grant the authorized reduction "after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable." Id.; see18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). The ultimate decision of "[w]hether to reduce a sentence and to what extent" is committed to the district court's discretion. United States v. Smalls, 720 F.3d 193, 195 (4th Cir. 2013) ; seeLegree, 205 F.3d at 727.
The Guidelines policy statement implementing the statute, Guidelines § 1B1.10, spells out the process for determining whether an amendment lowers a defendant's sentencing range. SeeU.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G.") § 1B1.10 (2014). Courts "shall substitute ... the amendments ... for the corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when the defendant was sentenced and shall leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected." Id.§ 1B1.10(b)(1). Section 1B1.10 also functions as a gatekeeper, specifying which Guidelines amendments apply retroactively and thus may give rise to a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2). Id.§ 1B1.10(a)(2)(A), (d).
Motions under § 3582(c)(2) must be based on an amendment to the Guidelines. Seeid.§ 1B1.10(a)(1). Following the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines with respect to cocaine base offenses.
For drug-trafficking crimes in general, a defendant's base offense level depends on the type of drug and the amount attributable to the defendant. SeeU.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c) (2015). The Drug Quantity Table specifies particular base offense levels for quantity ranges of various drugs, with a maximum of 38 levels. Id.§ 2D1.1(c).
The Sentencing Commission revised the Drug Quantity Table after Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act. To alleviate the severe sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine, the Act reduced the statutory penalties for cocaine base offenses. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 § 2, Pub. L. No. 111–220, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012) ). Accordingly, Guidelines Amendments 750 and 782 lowered the base offense levels assigned to different amounts of cocaine base. The Commission made both amendments retroactive. SeeU.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d).
Amendment 750 increased the minimum quantity of cocaine base necessary to trigger the maximum base offense level from 4.5 to 8.4 kilograms. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 750 (effective Nov. 1, 2011). Amendment 782 again raised the requisite amount of cocaine base from 8.4 to 25.2 kilograms. U.S.S.G. supp. app. C, amend. 782 (effective Nov. 1, 2014).
For defendants responsible for at least 25.2 kilograms of cocaine base, Amendment 782 has no effect; the maximum base offense level (38 levels) still applies. Defendants accountable for more than 8.4 but less than 25.2 kilograms of the drug, however, will receive a base offense level of 36 levels.
The appellant Spencer Peters was indicted in 2008 along with his brother Terrence Peters and their associate Clifford Noel.1 The two-count superseding indictment charged them with conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base (Count One) as well as conspiring to possess firearms in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense (Count Two). The indictment alleged that these conspiracies lasted nearly a decade, beginning around January 2000 and ending around February 2008.
At trial, the government presented numerous witnesses, including former confederates, law enforcement officials, and individuals who purchased cocaine base from Peters and members of his organization. The evidence indicated that Peters was second only to his brother, Terrence, in the conspiracy's multilayer hierarchy and led the group when Terrence was absent. Although Peters was incarcerated for a period in 2003 and again from May 2005 onward, witnesses explained that Peters stayed in contact with members of the conspiracy while in prison and attempted to recruit a fellow inmate.
According to the government's witnesses, members of the crack-distribution ring, including Peters, regularly traveled from Richmond, Virginia to New York to purchase cocaine hydrochloride, or "powder cocaine." They usually bought one to two kilograms per trip. The group used two vehicles for these missions. Peters transported the drugs back to Richmond in his car, which was specially outfitted with hidden compartments. Terrence drove ahead in a separate vehicle to look out for police and warn his brother. Upon returning to Richmond, Terrence converted the powder cocaine into crack.
The group distributed crack through multiple channels, using a dedicated house as home base. Witnesses testified that the traffickers, including Peters, sold cocaine base to individual users and drug dealers, mostly for money but sometimes for firearms. One witness estimated that he had purchased a total of 1 to 1.5 kilograms of crack from the group. Peters also supplied his subordinates with cocaine base to sell on consignment. At one point, the conspirators began working in shifts, retailing crack 24/7 from their house and serving 40 to 50 customers on an average day. The group later shifted to a wholesale model in which it primarily sold cocaine base to mid-level dealers.
The jury convicted Peters, his brother, and Noel in 2009. At sentencing, the government argued that "a highly conservative estimate of the attributable drug weight in this case exceeds 150 kilograms." J.A. 596. At Terrence's sentencing hearing, which directly preceded Spencer's, the district court observed: "The Government's estimate of 150 kilograms is not off the mark ... based on the evidence in the case of which there was ample amount and corroborated in every respect." J.A. 630.
Under the Drug Quantity Table in effect when Peters was sentenced, defendants responsible for 4.5 or more kilograms of cocaine base received the maximum, 38-level base offense level. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (2008). Peters's presentence investigation report (PSR) attributed at least 4.5 kilograms of crack to him. The PSR summarized the key facts supporting this finding:
Testimony showed that the members were bringing 1 to 2 kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride from New York to Richmond on a weekly basis. While there were time periods that no drugs were...
Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI
Get Started for FreeStart Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial
-
United States v. Hardnett, Case No. 3:03cr212
...for cocaine base offenses" to "alleviate the severe sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine." United States v. Peters , 843 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2016). Through the Fair Sentencing Act, Congress reduced the crack-to-powder cocaine disparity from 100-to-1 to 18-to-1. United S......
-
United States v. Wirsing
...] the base offense levels assigned to different amounts of cocaine base," including Amendments 750 and 782. United States v. Peters , 843 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 750 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2011); id. app. C supp., amend. 782 (U......
-
United States v. Celestine
... ... U.S.S.G. Amendment 782 and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to ... reduce Celestine's sentence. See, e.g., Chavez-Meza, 138 ... S.Ct. at 1963-68; Dillon V. United States, 560 U.S ... 817,827 (2010); Martin. 916 F.3d at 395-98; United States ... v. Peters, 843 F.3d 572,574 (4th Cir. 2016); United ... States v. Patterson, 671 Fed.Appx. 105,105-06 (4th Cir ... 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished); United States v ... Cole, 618 Fed.Appx. 178,178-79 (4th Cir. 2015) (per ... curiam) (unpublished); United States v. Thomas, 546 ... ...
-
Babb v. United States
...cocaine base offenses" in order to "alleviate the severe sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine." United States v. Peters, 843 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2016); see Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 264 (2012); Collington, 995 F.3d at 351 (noting that "the Fair Sentencing A......