United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc.

• Citation: 436 F.Supp.3d 1
• Decision Date: 20 December 2019
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 99-2496 (PLF)
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. PHILIP MORRIS USA INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

436 F.Supp.3d 1

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.PHILIP MORRIS USA INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 99-2496 (PLF)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Filed December 20, 2019

Daniel K. Crane-Hirsch, Linda Margaret McMahon, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Alfred McDonnell, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, London, UK, Amy Elizabeth Ralph-Mudge, Amy L. Rohe, Duane J. Mauney, Jonathan Louis Stern, Kevin M. Green, Leslie Wharton, Peter Thomas Grossi, Jr., Ryan David Guilds, Sharon L. Taylor, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Michael R Geske, Cause of Action Institute, Anastasia G. Weis, Jay L. Levine, Matthew A. Campbell, Christopher J. Cullen, Robert M. Rader, Timothy M. Broas, Winston & Strawn LLP, Daniel Church Jordan, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, James Miller Rosenthal, Wilkinson Walsh + Eskovitz, PLLC, Thomas M. Stimson, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, Amir Cameron Tayrani, Miguel A. Estrada, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Washington, DC, Ashley Cummings, Hunton & Williams, Atlanta, GA, Ben M. Germana, Herbert M. Wachtell, Jeffrey M. Wintner, Steven M. Barna, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Bradley E. Lerman, Lauren J. Bernstein, David E. Mollon, Winston & Strawn, C. Ian Anderson, Chadbourne & Parke LLP, James Lewis Brochin, Theodore V. Wells, Jr., Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Anand Agneshwar, Pro Hac Vice, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Lawrence Edward Savell, Herbert Smith New York LLP, New York, NY, Cindy L. Gantnier, Patricia M. Schwarzschild, Richard H. Burton, Cheryl Grissom Ragsdale, Christy L. Henderson, Michele B. Scarponi, Hunton & Williams, Murray R. Garnick, Altria Group, Inc., Richmond, VA, Dan K. Webb, Elizabeth D. Jensen, Jeffrey Wagner, Kevin J. Narko, Ricardo E. Ugarte, Thomas J. Frederick, Winston & Strawn, Chicago, IL, Renee D. Honigberg, Kirkland & Ellis, LLP, Chicago, IL, Floyd Elwood Boone, Jr., Bowles Rice LLP, Charleston, WV, Jeanna Maria Beck, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Melissa Marglous Merlin, Husch Blackwell Sanders LLP, Michael B. Minton, Thompson Coburn, LLP, St. Louis, MO, Seth Barrett Tillman, Department of Law, Ireland, Andrew Maher, Allens Arthur Robinson, Australia, George C. Lombardi, Winston & Strawn, LLP, Jessica L. Zellner, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER #92 – REMAND

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, United States District Judge Litigation in this case has persisted for over two decades. In 2006, Judge Gladys Kessler, after conducting a nine-month bench trial, issued a thorough opinion in which she found that the defendant manufacturers had conspired to violate and in fact did violate the substantive provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1962. See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 27 (D.D.C. 2006) ("J. Kessler Op."). Section 1964 of RICO gives the Court "jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders ... making due provision for the rights of innocent persons." See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a). Judge Kessler issued a remedial order that set out specific remedies to prevent and restrain future RICO violations by the defendant tobacco manufacturers, including an injunction requiring the defendants to issue "corrective statements." See J. Kessler Op. at 27; 938-41. The D.C. Circuit "largely affirm[ed] the remedial order ... and remand[ed] to the district court regarding only four discrete issues." See United States v. Philip Morris, 566 F.3d 1095, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2009). One of those four discrete issues is the implementation of one remedy: the corrective statements the defendants must include in their retail point-of-sale ("POS") displays. The D.C. Circuit "vacate[d] the remedial order as it regards point-of-sale displays and remand[ed] for the district court to make due provision for the rights of innocent third parties." Id. This is the single remaining issue on remand before this Court.¹

I. BACKGROUND

In her 2006 omnibus opinion, Judge Kessler determined that "an injunction ordering Defendants to issue corrective statements is appropriate and necessary to prevent and restrain them from making fraudulent public statements on smoking and health matters in the future." See J. Kessler Op. at 926. Judge Kessler ordered that the corrective statements be disseminated through newspapers, television, advertisements, onsets in cigarette packages, in retail displays, and on the manufacturers' corporate websites. See id. at 928. The corrective statements disseminated in retail displays (the POS remedy) would require retailers that participate in the defendants' Retail Merchandising Program – that is, those that contract to display the manufacturers' in-store advertising – to display signs containing corrective statements. See United States v. Philip Morris, 566 F.3d at 1141. The Remedial Order set out the specifications for the corrective statements; specifically, it dictated that the POS corrective statements be publicized in countertop displays and header displays. See J. Kessler Op. at 939-40.²

The D.C. Circuit vacated Judge Kessler's remedial order as it pertained to the POS displays only, finding that "the district court exceeded its authority by failing to consider the rights of retailers and crafting an injunction that works a potentially serious detriment to innocent persons not parties to or otherwise heard in the district court proceedings." See United States v. Philip Morris, 566 F.3d at 1141-42 : see also 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a). The court reasoned that the "[r]etailers affected by this order – none of whom were involved in the litigation in any way – did not receive notice of this remedy or an opportunity to present evidence or arguments to the district court regarding the impact the injunction would have on their businesses. Nor does it appear that the district court independently considered the impact of this program on affected retailers," a part of the Court's obligations under Section 1964(a). See United States v. Philip Morris, 566 F.3d at 1141.

Upon vacating the remedial order as it pertained to the POS displays, the D.C. Circuit instructed this Court "to evaluate and ‘mak[e] due provision for the rights of innocent persons,’ either by abandoning this part of the remedial order or by crafting a new version reflecting the rights of third parties." See United States v. Philip Morris, 566 F.3d at 1142 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) ). In other words, the Court may now order "some form of a point-of-sale display injunction" if it finds that it "is still appropriate after considering the rights of third parties and existing contracts." See id. After considering a joint status report [Dkt. No. 6261] from the parties, this Court decided that an evidentiary hearing would be necessary for the parties to adequately present their legal and factual arguments with respect to a "new version" of how the POS remedy would be implemented, and to allow third party retailers the opportunity to air their concerns. See May 21, 2019 Order [Dkt. No. 6283]. The Court's immediate task, therefore, is to determine the scope of that evidentiary hearing. A status conference was held on June 24, 2019, during which the parties expressed disagreement about the meaning and import of the D.C. Circuit's instructions. The Court then ordered the parties to brief their interpretations of those instructions regarding the scope of the evidentiary hearing. It turns now to an evaluation of the arguments the parties presented at the status conference and in their filings.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Parties' Arguments

The defendant manufacturers assert that the D.C. Circuit vacated the POS remedy in toto. Thus, they maintain that the Court's task is expansive: it must essentially begin at square one, allowing the parties to relitigate Judge Kessler's legal conclusions and factual findings. Specifically, defendants argue that the Court must evaluate its own statutory authority under Section 1964(a) and balance the equities before issuing an injunction. See Manufacturers' Opening Brief on the Scope of the Evidentiary Hearing ("Def. Op. Br.") [Dkt. No. 6293] at 2, 15-16.³ According to the defendants, the Court also must determine the benefit that the proposed POS remedy would provide, so that any such benefit may be weighed against "the burdens the remedy would impose on innocent third parties." See id. at 2. Such a calculation is necessary, the defendants argue, for the Court to determine whether it should impose a new POS remedy or whether such remedy should be abandoned altogether. See id. at 5; Manufacturers' Reply Brief ("Def. Reply") [Dkt. No. 6303] at 4. In evaluating the propriety of the POS remedy, the defendants maintain that the Court must consider current information – updated from the point in time that Judge Kessler made her factual findings and announced her legal conclusions – to determine anew whether the POS remedy will prevent and restrain future RICO violations. See Def. Op. Br. at 5-10.

The plaintiffs urge a more limited approach.⁴ In contrast to the defendants' argument, the plaintiffs contend that "[t]he D.C. Circuit's narrow remand does not authorize, much less require, this Court to consider or reconsider the many issues advanced by the manufacturers and retailers that are not specific to the retailers, such as whether the corrective statement remedy at retail points-of-sale is necessary and appropriate to prevent and restrain future violations of the RICO statute by the manufacturers." See Plaintiffs' Response Brief ("Pl. Response") [Dkt. No. 6300] at 7-8. They maintain that the question to be considered at the hearing instead is "whether Plaintiffs' proposed implementation of the corrective statement remedy at retail points-of-sale will affect retailers' rights, and if so, whether the order can be tailored to make ‘due provision’ for them." See id....