United States v. PIMA CTY. COMMUNITY COL. DIST.
| Decision Date | 22 March 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV 75-280-TUC-WCF.,CIV 75-280-TUC-WCF. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. PIMA COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
William C. Smitherman, U.S. Atty., Tucson, Ariz., J. Stanley Pottinger, Asst. Atty. Gen., Thomas M. Keeling, Daniel Bell, II, Steven H. Gurwin, Attys., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.
Charles L. Chester, Law Offices of Ryley, Carlock & Ralston, Phoenix, Ariz., Ronald J. Stolkin, Stolkin, Weiss & Tandy, Robert O. Lesher, Lesher, Kimble, Rucker & Lindamood P. C., Tucson, Ariz., for defendants.
On December 19, 1975, the Attorney General filed suit on behalf of the United States against the defendant College District, the District's Governing Board, and certain administrators of the District. The complaint alleges that the actions of the defendants ". . . constitute a pattern and practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of the rights, secured by Title VII, not to be discriminated against in retaliation for exercising or attempting to exercise rights protected by Title VII".
The complaint further alleges that the Court has jurisdiction on the basis of Title 42, United States Code, Section 2000e-6(b) which authorizes so-called pattern and practice suits and Title 28, United States Code, Section 1345 which is the general jurisdictional grant to the district courts to entertain actions specifically authorized by statute.
The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on the grounds that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action under Title 42, United States Code, Section 2000e-6. The sole issue before this Court appears to be one of first impression: Does Title 42, United States Code, Section 2000e-6 presently authorize the Attorney General to bring a pattern and practice suit against a government, government agency or political subdivision such as the College District?
The statute is unequivocal. Since March 24, 1974, the sole federal agency authorized to bring a pattern and practice suit against an employer, either private or public, is the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. "Effective two years after March 24, 1972, the functions of the Attorney General under this section shall be transferred to the Commission, together with such personnel, property, records and unexpended balances of appropriations. . . ." Title 42, United States Code, Section 2000e-6(c). (Emphasis added) The "function" of the Attorney General under Section 2000e-6 was to bring pattern and practice suits. Subsection (c) clearly relieves the Attorney General of that authority and vests it in the Commission. Subsection (c) refers exclusively to that section and does not in any manner alter the enforcement scheme set out in the remainder of Title VII where the Attorney General is given authority to act.
Subsection (c) was added to Title VII by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. The language of subsection (c) was essentially unchanged from the time it was first proposed in Senate Bill 2515 until the Act was finally adopted by the House and Senate. See SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR, COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (1972). The vesting of all pattern and practice suit authority in the Commission is not contradicted by any other provisions of Title VII. Title 42, United States Code, Section 2000e-5 provides that where the Commission has been unable to reach a conciliation agreement with a respondent, after an individual has filed an employment discrimination charge, then the Commission shall, in the case of a public sector respondent, refer the case to the Attorney General for the prosecution of a civil action on behalf of that individual. Authority for the Attorney General to act on his own initiative, such as claimed in this suit, is lacking. Title 42, United States Code, Section 2000e-6 authorizes suit where not a single charge of discrimination has been brought but, rather, where a pattern or practice in employment policy by an employer is alleged. An action brought pursuant to Section 2000e-6 is thus broader in scope. The Committee Report of both Houses of Congress, on various versions of the bill finally enacted, expressed the intent to centralize the handling of pattern and practice suits in a single agency for enforcement—the Commission. H.R.Rep.No. 238, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1971); S.Rep.No. 415, 92 Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29 (1971); U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1972, p. 2137. The Attorney General, in an attempt to create ambiguity or conflict where none exists, would have the Court rely on the remarks of several legislators made in floor debate....
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United States v. City of Yonkers
...L.Ed.2d 41 (1979); with id. at 393 ("entire pattern or practice jurisdiction" transferred); and United States v. Pima County Community College District, 409 F.Supp. 1061, 1062-63 (D.Ariz. 1976) (authority transferred altogether; only Commission can bring pattern-or-practice suit, even again......
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US v. BD. OF ED. OF GARFIELD HIGHTS. CITY SCH. DIST., Civ. A. No. C75-689.
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