United States v. Pimentel

Decision Date17 February 2022
Docket Number20-2024
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. KADEEM PIMENTEL, Defendant, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]

Jessica P. Thrall, Assistant Federal Public Defender, on brief for appellant.

Nathaniel R. Mendell, Acting United States Attorney, and Donald C. Lockhart, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.

Before Howard, Chief Judge, Lipez and Gelpí, Circuit Judges.

GELPÍ, Circuit Judge.

On August 31, 2018, around 2:30 a.m., officers of the Haverhill Police Department ("HPD") executed a no-knock search warrant for "88 Fountain St. 2nd floor," following reports of shots discharged hours before. The police found two shotguns and related paraphernalia in the bedroom of defendant-appellant Kadeem Pimentel ("Pimentel"), which was on the third floor of the building. Pimentel filed a motion to suppress, arguing, inter alia, that the police exceeded the scope of the warrant by searching his third-floor bedroom. The district court denied Pimentel's motion, finding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. Pimentel subsequently pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 26 months, followed by a three-year supervised release term. He appeals the denial of his suppression motion, contending that the search violated the Fourth Amendment and fell outside of the good-faith exception articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). We affirm.

I. Background[1]

The HPD received a phone call on the evening of August 30, 2018, indicating that shots had been fired at Pimentel close to 88 Fountain Street. Pimentel reported to the police arriving at the scene that, while he was sitting in a truck, a man in a passing car shot him. Pimentel had bloody bruises on his right thigh and the right leg of his shorts was shredded. While he received medical treatment, however, a neighbor approached the officers and provided a video of the incident indicating that the gunshot was in fact fired from the same truck in which Pimentel had been sitting. Confronted about the video, Pimentel revised his original account and claimed instead that he had been shot through the front side window by another passenger of the truck. The police subsequently questioned the owner of the truck, who stated that Pimentel himself had fired the shot and that he regularly carried a long gun in his waistband. The officers also noted that Pimentel's injuries were consistent with a downward shot fired from his waist. Based on the truck owner's description, the police also determined that the weapon was likely a sawed-off shotgun.

That evening, an HPD officer applied for and received a no-knock search warrant for 88 Fountain Street to look for shotguns and related property, including "any items that pertain to firearms and proof of residency." Regarding the person, place, or location to be searched, the warrant specified that "88 Fountain St. 2nd floor is a 3 story, multi-unit building, with a basement, numbered 88 on the left side of the front deck . . . which is occupied by and/or in possession of Kadeem Dashawn Pimentel, Maya Garrow [Pimentel's girlfriend], Diana Pimentel [Pimentel's aunt], and Phebe Pimentel [Pimentel's grandmother]." The notation "2nd floor" was not included in the original warrant application; rather, it was added in handwriting at the request of the issuing judge's clerk, who had sought clarification regarding where in the building Pimentel lived. This notation was based on HPD records of Pimentel's residence based on prior police encounters with him. The affidavit supporting the warrant application similarly stated that Pimentel lived on the second floor and specified that the HPD requested a warrant for "88 Fountain St, 2nd floor." The approved warrant also authorized a search for property "on the person or in the possession of . . . Kadeem Dashawn Pimentel, Maya Garrow, Diana Pimentel, and Phebe Pimentel."

88 Fountain Street is a three-story building that is jointly owned by Pimentel's grandfather and great-uncle. For most of his life, Pimentel had lived at 88 Fountain Street. Shortly prior to the search, he moved from the second floor of the building to the third floor, where his aunt Diana and her boyfriend also resided. At the time of the search, Pimentel's great-uncle resided on the first floor, while other members of Pimentel's family, including Pimentel's mother and grandmother, resided on the second floor. Each floor receives its own utility bill and is equipped with a separate living space, accessible through a door with a lock, located off a common hallway or stairwell. At some point in the past, the Pimentels had rented out the third floor to a different family who attended their church. A common staircase at the back of the building also connects the floors via rear doors, which are not always kept locked. The exterior of the building has three doorbells and mailboxes corresponding to the three floors of the building, although Diana Pimentel's name remained listed on the second-floor mailbox despite her residence on the third floor.

Around 2:30 a.m. on August 31, approximately ten HPD officers executed the search warrant, breaching both the front door of the building and the locked entrance door of the second floor. The officers secured the residents of the second floor, apart from Pimentel's bedridden great-grandmother, in the second-floor living room. Subsequently, an HPD officer entered the back stairwell of the building through an open door in the second-floor kitchen. The officer encountered Pimentel halfway between the second and third floors, heading downstairs. Pimentel informed the officer that his girlfriend, Garrow, was also upstairs. The officer then directed Pimentel to join the others in the second-floor living room. HPD officers proceeded to enter the third floor and brought Garrow and two other residents (Diana Pimentel and her boyfriend) to the second floor. After being advised of his Miranda rights, Pimentel acknowledged that he had two shotguns in his bedroom, which the officers understood to be on the third floor based on the stairwell encounter with him and Garrow's presence there. Subsequently, officers searched the third floor and recovered two shotguns and related paraphernalia from Pimentel's bedroom. None of the residents of the third floor had a firearms license, and none consented to a search of the third floor.

Pimentel was subsequently indicted in federal court for being a felon in possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Thereupon, he moved to suppress the items seized in the third-floor search, arguing that the search warrant had authorized only a search of the unit's second floor, and that the officers had violated the Fourth Amendment by searching the third floor.[2] Pimentel did not dispute that the police had established probable cause, or otherwise assert that the warrant was facially deficient.

The district court denied the motion. It agreed with Pimentel's argument that the second- and third-floor apartments were distinct units, but nevertheless found that the officers acted in good faith in searching the third-floor bedroom, relying on the reasoning of this court in United States v. Woodbury, 511 F.3d 93 (1st Cir. 2007). In so finding, the court bypassed what it called the "complex issue" of whether the warrant exclusively authorized a search of the second floor. Rather, it determined that, even if the warrant was so limited, the officers nevertheless acted in a good-faith belief that the same authorized them to search Pimentel's third-floor bedroom.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Pimentel challenges the denial of his suppression motion, arguing that the third-floor search was unauthorized by the warrant and that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is inapplicable. Upon close examination, we hold otherwise. On the record before us, the context in which the search was conducted -- combined with the textual ambiguity present on the face of the warrant -- is sufficient to conclude that the search was carried out in good faith within the purview of Leon.

A. Standard of Review

When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we assess factual findings for clear error and evaluate legal issues de novo. United States v. Tiru-Plaza, 766 F.3d 111, 114-15 (1st Cir. 2014). "In assessing these legal conclusions, however, we also give appropriate weight to the inferences drawn by the district court and the on-scene officers, recognizing that they possess the advantage of immediacy and familiarity with the witnesses and events." Id. at 115. Moreover, "we will uphold a district court's decision to deny a suppression motion provided that any reasonable view of the evidence supports the decision." United States v. Ferreras, 192 F.3d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. García, 983 F.2d 1160, 1167 (1st Cir. 1993)).

B. The Good-Faith Exception

The Fourth Amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable searches and seizures" protects against unwarranted government intrusions into one's person and property. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The exclusionary rule provides that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is ordinarily remedied by suppression. See United States v Brunette, 256 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2001). However, because suppression can impose a significant social burden, the exclusionary rule is not ironclad. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907. Instead, courts must consider "the flagrancy of the police misconduct at issue" in deciding...

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