United States v. Pipefitters Local Union No. 562

Citation434 F.2d 1116
Decision Date17 July 1970
Docket NumberNo. 19466.,19466.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. PIPEFITTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 562, etc., et al., Appellants.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

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Murry L. Randall, St. Louis, Mo., for appellants and filed brief. The following attorneys were on the brief with Mr. Randall: Richard L. Daly, James F. Nangle, Jr., John L. Boeger, Cordell Siegel, and Norman S. London, St. Louis, Mo.

Edgar N. Brown, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellee; Will Wilson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice and Jerome M. Feit, and Robert J. Rosthal, Attys., Dept. of Justice and Daniel Bartlett, Jr., U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., were on the brief with Mr. Brown.

Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, Chief Judge, and BLACKMUN and HEANEY, Circuit Judges.

VAN OOSTERHOUT, Chief Judge.

Defendants Pipefitters Local Union No. 562, Lawrence L. Callanan, John L. Lawler and George Seaton were tried by a jury on indictment charging them with conspiracy under 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 to violate 18 U.S.C.A. § 610 which prohibits labor organizations from making contributions and expenditures to candidates for federal offices. Each defendant was found guilty by the jury. Under instructions given, the jury determined a willful violation of § 610 was not contemplated. The union was fined $5,000. The individual defendants, who were officers of Local 562, were each sentenced to one year imprisonment and fined $1,000. All defendants have taken a timely appeal from their conviction and sentence.

As grounds for reversal, all defendants urge prejudicial errors were committed by the trial court in the following respects:

I. Failure to sustain defendants' motions for acquittal made at the close of the government's case and renewed at the close of all of the evidence based upon the grounds: (1) That the evidence introduced in the case was insufficient to sustain a conviction. (2) There was a material and prejudicial variance between the allegations of the indictment and the proof offered.

II. Failure to hold that § 610 as construed and applied by the court violates rights guaranteed defendants by the First, Fifth, Sixth and Seventeenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

III. Failure to hold that the provision in the jury verdict that a willful violation of § 610 was not contemplated requires an acquittal of all defendants.

We affirm the convictions for the reasons hereinafter set out.

BACKGROUND.

Section 610 to the extent here pertinent reads:

"It is unlawful for any * * * labor organization to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices, * * *"

The origin, legislative history and purpose of § 610 is discussed in detail in United States v. C. I. O., 335 U.S. 106, 68 S.Ct. 1349, 92 L.Ed. 1849, and in United States v. International Union United Auto Aircraft and Agr. Implement Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 77 S.Ct. 529, 1 L.Ed.2d 563. It is pointed out that Congress in 1907 enacted a statute making it unlawful for any corporation to make a money contribution in connection with an election for federal office in furtherance of the public interest for free elections. Such prohibition was later extended to labor organizations and this legislation in its present form is found in § 610. With respect to corporations, the Court in United States v. C. I. O. states:

"This legislation seems to have been motivated by two considerations. First, the necessity for destroying the influence over elections which corporations exercised through financial contribution. Second, the feeling that corporate officials had no moral right to use corporate funds for contribution to political parties without the consent of the stockholders." 335 U.S. 106, 113, 68 S.Ct. 1349, 1353.

With respect to extending the legislation to labor organizations, the Court in the same case observes:

"Its legislative history indicates congressional belief that labor unions should then be put under the same restraints as had been imposed upon corporations. It was felt that the influence which labor unions exercised over elections through monetary expenditures should be minimized, and that it was unfair to individual union members to permit the union leadership to make contributions from general union funds to a political party which the individual member might oppose." 335 U.S. 106, 115, 68 S.Ct. 1349, 1353.

Mr. Justice Rutledge, in reviewing the legislative history of the extension of the Corrupt Practices Act to labor organizations, indicates:

"In one important respect the history again is clear, namely, that the sponsors and proponents had in mind three principal objectives.
"These were: (1) To reduce what had come to be regarded in the light of recent experience as the undue and disproportionate influence of labor unions upon federal elections; (2) to preserve the purity of such elections and of official conduct ensuing from the choices made in them against the use of aggregated wealth by union as well as corporate entities; and (3) to protect union members holding political views contrary to those supported by the union from use of funds contributed by them to promote acceptance of those opposing views. Shortly, these objects may be designated as the `undue influence,\' `purity of elections,\' and `minority protection\' objectives. These are obviously interrelated, but not identical. And the differences as well as their combination become important for deciding the scope of the section\'s coverage and its validity in specific application." 335 U.S. 106, 134-135, 68 S.Ct. 1349, 1363.

THE MOTIONS TO ACQUIT.

Defendants' timely motions to acquit were based on two grounds: (1) A material variance between the allegations of the indictment and the proof, and (2) the insufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions. Defendants urge that the indictment was insufficiently clear with respect to the source of the funds used in the conspiracy charge. Such contentions lack merit.

The indictment is lengthy and elaborate. Sixty-one overt acts are charged. The indictment charged that the defendants established the Pipefitters Voluntary Political, Educational, Legislative, Charity and Defense Fund, hereinafter called the fund, to have the appearance of being a wholly independent entity separate from Local 562 and thereby conceal the fact that Local 562 would make contributions and expenditures in connection with certain elections. The indictment outlined defendants' complicated scheme to conceal the true nature of their activity and concluded by alleging that such activity amounted to an unlawful use of union funds contrary to § 610.

In United States v. Lewis Food Co., 9 Cir., 366 F.2d 710, 713, the court holds, "the allegation in the indictment that the corporation made an `expenditure' for the stated purpose, necessarily infers an allegation that general corporate funds were used."

The failure of the indictment to allege that the payments to the fund were involuntary is not fatal. The gist of the government's claim as reflected by the indictment is that the money in the fund is in truth and in fact money belonging to Local 562.1 If such allegation is established by the evidence, the issue of whether the payment to the fund is voluntary or involuntary is not controlling.

Of course as observed by the court in its instructions, the issue of whether the payments to the fund were voluntary is relevant and material on the issue of whether the fund is the property of Local 562. Other considerations such as the intention of the donors as to ownership and control of the fund also bear upon the issue.

We now pass to the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party prevailing in the jury trial, here the government. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680. When the evidence is so viewed, we find ample evidentiary support for the jury verdict.

The essential elements of a § 610 offense are (1) contribution or expenditure, (2) by a labor organization, (3) for the purpose of active electioneering (4) in connection with an election for named federal offices described in the statute. It is virtually undisputed that elements (1), (3) and (4) are clearly established. The controversy relates to whether the contributions or expenditures were made by a labor organization. A labor organization is defined in § 610. Local 562 clearly fits the description of a labor organization. Thus if the numerous substantial contributions made to federal office candidates were made by Local 562, the contributions were made by a labor organization. On the other hand if the voluntary fund is a separate and distinct entity and it made the contributions, no violation of § 610 would exist as the voluntary fund as a separate entity would not constitute a labor organization.

Contributions alleged to be voluntary by members of Local 562 and members of other unions working within its jurisdiction aggregating $1,230,968 were made during the indictment period (1963-1968). The proceeds of such collections were maintained in a separate bank account of the fund. Disbursements out of the fund for aid of candidates for federal office during the indictment period aggregated $151,412. There is substantial evidence to support a jury finding that the fund was not a bona fide separate and distinct entity but was in fact a device set up to circumvent the provisions of § 610 and that the fund constituted union money. We will not attempt to set out the voluminous evidence, much of which is conflicting,...

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