United States v. Pollard, 36912.

Decision Date16 March 1959
Docket NumberNo. 36912.,36912.
Citation171 F. Supp. 474
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Marmion POLLARD, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

Fred W. Kaess, U. S. Atty., George E. Woods, Chief Asst. U. S. Atty., Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff.

Kermit G. Bailer, Detroit, Mich., for defendant.

LEVIN, District Judge.

The defendant, Marmion Pollard, having waived indictment, the Government instituted this prosecution on a three-count information charging him, under Section 2113(d), Title 18 U.S.C., with the attempted robbery of the Chene-Medbury Branch of the Bank of the Commonwealth and the 24th-Michigan Branch of the Detroit Bank & Trust Company on May 21, 1958, and the attempted robbery on June 3, 1958, of the Woodrow Wilson-Davison Branch of the Bank of the Commonwealth. These banks, members of the Federal Reserve System and insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, are located in Detroit, Michigan.

On arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty before another judge of this Court. Subsequently, upon advice of counsel, he moved to set aside the guilty plea on the ground that he was insane at the time he committed the acts upon which the prosecution was based. The Court, with the acquiescence of the Government, permitted the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, and a plea of not guilty was entered. The case was then assigned to me for trial.

Prior to trial, I was advised that a psychiatric report of a psychiatrist retained by the defendant indicated that the defendant was, at the time of the offenses, suffering from a diseased mind which produced an irresistible impulse to commit the criminal acts. Subsequently, a report was submitted to the Government by each of two psychiatrists who had examined the defendant at its request. These reports, which were made available to me, agreed with the conclusion of the defendant's psychiatrist. It then appeared to me that it would be in the interest of justice to secure a psychiatric evaluation of defendant's state of mind based upon more extensive study. I was particularly desirous of having such a study made inasmuch as the psychiatric reports submitted to me were based on interviews that did not exceed a maximum of two hours with each of the three psychiatrists. I, thereupon, on October 10, 1958, entered an order that the defendant be sent to the United States Medical Center at Springfield, Missouri. After a study of thirty days, the Medical Center submitted a report which was introduced in evidence. The gist of the report may be set out as follows:

During the period under inquiry, "a dissociative state may have existed and that his defendant's actions may not have been consciously motivated.
"It is, therefore, our opinion that during the period in question, Pollard, while intellectually capable of knowing right from wrong, may have been governed by unconscious drives which made it impossible for him to adhere to the right.
"* * * We readily acknowledge our inability either to marshal sufficient objective facts or formulate a completely satisfactory theory on which to base a solid opinion as to subject's responsibility during the period in question."1

The defendant elected to be tried by the Court without a jury. During the trial, the following facts appeared:

The defendant is an intelligent, twenty-nine year old man. In 1949, he married and, during the next four years, three sons and a daughter were born of this marriage. He was apparently a well-adjusted, happy, family man. In 1952, he became a member of the Police Department of the City of Detroit and continued to work as a policeman until he was apprehended for the acts for which he is now being prosecuted. In April, 1956, his wife and infant daughter were brutally killed in an unprovoked attack by a drunken neighbor.

On May 21, 1958, one day before he remarried, at about 11:00 A.M., defendant entered the 24th-Michigan Branch of the Detroit Bank & Trust Company. He paused for a few moments to look over the bank and then proceeded to an enclosure in which a bank official was at work. He told the official, whom he believed to be the manager, that he wanted to open a savings account. He then walked through a swinging gate into the enclosure, sat down at the desk, pulled out a gun and pointed it at the official. He ordered the official to call a teller. When the teller arrived, the defendant handed a brown paper grocery bag to him and told him to fill it with money. While it was being filled, defendant kept the bank official covered. The teller filled the bag with money as ordered and turned it over to the defendant. Thereupon, defendant ordered the bank official to accompany him to the exit. As both the defendant and bank official approached the exit, the official suddenly wrapped his arms around the defendant, who then dropped the bag and fled from the bank and escaped.

About 4:00 P.M., on the same day, he entered the Chene-Medbury Branch of the Bank of the Commonwealth and walked to a railing behind which a bank employee was sitting. He pointed his gun at the man and hold him to sit quietly. The employee, however, did not obey this order but instead raised an alarm, whereupon the defendant ran from the bank and again escaped.

After the defendant was apprehended by the Detroit Police under circumstances which I shall later relate, he admitted to agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that after his abortive attempts to rob the two banks, he decided to rob a third bank and actually proceeded on the same day to an unnamed bank he had selected but decided not to make the attempt when he discovered that the bank was "too wide open"—had too much window area so that the possibility of apprehension was enhanced.

On June 3, at about 3:00 P.M., the defendant entered the Woodrow Wilson-Davison Branch of the Bank of the Commonwealth and went directly to an enclosure behind which a male and female employee were sitting at desks facing each other. Defendant held his gun under a jacket which he carried over his right arm. He ordered the woman employee to come out from behind the railing. In doing so, she grasped the edge of her desk. Defendant, in the belief that she may have pushed an alarm button, decided to leave but ordered the woman to accompany him out of the bank. When they reached the street, he told her to walk ahead of him, but not to attract attention. Defendant noticed a police car approaching the bank and waited until it passed him, then ran across an empty lot to his car and again escaped.

On June 11, 1958, he attempted to hold up a grocery market. He was thwarted in the attempt when the proprietor screamed and, becoming frightened, the defendant fled. In so doing, he abandoned his automobile in back of the market where he had parked it during the holdup attempt. Routinely, this car was placed under surveillance and later when the defendant, dressed in his Detroit Police Officer's uniform, attempted to get in it, he was arrested by detectives of the Detroit Police Force.

After his apprehension, the defendant confessed to eleven other robberies, or attempted robberies.

The three psychiatrists who submitted the written reports, all qualified and respected members of their profession, testified that in their opinion the defendant, at the time he committed the criminal acts, knew the difference between right and wrong and knew that the acts he committed were wrong but was suffering from a "traumatic neurosis" or "dissociative reaction", characterized by moods of depression and severe feelings of guilt, induced by the traumatic effect of the death of his wife and child and his belief that he was responsible for their deaths because by his absence from home he left them exposed to the actions of the crazed, drunken neighbor. They further stated that he had an unconscious desire to be punished by society to expiate these guilt feelings and that the governing power of his mind was so destroyed or impaired that he was unable to resist the commission of the criminal acts. In their opinion, however, the defendant was not then, nor is he now, psychotic or committable to a mental institution.

Three of defendant's fellow police officers, called as defense witnesses, testified that during the period in which the defendant committed the criminal acts he had a tendency to be late for work; that at times he was despondent; and that he occasionally seemed to be lost in thought and did not promptly respond to questions directed to him. One of the officers testified that on one occasion, he repeatedly beat the steering wheel of the police car in which they were riding, while at the same time reiterating the name of his murdered wife. However, none of them found his conduct or moods to be of such consequence that they believed it necessary to report the defendant to a superior officer.

Defendant's present wife, who impressed me as an intelligent person, testified that on two occasions defendant suddenly, and for no reason apparent to her, lapsed into crying spells and that he talked to her once or twice about committing suicide. She also testified that during one such period of depression he pointed a gun at himself; that she became frightened and called the police; that the police came, relieved him of his gun, and took him to the precinct police station; and that after his release he appeared jovial and acted as if nothing had happened. Defendant's brother-in-law stated that the defendant had always been a very happy person but that he became noticeably despondent after the death of his wife and child and expressed a desire to commit suicide because he now no longer had a reason for living.

A police lieutenant of the Detroit Police Department testified that the defendant's police work, during the period with which we are now concerned, as evidenced by his efficiency rating and his written duty reports, was, if anything, more effective than his service prior to the death of...

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3 cases
  • State v. Prewitt
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • March 28, 1969
    ...that the function of the jury becomes of even greater importance in cases where insanity is raised as a defense. In United States v. Pollard, D.C., 171 F.Supp. 474, the court stated the basis for this reasoning as "The psychiatrist merely expounds on the theoretical and clinical aspects of ......
  • Pollard v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • October 6, 1960
    ...researched opinion of the Chief Judge reversing the conviction in the above case. I follow the fact findings of the District Judge (D.C., 171 F.Supp. 474) and agree that they substantially sustain his conclusion that the Appellant was sane when he committed the crimes charged. Particularly ......
  • State v. Cano
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • February 1, 1968
    ...that the function of the jury becomes of even greater importance in cases where insanity is raised as a defense. In United States v. Pollard, D.C., 171 F.Supp. 474, the court stated the basis for this reasoning as "The psychiatrist merely expounds on the theoretical and clinical aspects of ......
5 books & journal articles
  • § 25.04 Definitions of "Insanity"
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Criminal Law (CAP) 2022 Title Chapter 25 Insanity
    • Invalid date
    ...to prove when dealing with the subtle and complex operations of the human mind").[84] Id. at 619.[85] See United States v. Pollard, 171 F. Supp. 474, 478 (E.D. Mich. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, Pollard v. United States, 282 F.2d 450 (6th Cir. 1960).[86] Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021,......
  • §25.04 DEFINITIONS OF "INSANITY"
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Criminal Law (CAP) 2018 Title Chapter 25 Insanity
    • Invalid date
    ...to prove when dealing with the subtle and complex operations of the human mind").[84] . Id. at 619.[85] . See United States v. Pollard, 171 F. Supp. 474, 478 (E.D. Mich. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, Pollard v. United States, 282 F.2d 450 (6th Cir. 1960).[86] . Robinson, Note 71, supra, at......
  • § 25.06 ABOLITION OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Criminal Law (CAP) 2018 Title Chapter 25 Insanity
    • Invalid date
    ...do not place the burden of persuasion on the prosecution in insanity claims. See § 25.02[E], supra.[139] . United States v. Pollard, 171 F. Supp. 474, 479 (E.D. Mich. 1959).[140] . Gino C. Speranza, The Medico-Legal Conflict over Mental Responsibility, 13 Green Bag 123, 125 (1901).[141] . M......
  • TABLE OF CASES
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Criminal Law (CAP) 2018 Title Table of Cases
    • Invalid date
    ...v., 827 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1987), 344 Polizzi, United States v., 545 F. Supp. 2d 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), 329 Pollard, United States v., 171 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Mich. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, Pollard v. United States, 282 F.2d 450 (6th Cir. 1960), 329, 330, 338 Pomeroy v. State, 94 Ind. 96 ......
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