United States v. Pomponio, No. 75-1667

• Court: United States Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Citation: 429 U.S. 10,50 L.Ed.2d 12,97 S.Ct. 22
• Docket Number: No. 75-1667
• Decision Date: 12 October 1976
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. Peter POMPONIO et al

50 L.Ed.2d 12 97 S.Ct. 22 429 U.S. 10 UNITED STATES

v.

Peter POMPONIO et al.

No. 75-1667. Oct. 12, 1976.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 29, 1976. See 429 U.S. 987, 97 S.Ct. 510.

PER CURIAM.

After a jury trial, respondents were convicted of willfully filing false income tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1).¹ Based on its reading of United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 93 S.Ct. 2008, 36 L.Ed.2d 941 (1973), the Court of Appeals held that the jury was incorrectly instructed concerning willfulness, and remanded for a new trial. 528 F.2d 247 (1975). The United States petitioned for certiorari. We reverse.

The respondents were charged with falsifying tax returns in two principal ways: (1) they allegedly caused corporations they controlled to report payments to them as loans, when they knew the payments were really taxable dividends; and (2) they allegedly claimed partnership losses as deductions knowing that the losses were properly attributable to

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a corporation. Their defense was that these transactions were correctly reported, or at least that they thought so at the time.

The jury was instructed that respondents were not guilty of violating § 7206(1) unless they had signed the tax returns knowing them to be false,² and had done so willfully. A willful act was defined in the instructions as one done "voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something which the law forbids, that is to say with (the) bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law." Finally, the jury was instructed that "(g)ood motive alone is never a defense where the act done or omitted is a crime," and that consequently motive was irrelevant except as it bore on intent. The Court of Appeals held this final instruction improper because "the statute at hand requires a finding of a bad purpose or evil motive." 528 F.2d, at 249. In so holding, the Court of Appeals incorrectly assumed that the reference to an "evil motive" in United States v. Bishop, supra, and prior cases meant something more than the specific intent to violate the law described in the trial judge's instruction.

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In Bishop we held that the term "willfully" has the same meaning in the misdemeanor and felony sections of the Revenue Code, and that it requires more than a showing of careless disregard for the truth.³ We did not, however, hold that the term requires proof of any motive other than an intentional violation of a known legal duty. We explained the meaning of willfulness in § 7206 and related statutes:

"The Court, in fact, has recognized that the word 'willfully' in these statutes generally connotes a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty. It has formulated the requirement of willfulness as 'bad faith or evil intent,' (United States v.) Murdock, 290 U.S. (389,) 398, 54 S.Ct. (223), at 226 (78 L.Ed. 381), or 'evil motive and want of justification in view of all the financial circumstances of the taxpayer,' Spies (v. United States ), 317 U.S. (492,) 498, 63 S.Ct. (364), at 368 (87 L.Ed. 418), or knowledge that the taxpayer 'should have reported more income than he did.' Sansone (v. United States ), 380 U.S. (343,) 353, 85 S.Ct. (1004) at 1011 (13 L.Ed.2d 882). See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 221, 81 S.Ct. 1052, 6 L.Ed.2d 246 (1961); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 471, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969)." 412...