United States v. Ponder, 72-2773 Summary Calendar.

• Decision Date: 12 April 1973
• Docket Number: No. 72-2773 Summary Calendar.,72-2773 Summary Calendar.
• Citation: 475 F.2d 37
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America and Elmer W. Holmes, Internal Revenue Agent, Internal Revenue Service, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. L. Barbee PONDER, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

475 F.2d 37 (1973)

UNITED STATES of America and Elmer W. Holmes, Internal Revenue Agent, Internal Revenue Service, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. L. Barbee PONDER, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 72-2773 Summary Calendar.^*

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 15, 1973.

Rehearing Denied April 12, 1973.

L. Barbee Ponder, Jr., pro se.

Scott P. Crampton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Meyer Rothwacks, Atty., Tax Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Gerald J. Gallinghouse, U. S. Atty., New Orleans, La., Elmer W. Holmes, Agent, I. R. S., Baton Rouge, La., Mary Williams Cazalas, Joseph R. McMahon, Jr., Asst. U. S. Attys., New Orleans, La., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before WISDOM, GODBOLD and RONEY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from an order of the District Court requiring taxpayer to comply with an Internal Revenue summons issued under the authority of 26 U.S.C.A. § 7602.¹ We affirm.

1. There was no abuse of discretion in the denial of taxpayer's motion for a change of venue. Although a District Court may, for the convenience of parties and witnesses, transfer the action to any other District where it might have been brought, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a), a motion for a change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and the denial of the motion will not be overturned on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 442 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1971); Nowell v. Dick, 413 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1969).

2. Relying on the fact that the return day specified in the summons was a legal holiday, which date was later changed by means of a letter from the agent issuing the summons, taxpayer asserts that the summons was invalid. Under the circumstances of this case, the District Court committed no error in denying the motion to dismiss the summons. Taxpayer, a practicing lawyer, appeared on the date specified in the supplementary letter, yet he did not question at that time the validity of the summons. By failing to object, taxpayer waived the right to assert this defense.

3. The attorney-client privilege is no defense to the summons. The privilege applies to communications between lawyer and client, and, to come within the scope of the privilege, an attorney must show that the communication was made to him confidentially, in his professional capacity, for the purpose of securing legal advice or assistance. See e. g., Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951, 83 S.Ct. 505, 9 L.Ed. 2d 499 (1963). The identity of a client is a matter not normally within the privilege, Frank v. Tomlinson, 351 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 1028, 86 S.Ct. 648, 15 L.Ed.2d 540 (1966), nor are matters involving the receipt of fees from a client usually privileged, see United States v. Finley, 434 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1970).

The summons here at issue sought only financial records limited to cancelled checks, bank statements, duplicate deposit slips, and general ledger and cash receipts and disbursements journals, and taxpayer failed to carry his burden of proving that these records fell within the attorney-client privilege. Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963); cf. United States v. Johnson, 465 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1972).

4. Taxpayer's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not a defense to the summons. Although the summons seeks personal financial records, taxpayer made no showing that his claim of privilege was justified. As we stated in United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1969),

"the witness\' remedy is not to voice a blanket refusal to produce his records or to testify. Instead, he must present himself with his records for questioning, and as to each question and each record elect to raise or not to raise the defense. The district court may then determine by reviewing . . . the witness\' records and by considering each question whether, in each instance, the claim of self-incrimination is well founded."

420 F.2d at 852. See also United States v. Johnson, supra.

Instead of selectively invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege, taxpayer broadly claimed the privilege. He neither specified particular documents nor advanced any evidence indicating how production of the requested...