United States v. Poulin

Decision Date05 January 2016
Docket NumberNo. 14–2458.,14–2458.
Citation809 F.3d 924
Parties UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Matthew POULIN, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Greggory R. Walters, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Peoria, IL, for PlaintiffAppellee.

Johanna M. Christiansen, Attorney, Thomas W. Patton, Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Peoria, IL, for DefendantAppellant.

Before POSNER, FLAUM, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

In 2013, the district court sentenced Matthew Poulin to two concurrent 115–month terms of imprisonment followed by concurrent life terms of supervised release after he pled guilty to receipt and possession of child pornography. Poulin appealed his prison and supervised release terms as well as four special conditions of his supervised release. We held that the district court erred by not addressing a principal argument in mitigation and by not providing reasons for imposing the maximum term of supervised release. We also determined that the record lacked necessary reasoning for us to review the validity of the special conditions. We therefore vacated Poulin's prison and supervised release terms, as well as the special conditions accompanying his supervised release, and remanded for resentencing.

On remand, the district court resentenced Poulin to concurrent 84–month terms of imprisonment on both counts of conviction, followed by a 10–year term of supervised release. The district court imposed thirteen standard conditions of supervision and seven special conditions. Poulin now brings a successive appeal challenging various conditions of his supervised release. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the disputed conditions and remand to the district court for resentencing in conformance with our recent jurisprudence, which encourages the imposition of supervised-release conditions that are "properly-noticed, supported by adequate findings, and well-tailored to serve the purposes of deterrence, rehabilitation, and protection of the public." United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 835–36 (7th Cir.2015) ; see also United States v. Armour, 804 F.3d 859 (7th Cir.2015) ; United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir.2015). We do this recognizing that the district court did not have the benefit of guidance provided by the above-cited cases.

I. Background

Matthew Poulin lived in the basement of his mother's home in Silvis, Illinois, where he kept a computer. In September 2011, law enforcement identified the IP address associated with Poulin's computer as receiving and distributing child pornography. Officers executed a search warrant on October 7, 2011, and recovered two hard drives and a computer from Poulin's basement room. The hard drives contained seventy-eight videos depicting child pornography. Poulin was interviewed during the search and admitted to possessing and receiving child pornography from the internet.

In December 2011, a grand jury indicted Poulin on one count of receiving child pornography and one count of possessing thirty or more visual depictions of child pornography. Poulin pled guilty to both counts on August 21, 2012.

Before pleading guilty, Poulin underwent competency and sanity examinations. The Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") confirmed four prior hospitalizations due to psychiatric difficulties. The BOP records contain conflicting information regarding Poulin's use of alcohol and controlled substances. For instance, in August 2006 at the age of twenty-one, Poulin was diagnosed with alcohol dependence and cannabis abuse. Poulin also told the BOP psychologist that he handles stress using "alcohol and prescription medication." The psychologist noted, however, that there was no evidence in the records he reviewed to indicate that Poulin misused these substances. During an interview with a probation officer, Poulin stated that he only consumed alcohol socially and that he had stopped using cannabis at the age of sixteen—a statement that conflicts with information in his medical records. In spite of these contradictions, the BOP psychologist concluded that Poulin would benefit from continued mental health treatment and noted that Poulin's "over-reliance on medication and perhaps alcohol" were among the factors that might limit Poulin's therapeutic progress.

The presentencing investigation report gave Poulin a total in an advisory guidelines range of 151 to 188 months in prison. On March 15, 2013, the district court sentenced Poulin to concurrent sentences of 115 months in prison, followed by concurrent life terms of supervised release.

During his first appeal, Poulin challenged the sentence of imprisonment and lifetime term of supervised release. Additionally, he challenged four special conditions of supervised release that collectively prohibited unsupervised contact with minors, as well as access to and possession of adult pornography. We held that the district court erred by not addressing a principal argument in mitigation and by not providing reasons for imposing the maximum term of supervised release. We also concluded that the record lacked the explanation necessary for us to review the validity of the special conditions. We therefore vacated Poulin's prison and supervised release terms, as well as the special conditions accompanying his supervised release, and remanded for resentencing.

The district court held a resentencing hearing on June 27, 2014 and sentenced Poulin to concurrent 84–month terms of imprisonment, followed by a 10–year term of supervised release. The district court imposed thirteen standard conditions of release and seven special conditions. During the hearing, the court discussed the mandatory conditions and defense counsel indicated that Poulin did not object to the mandatory conditions. The court did not verbally address any of the standard conditions except in the context of Poulin's objection to the requirement that he attend substance abuse treatment and abstain from alcohol during the term of supervised re-lease.1

The district court then considered the special conditions. Defense counsel objected to four of the special conditions, including the provisions barring contact with minors, governing use of the internet, and requiring that Poulin undergo substance abuse treatment and abstain from alcohol. Based on Poulin's objections, the district court modified a number of the conditions.

Poulin now appeals a second time, challenging the following standard conditions of his supervised release:

The defendant shall not leave the judicial district without the permission of the court or probation officer.
The defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation officer.
The defendant shall report to the probation officer in a manner and frequency directed by the court or probation officer.
The defendant shall support his or her dependents and meet other family responsibilities.
The defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation, unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable reasons.
The defendant shall notify the probation officer at least ten days prior to any change in residence or employment.
The defendant shall refrain from any use of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any controlled substance or any paraphernalia related to any controlled substances, except as prescribed by a physician.
The defendant shall not frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered.
The defendant shall not associate with any persons engaged in criminal activity and shall not associate with any person convicted of a felony, unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer.
The defendant shall permit a probation officer to visit him or her at any time at home or elsewhere and shall permit confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view of the probation officer.
• As directed by the probation officer, the defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant's criminal record or personal history or characteristics and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifications and to confirm the defendant's compliance with such notification requirement.

Poulin also challenges the following special conditions of his supervised release:

• You shall participate in a sex offender treatment program as directed by the U.S. Probation Office. You shall abide by the rules of the treatment provider. You will submit to physiological testing, including polygraph testing. You shall pay for these services, if financially able, as directed by the U.S. Probation Office.
• You shall at the direction of the U.S. Probation Office, participate in a program for substance treatment including not more than six tests per month to determine whether you have used controlled substances or alcohol. You shall abide by the rules of the treatment provider. You shall pay for these services, if financially able, as directed by the U.S. Probation Office.
• You shall participate in psychiatric services and/or a program of mental health counseling/treatment as directed by the U.S. Probation Officer and take any and all prescribed medications as directed by the treatment providers. You shall pay for these services, if financially able, as directed by the U.S. Probation Office.
• You shall have no contact with any female under the age of 18 except: (1) in the presence of a responsible adult who is aware of the nature of your background and current offense, and who has been approved by the U.S. Probation Office; (2) in the course of normal commercial business; (3) in other cases of unintentional and incidental contact.
II. Discussion

We have addressed the requirements for imposing conditions of supervised release repeatedly over the past two years. United States v. Douglas, 806 F.3d 979, 982 (7th...

To continue reading

Request your trial
32 cases
  • United States v. Evans
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • February 28, 2018
    ...word "regularly," arguing that it has no clear definition and renders the condition unconstitutionally vague. See United States v. Poulin , 809 F.3d 924, 932 (7th Cir. 2016) ; Kappes , 782 F.3d at 849. Indeed, the word "regularly" has no clear meaning in this context: it could mean somethin......
  • United States v. Flores, 18-3249
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • July 3, 2019
    ...v. Thompson , 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015). See, e.g., United States v. Gill, 824 F.3d 653, 661 (7th Cir. 2016) ; United States v. Poulin , 809 F.3d 924, 930–31 (7th Cir. 2016). Neither concern is present here. In other decisions, we simply did not address waiver when applying plain-error r......
  • United States v. Anglin
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • January 25, 2017
    ...days prior to or as soon as you know about any changes in residence and any time you leave a job or accept a job." United States v. Poulin , 809 F.3d 924, 933 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).Another challenged condition required Anglin, at the probation officer's directio......
  • United States v. Carson, 15–2899.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • May 6, 2016
    ...matters, such as the length of imprisonment, and justify them accordingly. See, e.g., Henry, 813 F.3d at 683 ; United States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 931–34 (7th Cir.2016) ; United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 848–53 (7th Cir.2015) ; United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 373 (7th Cir.......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT