United States v. Price

• Decision Date: 28 August 1908
• Citation: 163 F. 904
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. PRICE et al. SAME v. HAAS et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

163 F. 904

UNITED STATES v. PRICE et al.

SAME v. HAAS et al.

United States Circuit Court, S.D. New York.

August 28, 1908

On or about April 30, 1908, Jesse C. Adkins, Esq., was duly appointed by the Attorney General of the United States to be a special assistant to the United States attorney for this district. In the language of the letter of designation such appointment was 'to aid in the investigation of the 'cotton leak matter,' with a view of obtaining indictments-- if the evidence warrants--against Moses Haas Theo. H. Price, and others. ' The 'matter' referred to attracted public attention as long ago as 1905 and was in substance a suspicion that Haas, Price, and others interested in speculative purchases and sales of cotton had obtained through one Holmes, an 'Assistant Statistician' in the Department of Agriculture, early if not secret information regarding the planting of cotton and the condition of the growing crop, which information might be useful to them in dealing with persons not so well informed. The May grand jury for this district being in session, it was attended by Mr. Adkins, as well as by the district United States attorney and his regular assistants, and by their suggestion the jurors began an investigation into said 'matter.' At the time of the occurrences giving rise to these motions, no indictment had been found growing out of 'cotton leak' transactions, no complaint or information had been filed, nor had any person been arrested or held for examination by reason thereof. It appears by affidavit that counsel for the United States or some of them were informed that Price desired to make a statement to them and that Haas was willing to give testimony, if himself guaranteed immunity from prosecution. Later, however, said counsel were advised that Haas had concluded not to testify and that Price would make no statement to the grand jury. Before Price had definitely made this statement, a subpoena directed to him and requiring attendance before the grand jury was issued, but not legally served. He, however, became fully aware of its existence and tenor. After Haas' alleged change of mind became known to the United States attorneys, a similar subpoena was duly served upon him. Both these subpoenas were in usual form, and required the attendance of Price and Haas, respectively, to testify 'all and everything you may know in a certain cause now pending and undetermined in (this) court between the United States and * * * on the part of the United States. ' Haas appeared in obedience to the subpoena, and Price, after learning through counsel that if he did not come, despite the informality of service, he would ultimately be compelled so to do, also attended in the grand jury room. Both were duly and fully informed of their constitutional rights, and that the jurors were investigating the 'cotton leak.' Both protested against being sworn. Each was asked whether he knew the other, and both refused to answer on constitutional grounds. A few other wholly unimportant questions were asked, privilege claimed as to each, and the episode then closed without either of the moving parties having uttered any words which could be regarded as evidence against anybody. Thereafter these indictments (based on alleged 'cotton leak' wrongdoing) were found against both Price and Haas, and by the same grand jury before which they had appeared.

Both now move to quash said indictments on the ground that the proceedings above outlined constitute an invasion of rights guaranteed by the fifth amendment of the Constitution, in that compelling attendance of persons ultimately indicted, and swearing them as witnesses makes them witnesses against themselves, even though by prompt claim of privilege no words of the slightest evidential value are uttered. Defendants' claim may be thus fairly stated: It is a breach of constitutional privilege to compel the possible defendant in a criminal case to elect before any grand jury having power to indict him, whether or not to claim said privilege.

Nicoll, Anable, Lindsay & Fuller, for Price.

Nash Rockwood, for Haas.

Henry L. Stimson, U.S. Atty., and Jesse C. Adkins, Goldthwaite H. Dorr, and Charles A. Roberts, for the United States.

HOUGH District Judge (after stating the facts as above).

A part of the argument addressed to the court appeared to assert that Price and Haas had been oppressed by the agents or attorneys of the United States. Let it be assumed that discretionary power rests in the court to quash an indictment found by coercion or oppression of jurors or witnesses or by device or trick inconsistent with the fair and honorable administration of law, yet there is nothing even in defendants' affidavits giving color to a suggestion of such conduct in this proceeding. What was done was all in the open, with every opportunity for defendants to consult counsel, and not one of the formal questions put (the examination never got further) was even asked before full and fair knowledge of his legal privilege had been given each of the present defendants, and by one or several representatives of the United States. This conclusion is reached without reading the minutes of the grand jury-- a means of information doubtless legal, but in my opinion not to be resorted to if recourse can be avoided, because the grand inquest is not only a supremely important, but wholly independent part of our legal system, and prying into its records directly tends to subordinate that jury to the court and to increase technicality of procedure; two results equally to be deplored.

The real and only questions raised by these motions are narrow but important matters of law; i.e.: Were these defendants by the transactions above stated (1) compelled to be witnesses against themselves (2) in a criminal...