United States v. Prince William County

• Decision Date: 15 December 1934
• Citation: 9 F. Supp. 219
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY.

9 F. Supp. 219

UNITED STATES v. PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY.

District Court, E. D. Virginia.

December 15, 1934.

Sterling Hutcheson, U. S. Atty., of Richmond, Va., and Paul W. Kear, Special Asst. to U. S. Atty., of Norfolk, Va.

Thomas H. Lion, of Manassas, Va., and Raymond M. Hudson and E. Hilton Jackson, both of Washington, D. C., for defendant.

CHESNUT, District Judge.

This is the fifth of a series of cases involving title of the Government to property now constituting the Naval Base at Quantico, Virginia. The suit is a bill in equity to quiet title to the particular lands described in the bill, and to enjoin the prosecution of an ejectment suit heretofore instituted and now pending in the Circuit Court for Prince William County, Virginia, by the defendant in this case, the County of Prince William, against Smedley D. Butler, and others, sued individually but who were custodians of the property for the Government.

The title of the Government originated by the taking, by Presidential Proclamation, of the whole area of about 5,000 acres, under the authority of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1918 (chapter 114, 40 Stat. 724, 738), which was passed while the Government of the United States was at war with Germany and Austria. The Act, similar in purpose and provisions to numerous other Acts of the same general nature passed during the recent war, authorized the President to take the particular property at Quantico as a Naval Base for the Marine Corps; and authorized the President to determine the just compensation to be paid to the owners. The Act specially provided that the title in fee simple should vest immediately and absolutely in the United States upon the taking. After the determination by the President of just compensation, it was provided that such compensation should be paid immediately if satisfactory to the owners respectively, otherwise seventy-five per cent. of the amount was to be paid at once with leave to the dissatisfied property owners to sue in the Court of Claims or in the United States District Court, for the balance due. The procedure outlined in the Act for the taking of the property was complied with; and after the Presidential Proclamation the Government promptly occupied the property and has constructed thereon large and costly improvements.

About twelve years after the taking by the Government, several of the property owners brought ejectment suits in the State Court against the Custodians of the property and shortly thereafter the Government filed bills in equity to quiet title and enjoin prosecution of the ejectment suits. Four of these cases have been finally decided in favor of the Government. The underlying questions were common to all, with minor variations in facts. The principal opinion of this court was written in the case entitled United States v. McIntosh, 57 F.(2d) 573; Id. (D. C.) 2 F. Supp. 244; Id. (D. C.) 3 F. Supp. 715. Appeals were taken in two of the cases and dismissed because not filed in time (C. C. A. 70 F.(2d) 507), and petitions for certiorari asking a review of the whole cases were subsequently denied by the Supreme Court (McIntosh v. U. S., 55 S. Ct. 101, 79 L. Ed. ___, Gilliam v. U. S., 55 S. Ct. 111, 79 L. Ed. ___).

The only material difference between the present case and those which have been heretofore decided are (1) that the lands here involved consist only of several streets, alleys and roads within the area taken, as contrasted with fee simple property in exclusively private ownership, and (2) no compensation was determined or paid by the Government for the property involved in this case. The latter consideration renders unavailable to the Government in this case the defense of estoppel, one of the grounds, but not the sole ground, for the decision in the other cases.

The theory of the Executive Department in not fixing compensation for the taking of the streets, alleys and roads, was that the title to the fee in the beds of these streets, alleys and roads, was vested by the general law of the State of Virginia in the owners of the abutting property, and the public easement of access and travel over them was of no ascertainable value. So far as the rights of the present defendant, the County of Prince William, in these highways is concerned, it is also contended by counsel for the Government in this case that the rights, if any, are vested in the State of Virginia rather than in the County; but in the view I take of the case, it is unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of this question of title or ownership between the abutting property owners and the County and the State because, as is correctly pointed out I think, by counsel for the defendant, if the Government is to prevail in this case, it must be upon the strength of its own title and not upon the weakness of the defendant's title. Dick v. Foraker, 155 U. S. 404, 414, 15 S. Ct. 124, 39 L. Ed. 201.

The property here involved is specifically described in the bill of complaint as 27 separate parcels of which the first 25 constitute streets and alleys laid out on a plat of a sub-division of a portion of the land of the Quantico Company, which plat was duly recorded in the Clerk's office of the Circuit Court for Prince William County, Virginia. Lot 26 is described as follows:

"All that strip of land 30 feet wide by 15,000 feet long, more or less, known as the County Road from Quantico, Virginia, to the `Triangle,' lying in said highway as it runs from Potomac Avenue at Quantico, Virginia, thence northwesterly, thence westerly directly to the point of the intersection of the southeast side of the Richmond and Washington Highway at the `Triangle.'"

Lot 27 was described as follows:

"All that strip of land 30 feet wide by 13,800 feet long, more or less, known as a part of the Richmond and Washington Highway, lying in said highway as it runs from its point of intersection with the County Road at the `Triangle,' thence in a westerly and southwesterly direction, as it meanders, to the old bed of Chippawamsic Creek."

Most of the streets and alleys described in parcels 1 to 25, inclusive, were simply paper streets not actually physically laid out or improved as streets or alleys, but some few of them were in actual use. After the Government took possession of the whole area most, if not all, of these streets and alleys were closed to public use except by special permission given, but it does not appear that any public inconvenience has resulted. One of the streets which was used by the public afforded access to a school house and hotel, for which compensation was paid. The County Road (Item 26) and the State Highway (Item 27) were very substantially improved by the Government. The County Road when taken over by the Government was an ordinary dirt road which was improved by the Government at an expenditure of $200,000. Potomac Avenue, which connected with the County Road and gave access to the dock, was improved at a cost of $24,650; and the Government also spent in 1918 and 1919, approximately $150,000 in the improvement of that portion of the Richmond-Washington Highway embraced within the area of the whole land taken. In 1920 the State of Virginia resumed maintenance of that portion of the Highway and it is said a portion of the whole of that section of the Highway has now been relocated. The public generally has continuously had free and uninterrupted use of the County Road and the State Highway in their improved condition.

The controlling question in the case is simply whether the United States obtained a good title to the property by the Presidential Proclamation pursuant to the Act of Congress and the procedure thereunder. For the reasons stated in the several opinions in the McIntosh Case it is my opinion that the title thereby acquired by the Government was good. The principal contention of the defendant is that the Act is invalid because it could not constitutionally authorize the taking of the property before payment of just compensation as determined by a jury trial. This...