United States v. Prince
| Decision Date | 10 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 4:10CR47,Case Number: 4:09-CR-161 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. CLOVIS L. PRINCE |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Release Under the First Step Act This Emergency Motion for Reduction of Sentence in accordance to Compassionate Release Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 3582(c)(1)(A) Resulting Because of the COVID-19 Pandemic (Dkt. 377). Defendant filed a supplement (Dkt. #379). The Government has responded in opposition (Dkt. #382). Defendant filed a reply (Dkt. # 387).1
The Court, having considered the motion, the response, the record, and the applicable law, finds that the motion must be DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
Defendant was indicted on September 10, 2009, for one count of Bank Fraud and fourteen counts of Money Laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 and 18 U.S.C. § 1957 in case number 4:09CR161. Defendant was released pending trial. While on pre-trial release, Defendant was alleged to have committed perjury and fraud relating to his bankruptcy proceedings. Defendant was indicted on March 10, 2010, for ten counts of perjury and five counts of Bankruptcy Fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1621, 18 U.S.C. § 152, and § 157 in case number 4:10CR47. A superseding indictment was filed on July 14, 2010, charging 23 total counts of False DeclarationBefore the Court and Bankruptcy Fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1623(a) and §§ 152, 157 (Dkt. #32). The second indictment triggered a warrant to be issued for violating his pretrial release. When agents went to arrest Defendant for the crimes alleged in the second indictment, Defendant attempted to flee in his vehicle and crashed, later claiming he thought he was being "carjacked." He was taken to the hospital with minor injuries, where he attempted to escape through a ceiling tile in the bathroom, only to later claim he was attempting suicide because he had just been told he was going blind, didn't have feeling in his left leg, and was being charged by a "bogus" indictment.
Defendant pleaded not guilty to all charges. The Court ordered the cases consolidated and the parties proceeded to trial on both indictments on November 10, 2010. After an almost four-week trial, Defendant was found guilty by a jury on all counts and eventually sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment of 30 years' imprisonment on Count 1 and ten years on each of Counts 2 through 15 in 4:09CR161, and 48 months on each of Counts 1-23 in 4:10CR47, plus 12 months under 18 U.S.C. § 3147 consecutive to the 48 months (Dkt. #313, #214, respectively). The sentence in 4:10CR47 was ordered concurrent to the sentence in 4:09CR161. Defendant was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $13,640,425.56. Defendant has served only ten years of his 30-year sentence and is currently 71 years old.
Defendant seeks release based upon COVID-19 concerns and his other medical conditions. The Government opposes Defendant's motion
A judgment of conviction imposing a sentence of imprisonment "constitutes a final judgment and may not be modified by a district court except in limited circumstances." Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 824, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). One such circumstance, invoked by Defendant, arises from18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), which authorizes a district court to reduce a term of imprisonment when "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a reduction exist that are "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission," and other procedural and substantive requirements are met. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Defendant's compassionate-release motion may be considered only if he first meets section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement. The statute provides that a court may not consider any modification to a defendant's sentence under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) unless a motion for such a modification is properly made by the Director of the BOP or by a defendant who has fully exhausted his or her administrative remedies. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Director of the BOP may request a sentence reduction in court at any time. Id. A defendant may also make such a request but only after fully exhausting remedies within the BOP or after 30 days have passed since he or she sought administrative remedies. Id.2
Defendant submitted a request regarding his release to his warden on March 30, 2020. Since more than 30 days have passed since Defendant made the request, Defendant has, therefore, met section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement.
Under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), a district court may grant a sentence reduction if it finds that (1) "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction," (2) "such a reduction isconsistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission," and (3) such a reduction is appropriate "after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] to the extent that they are applicable." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Congress did not define what constitutes "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(1)(A), but rather delegated that authority to the Sentencing Commission. In 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2), Congress granted the Commission broad authority to promulgate "general policy statements regarding application of the guidelines or any other aspect of sentencing or sentence implementation that in the view of the Commission would further the purposes set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)]." And, as particularly relevant here, in 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), "Congress instructed the Commission to 'describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction [under section 3582(c)(1)(A)], including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples.'" United States v. Garcia, 655 F.3d 426, 435 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(t)).
The Commission's policy statements, issued under 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), are binding concerning what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). As the Fifth Circuit has explained, "a common sense reading" of section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s phrase that a sentence reduction must be "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission," is that, "regardless of whether Congress wanted [the Commission's] policy statements to be binding in the sentencing context, it wished them to be binding in § 3582(c) proceedings." Id. "If a sentence reduction is inconsistent with a policy statement, it would violate § 3582(c)'s directive, so policy statements must be binding." Id.; see also Dillon, 560 U.S. at 827 ().
Thus, Defendant cannot obtain a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(1)(A) merely by asserting reasons that he, or for that matter this Court, might believe are sufficiently "extraordinary and compelling" to justify a sentence reduction. Instead, under the plain text of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), as well as controlling precedent, Defendant's proffered reasons must be consistent with the Sentencing Commission's applicable policy statement concerning what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(1)(A).
Section 1B1.13 allows a sentence reduction for "extraordinary and compelling reasons" only if the reasons are "consistent with this policy statement." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(1)(A), (3).3 Application note 1 to the policy statement explains that "extraordinary and compelling reasons exist under any of the circumstances set forth below," which include only: (a) a defendant suffering from a terminal illness or other medical condition "that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover"; (b) a defendant at least 65 years old who "is experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process" and "has served atleast 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less"; (c) a defendant who has minor children without a caregiver or with an incapacitated spouse or partner who needs the defendant to be the caregiver; or (d) "[a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, . . . an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the [above] reasons." Id., comment. (n.1(A)-(D)).
Consistent with the application note, the BOP has issued Program Statement 5050.50 ("PS 5050.50"), which describes the BOP's consideration of compassionate-release requests. PS 5050.50, which was amended effective January 17, 2019, following the passage of the First Step Act, sets forth in detail the BOP's definition of circumstances that may support a request for compassionate...
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