United States v. Pritchard

• Decision Date: 07 July 2020
• Docket Number: No. 18-6210,18-6210
• Citation: 964 F.3d 513
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steve Allen PRITCHARD, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

964 F.3d 513

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Steve Allen PRITCHARD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18-6210

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: October 23, 2019

Decided and Filed: July 7, 2020

OPINION

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge.

Some men just want to watch the world burn. Others start fires to collect insurance money. Steve Pritchard is the latter. But after playing with fire several times, Pritchard's penchant for profiting from arson took a deadly turn. Instead of only damaging property, a fire started by Pritchard in June 2011 led to firefighter Charles Sparks's death. While responding to the fire, Sparks suffered a fatal heart attack. Although Pritchard could have supposed that a firefighter would respond to the blaze, he had no reason to suspect that Charles Sparks would arrive on the scene, bringing with him a history of coronary disease

and spotty use of his prescription medication. At issue is whether Pritchard caused Sparks's death within the meaning of the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).

Pritchard's appeal turns on first principles of causation. The common law typically permits liability only when the perpetrator acts as both the but-for and the legal cause of the harm. And that distinction often matters. Every fledgling law student knows that "a kingdom might be lost ‘all for the want of a horseshoe nail,’ " see Massachusetts v. EPA , 549 U.S. 497, 546, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), but we still don't hold the blacksmith responsible for the defeat despite his faulty craftmanship's role as the but-for cause. For that reason, laws that invoke proximate causation generally impose liability when the harm was foreseeable. Under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), Sparks's death need only be "a direct or proximate result of [Pritchard's] conduct." Because the government introduced testimony showing how firefighting can trigger a heart attack, we find that the jury had sufficient evidence to hold Pritchard responsible for Sparks's death. Pritchard also alleges that the lower court committed various reversible errors, including wrongly admitting propensity evidence, denying his motion to suppress cell phone data seized by the government, and applying an unwarranted sentencing enhancement. Those arguments also lack merit. Thus, we AFFIRM.

I.

This case involves a fire, a firefighter, and a fraudster. First, the fire. At 3:05 AM on June 30, 2011, a 911 caller reported a fire at the Pritchard residence. Eleven minutes later, firefighters, including Assistant Chief Charles Sparks, arrived on the scene. These firefighters found the house engulfed in "[a] lot of fire, a lot of flames." (R. 145, Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at PageID# 1055.) During the firefighting, Sparks lost consciousness. Personnel at the scene administered CPR to Sparks and called for an ambulance. Although the emergency workers tried to revive Sparks, who was not breathing and did not have a pulse, he never regained consciousness. Eight days later, Sparks died after being taken off life support.

Before fighting the fire on June 30, 2011, Sparks suffered from various medical ailments. In 2005, Sparks had a heart attack

that required inserting a stint in his coronary artery. Sparks also suffered from coronary disease, hypertension, and diabetes—all of which are risk factors for a heart attack. Around the time of his death, Sparks had not been taking his prescribed heart medication or insulin to treat his diabetes.

Brandi Pritchard, Steve Pritchard's wife, clocked into work at 3:34 AM on June 30, 2011. She worked about forty-five minutes away from her house, meaning she left for work around 2:45 AM. Around 7:00 AM that morning, Brandi received a call informing her that her home was on fire.

Now for the fraud. To Brandi's purported surprise, Pritchard decided to drive her to work that morning, telling her that it "would be a good morning to go ahead and start ... this fire in this house[.]" (R. 146, Trial Tr. Vol. 3 at PageID# 1352.) On the way to work, Pritchard proclaimed, "I did it[,]" referring to the fire. (Id. at 1353.) Pritchard had arranged for Brandi's children and his dog to be out of the house that morning. Later, Brandi's children would testify that Pritchard showed them photographs of the fire he took from his phone and that Pritchard implied he started the fire. And Dale Clark, a longtime acquaintance of Pritchard and Brandi, also testified that Pritchard insinuated that he started the fire with Brandi's help. Finally, Sherry Waggoner, a friend of the Pritchards, recounted overhearing the couple argue about the fire. She testified that Pritchard claimed to be "the genius in the project [and] ... the one that master planned it." (R. 145, Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at PageID# 1143.) Sherry's husband, Robbie Waggoner, confirmed this conversation and that Pritchard took credit for the arson.

Later that day, Pritchard picked Brandi up from work and instructed her on "what [she] needed to say when [they] got [home]." (R. 146, Trial Tr. Vol. 3 at PageID# 1356.) Pritchard wanted Brandi to tell investigators that he had spent the night in Louisville. And that's the same story he gave to the police. Yet Pritchard's alibi did not withstand scrutiny. Cell tower records revealed that Pritchard had not been in Louisville on the night of the fire. The government obtained Pritchard's cell-site location information (CSLI) without a warrant in July 2015, relying on the warrant exception in the Stored Communications Act (SCA).

June 30 wasn't the first time Brandi heard about Pritchard's plot. Brandi bought a $50,000 insurance policy for the house six days before the fire. So when Pritchard learned about the insurance policy, he remarked about "how easy it would be to burn the house down and get the money for it." (Id. at 1335.) At first, Brandi balked at Pritchard's plan, finding it "ludicrous[.]" (Id. at 1343.) To persuade Brandi, Pritchard recounted previous fires that he started to collect insurance money, including burning down a house owned by Tena Gowen, the couple's close friend. He also mentioned setting a car belonging to Whitney Clark, his niece, on fire to collect insurance money. And Pritchard discussed setting his own car on fire, as well as the home of David Newcomb.

After the fire, Brandi collected on her insurance policy. In the ensuing investigation of the fire, carried out by Kentucky State Police and the FBI, Pritchard pressured Brandi to lie to cover up the arson. When he became worried about Brandi's resolve, Pritchard resorted to threats of violence to coerce Brandi not to confess. In response, Brandi obtained multiple protective orders against Pritchard. Pritchard's threats continued for years; after the FBI interviewed Pritchard in 2014, he broke into Brandi's house and threatened to harm her and her children if she told the truth about the arson. Brandi eventually confessed to her role in the arson, the insurance fraud, and the cover up.

Following the investigation, a federal grand jury charged Pritchard and Brandi with Malicious Destruction of Property by Fire, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) that permits punishment for arson causing death, and Mail Fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Brandi pleaded guilty and Pritchard went to trial.

At Pritchard's trial, Dr. Thomas Hales, a physician for the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, testified about risk factors relevant to Sparks's death. Hales concluded that firefighting "triggered" Sparks's fatal heart attack

. (Id. at 1313.) He also testified that firefighting requires "a lot of heavy physical exertion" and recounted how studies show a link between strenuous physical activity and cardiac malfunction. (Id. at 1258–64.) But he could not conclude, given Sparks's history, that Sparks would not have had a heart attack independent of the fire. Dr. Divyesh Bhakta, who treated Sparks after his heart attack, testified that Sparks's untreated diabetes and failure to take his heart medicine produced "a number of risk factors[.]" (R. 134, Trial Tr. Vol. 5 at PageID# 728–40.) He also could not conclude whether the fire, and not these risk factors, caused Sparks's heart attack. After hearing this evidence, the jury found Pritchard guilty of arson causing death.

Pritchard's counsel made many objections before, during, and after trial. Before the trial, he filed an unsuccessful motion to exclude evidence about Pritchard's previous arsons and the Emergency Protective Orders (EPOs) obtained by Brandi. During trial, he objected to the court's refusal to give his proposed jury instructions about proximate cause. He also argued that the district court should not have admitted CSLI seized by the government because the officers lacked a valid warrant for the search. So Pritchard moved to suppress, contending that admitting the cell phone records violated the exclusionary rule. In addition, Pritchard's counsel challenged the relevancy of testimony given by the government's expert witness, David West, about the characteristics and motives shared by arsonists. And during sentencing, Pritchard's counsel argued against applying a two-level leadership enhancement to Pritchard's sentence. The lower court overruled these challenges.

In sum, Pritchard received a sentence of 360 months for arson causing death and a concurrent 240-month term for mail fraud. Pritchard now appeals his conviction and sentence.

II.

An arsonist started a fire to collect insurance money. Then a firefighter lost his life putting that fire out. Before us is whether the firefighter's death was the "direct or proximate result" of the arsonist's actions, the predicate necessary for guilt under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). While ordinarily a straightforward question, this case poses a wrinkle: The firefighter had a history of cardiac disease and passed away from a heart attack suffered during the fire. Pritchard, who started the fire, tells us that he isn't responsible for the firefighter's existing heart...