United States v. Prochaska, 11357.

• Decision Date: 10 June 1955
• Docket Number: No. 11357.,11357.
• Citation: 222 F.2d 1
• Parties: The UNITED STATES of America v. John Joseph PROCHASKA, Jr.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

222 F.2d 1 (1955)

The UNITED STATES of America v. John Joseph PROCHASKA, Jr.

No. 11357.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

April 26, 1955.

Rehearing Denied June 10, 1955.

George F. Callaghan, Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

Robert Tieken, U. S. Atty., Richard B. Ogilvie, John Peter Lulinski, Asst. U. S. Attys., Chicago, Ill., for appellee.

Before MAJOR, LINDLEY and SWAIM, Circuit Judges.

LINDLEY, Circuit Judge.

Defendant was indicted on the charge that he, with intent to extort from Maurice B. Frank a sum of money, deposited with and caused to be delivered by the Post Office Department, a letter addressed to Frank, containing a threat to injure the person of the addressee, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 876. The document, set forth verbatim in the indictment, is as follows: "Okay, Maurie, this is it, get it and get it straight because you have only one chance. We want $10,000.00 cash in 10's and 20's to be placed by you in a place designated by us in our next letter. You have 5 to 7 days. If you should wish to contact us please do so by advertising under personals in the Tribune. Please Maurie, make it easy on yourself by cooperating fully."

The cause was tried without a jury, on the stipulation of the parties that defendant mailed the letter, as well as others of like import, to the addressee, and that he was apprehended by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation immediately after he had picked up a parcel which he supposed contained the money demanded.

Defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that the letter failed to disclose any threat to injure the person of the addressee was overruled. His motion in arrest of judgment to the same effect was likewise overruled. He assigns error in each of these rulings, contending that any document, in order to amount to an offense under the Statute, must contain an express threat to do injury to the person of the addressee as well as an illicit demand for money, i. e., that the statutory crime of extortion by mail cannot be based on innuendo or implied threats.

The statute provides in pertinent part: "Whoever, with intent to extort from any person any money or other thing of value, so deposits, or causes to be delivered by the Post Office Department any communication containing any threat * * * to injure the person of the addressee or of another, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both." 18 U.S.C.A. § 876. We have found no guiding judicial interpretation of this statutory language, but we think it obvious that Congress intended thereby to penalize every extortion demand by mail which is coupled with an express threat or with any language or expression which carries with it the reasonable connotation of a threat to injure the person of the addressee. Our decision, therefore, must depend on whether the essential significance of the language used by defendant necessarily constituted a threat to injure the person of Frank; whether the actual meaning of the language, plus its necessary suggested implications, was such as reasonably to instill in him the actual apprehension of...