United States v. Ptomey, 15611

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
• Writing for the Court: GANEY and SMITH, Circuit , and KIRKPATRICK
• Citation: United States v. Ptomey, 366 F.2d 759 (3rd Cir. 1966)
• Decision Date: 20 September 1966
• Docket Number: No. 15611,15612.,15611
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Charles H. PTOMEY and Edward L. Young, Appellants.

366 F.2d 759 (1966)

UNITED STATES of America v. Charles H. PTOMEY and Edward L. Young, Appellants.

Nos. 15611, 15612.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued June 16, 1966.

Decided September 20, 1966.

H. David Rothman, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellants.

Stanley W. Greenfield, Asst. U. S. Atty., Pittsburgh, Pa. (Gustave Diamond, U. S. Atty., Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.

Before GANEY and SMITH, Circuit Judges, and KIRKPATRICK, District Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT

KIRKPATRICK, District Judge.

These two appellants, indicted in the District Court for robbery of a bank, entered pleas of not guilty, at first, but on October 1, 1964, withdrew their pleas of not guilty and pleaded guilty. They were at that time represented and advised by J. J. Cohen, Esquire, a lawyer whose competency and long experience in criminal practice are not disputed. A motion under Rule 32(d) to withdraw their pleas of guilty was filed by their attorney December 31, was heard by the court on January 6, 1965, and was denied on the same day. At the hearing, they advanced nothing either by way of evidence or argument in support of their motion, except that Young gave testimony which amounted to no more than a general denial that he was guilty of the offense charged.

They then changed lawyers and tried again. After a hearing on March 5 before a different judge, their second motion was, on June 4, also denied, 244 F. Supp. 464. On June 30 they were both sentenced to prison terms. From the judgment of the court on the guilty pleas, they have taken this appeal.

The case comes here over well travelled ground. This court has had occasion to pass upon appeals involving points similar to those now presented upon at least four occasions. See United States v. Colonna, 3 Cir., 142 F.2d 210; Gawantka v. United States, 3 Cir., 327 F.2d 129; Hudgins v. United States, 3 Cir., 340 F.2d 391; United States v. Washington, 3 Cir., 341 F.2d 277. The applicable principles of law are well settled. A plea of guilty is a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses and constitutes an admission of guilt. Conviction and sentence following a plea of guilty are based solely and entirely upon the plea and not upon any evidence which may have been acquired by the prosecuting authorities. The plea in itself is a conviction upon which sentence may be imposed without further action of the court.

The withdrawal of a plea of guilty is not a matter of right. A motion for leave to withdraw a plea of guilty and substitute a plea of not guilty is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and should be denied if the defendant knew and understood what was being done and there were not present any circumstances of force, mistake, misapprehension, fear, inadvertence or ignorance of his rights and understanding of the consequences of his plea. United States v. Colonna, supra.

The trial judge painstakingly reviewed the testimony and searched the record before him to see whether there was anything which would indicate that the defendants were misled or coerced or that their pleas were not freely...