United States v. Quattrone
| Decision Date | 29 January 1957 |
| Docket Number | Cr. No. 502-56. |
| Citation | 149 F. Supp. 240 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Samuel QUATTRONE, Jimmy Lubin, Guy N. Wilson, Arthur K. Kercoude. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Thomas Flannery, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.
Myron Ehrlich, Joseph Sitnick, Washington, D. C., for defendant.
The Court, sua sponte, has determined to disqualify itself from ruling upon the pending motion of the defendants in the case of United States v. Quattrone,1 and from presiding over the trial of the case, and will enter an order to that effect. Having reached this decision with great reluctance, the Court believes that it is important that its reasons be explained.
Defendants were indicted on sixteen counts for violation of certain gambling statutes.2 On January 4, 1957, the Court heard oral argument upon the motion of the defendants for the return of seized property and the suppression of evidence. At that time the Court took the motion under advisement and subsequently received memoranda from both parties concerning the legal issues involved. While the Court had the motion under advisement and was giving serious consideration to the difficult legal problems presented therein, the Court was visited in its chambers by an individual who is known personally to the Court but who is not counsel of record in the case. The individual involved, after stating emphatically that he had neither an intention nor a desire to attempt to influence the Court, requested information concerning the expected date of the ruling and the probable date of trial. The discussion of the case was the sole subject of conversation during the visit. The Court was and is puzzled as to the purpose of the inquiries. The Court also does not understand why this individual should be interested in this particular case. However, the Court does not believe that any improper act was intended. In fact the Court's reluctance to disqualify itself results in part from its desire to avoid creating an impression that the individual was a party to a wrongful action. Nevertheless, in view of the particular individual's acquaintanceship with the Court, it might appear to others that an effort was made to influence the Court's judgment.
That the Court is not required to disqualify itself in this case is too clear to require discussion. This is not a case in which the authority of the Court to determine a particular issue is in question. The only issue is whether, under the circumstances surrounding this case, the Court should exercise its discretionary power to relinquish jurisdiction. In making this decision, the Court believes that it should consider not only whether what has happened would actually influence the Court, but whether it might give the appearance of so doing.
In these times in which the Judiciary has been recklessly attacked and its integrity wrongfully challenged, it is particularly important that the problem of voluntary disqualification be carefully considered. For the Court would be loath to give comfort to those who frivolously suggest disqualifiation of members of the Judiciary on the grounds of political or social prejudice. In such cases it seems clear that the integrity of the courts may best be preserved through a firm refusal to yield to its attackers. For voluntary disqualification under those circumstances would only serve the malicious purpose of the Court's detractors. In the present case, however, no comfort can result to any adversaries of the Judiciary as a result of voluntary disqualification.
As a general rule, voluntary disqualification is an appropriate remedy in cases in which it may reasonably appear that the determination of the issues by the judge concerned might be improper, even though the facts do not support such a supposition.3 In this connection the Court has been much impressed with the following statement of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in an opinion explaining his failure to take part in the consideration and decision of a recent case: ...
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Commonwealth of Pa. v. Local U. 542, Int. U. of Op. Eng.
...affidavit urging disqualification, but sua sponte in order to expedite affiant's trial for conspiracy. Similarly, in United States v. Quattrone, 149 F.Supp. 240 (D.D.C.1957), the trial judge emphatically stated that he was not required by law to recuse himself, but said that he did so only ......
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Scoot v. U.S.
...cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926, 102 S.Ct. 1971, 72 L.Ed.2d 440 (1982). 2. See ante at 1045 note 6. 3. See United States v. Quattrone, 149 F.Supp. 240, 242 (D.D.C. 1957) (Youngdahl, J.) ("confidence in the Judiciary is essential to the successful functioning of our democratic form of government"......
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State ex rel. Anaya v. Scarborough
...to be disinterested as well as be so in fact.' District Judge Youngdahl's statement on disqualifying himself in United States v. Quarttrone (U.S.D.C.1957) 149 F.Supp. 240, is likewise interesting and The following summary of the functions of a judge from Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial ......
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United States v. Mitchell
...that the motions were legally insufficient, and quoted at length from Judge Youngdahl of this court who stated in United States v. Quattrone, 149 F.Supp. 240, 242 (D.D.C.1957), "The Court does not believe that any general principles can be laid down concerning the degree to which an appeara......