United States v. Quinn
Decision Date | 25 April 1956 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. T. Vincent QUINN, Martin Schwaeber and James D. Saver. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
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Paul W. Williams, U. S. Atty., by Clement J. Halliman, Jr. Asst. U. S. Atty., New York City, and Henry Formon, Asst. U. S. Atty., Ridgefield, N. J., for the United States.
Boris Kostelanetz, New York City, for defendant Quinn.
Jeremiah F. Cross, New York City, for defendant Saver.
Myron J. Greene, New York City, for defendant Schwaeber.
WEINFELD, District Judge. (Delivered orally from the Bench.)
The defendants move for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the Government's case of the various counts contained in two separate indictments which have been consolidated and tried together. The motion is made pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure on the ground the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of offenses charged.
The indictment charges the defendant Quinn who was a member of Congress from January 1, 1949 to December 31, 1951, as a principal with violation of Section 281 of Title 18, and also charges the defendants Schwaeber and Saver, who were his partners in the practice of law at various times, with aiding and abetting in the commission of the offense. Section 281 in substances makes it illegal for a member of Congress to receive or agree to receive compensation for services rendered or to be rendered in any matter before a Federal department or bureau in which the Government is interested, whether he personally or another performs the services.
In this case the charge is the receipt of compensation. The broad objective of the Act is to secure the integrity of executive action against undue influence of members of Congress upon executive officers and to insure efficiency in the conduct of public affairs. It was felt that the absence of pecuniary gain to members of Congress would reduce or eliminate any undue influence upon executive officers or employees in those matters where they appeared before such executive officials.1
The issue presented in this case is novel, as Government counsel concede, in that it is the first prosecution under that statute where admittedly the defendant Quinn as a member of Congress did not personally appear nor render services before the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Bureau involved, on behalf of any taxpayer or in any proceeding, with but one single exception, to which I shall make reference. All the services before the Bureau were rendered by either Quinn's law partners, co-defendants Schwaeber or Saver, or associates of the firm. It is acknowledged that none of the clients have retained him, met him or in general that he had any contact with them. However, this circumstance in and of itself is no bar to a prosecution, providing that the Government establishes prima facie the essential elements of the offense sufficient to send the case to the jury.
Section 281 of Title 18 of the United States Code, in so far as applicable, provides:
"Whoever, being a Member of * * * Congress * * * directly or indirectly receives or agrees to receive, any compensation for any services rendered or to be rendered, either by himself or another, in relation to any proceeding, contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation, arrest, or other matter in which the United States is a party or directly or indirectly interested, before any department, agency, court martial, officer, or any civil, military, or naval commission, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States."
Count 1 of the indictment charges as follows:
This first count of the second indictment is the only one in which the defendant Schwaeber is not also named as a defendant, as an aider and abettor.
The remaining counts of the indictments are all of similar import, except the alleged violation is charged with respect to different matters and on different dates.
The key problem on this motion is what are the essential elements which the Government must establish and whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable person might conclude that the essential elements have been established.
I hold that under the statute, and the indictment as drawn in this case, the essential elements which the prosecution must establish are:
(1) that the defendant Quinn was a member of Congress at the times referred to in the indictment. It is conceded that he was such a member of Congress from January 1, 1949 to December 31, 1951.
(2) that the defendant Quinn received, directly or indirectly, compensation derived from one or more of the matters specified in the indictment.
(3) that the compensation was for services rendered either by him or another, in this case by either or both of the other defendants Schwaeber...
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33 507 United States v. Brewster 8212 45
...Branch may exist, but this country has no tradition of absolute congressional immunity from criminal prosecution. See United States v. Quinn, 141 F.Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y.1956) (motion for acquittal granted because the defendant Member of Congress was unaware of receipt of fees by his law firm)......
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U.S. v. Evans
...v. Kenner, 354 F.2d 780, 785 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958, 86 S.Ct. 1223, 16 L.Ed.2d 301 (1965). Cf. United States v. Quinn, 141 F.Supp. 622, 627 (S.D.N.Y.1956). The gravamen of each offense, then, is not an intent to be corrupted or influenced, but simply the acceptance of an......
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United States v. Johnson
...by hopes of pecuniary reward." Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. at 368, 26 S.Ct. at 693-694, 50 L.Ed. 1057. See also United States v. Quinn, S.D.N.Y., 141 F.Supp. 622, 624. The evils are further increased if the Member of Congress fails to disclose the fact that he is appearing as an attor......
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US v. Lord, Crim. No. 88-138-N.
...element of Section 203(a), Johnson does not suggest that specific intent is a requisite element. The Johnson court's citation to United States v. Quinn suggests the very opposite. In United States v. Quinn, 141 F.Supp. 622, 627 (S.D.N.Y.1956), the district court held that, "It is not necess......