United States v. Quintero, No. 19-10300

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: BYBEE, Circuit Judge
• Citation: 995 F.3d 1044
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sonia QUINTERO, Defendant-Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 19-10300
• Decision Date: 29 April 2021

995 F.3d 1044

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Sonia QUINTERO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-10300

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted November 17, 2020 Phoenix, Arizona
Filed April 29, 2021

M. Edith Cunningham (argued) and James D. Smith, Assistant Federal Public Defenders; Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender; Office of the Federal Public Defender, Tucson, Arizona; for Defendant-Appellant.

Shelly K.G. Clemens (argued), Assistant United States Attorney; Christina M. Cabanillas, Deputy Appellate Chief; Michael Bailey, United States Attorney; United States Attorney's Office, Tucson, Arizona; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before: Richard C. Tallman, Jay S. Bybee, and Bridget S. Bade, Circuit Judges.

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

Sonia Quintero was found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) for assessment of her potential for restoration to competency. Under Department of Justice policy, Quintero was to be hospitalized in an inpatient facility for evaluation and treatment. Quintero argues that the district court should have ordered evaluation and treatment in an outpatient facility and that her commitment violates her statutory and constitutional rights.

We affirm the district court's commitment order.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In December 2017, Quintero was charged in the District of Arizona with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(vii). During pretrial proceedings, Quintero filed a motion to determine competency, along with a neuropsychological evaluation concluding that Quintero was incompetent to stand trial due to cognitive impairment resulting from severe traumatic brain injury and that she was not restorable to competency. The magistrate judge ordered a second psychiatric evaluation, which concluded that Quintero was incompetent to stand trial but was restorable to competence.

After an evidentiary hearing with testimony from both evaluators, the magistrate judge agreed that Quintero was not competent to stand trial, but determined that she was likely restorable to competence.¹

995 F.3d 1049

Quintero objected to mandatory commitment for competency restoration and instead requested outpatient treatment. However, the magistrate judge found that commitment was mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) and ordered her committed to the custody of the Attorney General.

Quintero objected to the magistrate judge's order, but the district court overruled the objection. Quintero timely appealed.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. United States v. Friedman , 366 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 2004). We review challenges to the constitutionality of a statute and questions of statutory construction de novo. United States v. Strong , 489 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007) ; United States v. Kowalczyk , 805 F.3d 847, 856 (9th Cir. 2015).

III. DISCUSSION

The Insanity Defense Reform Act (IDRA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 17, 4241 – 47, governs pretrial competency evaluation and restoration. Section 4241 provides in relevant part:

If, after the hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense, the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General. The Attorney General shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a suitable facility–

(1) for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, as is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward; and

(2) for an additional reasonable period of time until–

(A) his mental condition is so improved that trial may proceed, if the court finds that there is a substantial probability that within such additional period of time he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward; or

(B) the pending charges against him are disposed of according to law;

whichever is earlier.

18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).

Quintero raises seven distinct challenges to her mandatory inpatient commitment under § 4241(d). She argues: (1) § 4241(d) grants the district court discretion to order a specific form of treatment, and the policies of the Attorney General and Bureau of Prisons (BOP) violate the Constitution; mandatory commitment violates (2) due process, (3) equal protection, (4) fundamental fairness, (5) the Sixth Amendment, and (6) the Eighth Amendment; and (7) mandatory commitment discriminates on the basis of disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. None of these arguments is persuasive.

995 F.3d 1050

A. Statutory Construction

1. District Court Discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 4241

Quintero argues that § 4241(d) grants the district court discretion to order outpatient competency restoration assessment and treatment. This contention is meritless. The statute is clear that upon finding a defendant mentally incompetent to stand trial, "the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General" and that "[t]he Attorney General shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a suitable facility." 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) ; see Strong , 489 F.3d at 1057 (holding that mandatory commitment under § 4241(d) does not violate due process). The district court's responsibility is to make the appropriate determination that the defendant is mentally incompetent. The court has no role in determining the "suitable facility."

Other provisions of the IDRA support this construction of § 4241(d). For an initial psychological evaluation of a pretrial defendant—the step before commitment for competency restoration evaluation—Congress employed almost identical language to § 4241(d), except that it used the permissive verb "may" in § 4247(b). See 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b) ("[T]he court may commit the person to be examined for a reasonable period ... to the custody of the Attorney General for placement in a suitable facility.") (emphasis added)). And the IDRA provides that upon restoration of competency, "the court shall order his immediate discharge from the facility in which he is hospitalized." Id. § 4241(e) (emphasis added). In order for Quintero's proposed reading of § 4241(d) —that "shall" means "may"—to be consistent, we would have to read § 4241(e) to be permissive as well, a reading we are confident Quintero would not support. If there is discretion here, it rests with the Attorney General, as elsewhere the IDRA provides that the Attorney General "shall ... consider the suitability of the facility's rehabilitation programs in meeting the needs of the person" and "may contract with a State, a political subdivision, a locality, or a private agency for the confinement, hospitalization, care, or treatment of, or the provision of services to, a person committed to his custody." Id. § 4247(i)(A), (C).

Quintero attempts to draw inferences from definitions of "custody" and "hospitalize" in other statutes. We need not consider these, because any such inferences are irrelevant where, as here, the language of the statute is unambiguous. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson , 525 U.S. 432, 438, 119 S.Ct. 755, 142 L.Ed.2d 881 (1999) ("[W]here the statutory language provides a clear answer, [the inquiry] ends there ....").

We hold that § 4241(d) mandates that district courts commit mentally incompetent defendants to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment, without discretion for the court to order a particular treatment setting.

2. Attorney General and Bureau of Prison Policies

Quintero next asserts that under Attorney General and Bureau of Prison (BOP) policies,² defendants are automatically hospitalized and that this contravenes her construction of the statute in violation of the Take Care Clause of Article II and general separation of powers principles.

995 F.3d 1051

See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. Quintero offers no particular assessment of the Take Care Clause or the separation of powers. Rather, she asserts that the phrase "as is necessary" in § 4241(d)(1) requires the Attorney General to consider the need for hospitalization to achieve competency restoration. Because, in her view, the policies are inconsistent with the statute, Quintero argues that the Attorney General and BOP have failed to take care that the statute be faithfully executed. We find no merit in these arguments.

Section 4241(d) grants the Attorney General the discretion to "hospitalize" the defendant for treatment in a "suitable facility." The IDRA defines "suitable facility" as treatment in a "facility that is suitable to provide care or treatment given the nature of the offense and the characteristics of the defendant." Id. § 4247(a)(2). The statute does not enjoin the Attorney General to choose the least...