United States v. Raines

• Decision Date: 24 January 1961
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 442.
• Citation: 203 F. Supp. 147
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. James Griggs RAINES, Dixon Oxford, Roscoe Radford, Registrars of Terrell County, Georgia, F. Lawson Cook, Sr., and Mrs. F. Lawson Cook, Sr., Deputy Registrars, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

203 F. Supp. 147

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. James Griggs RAINES, Dixon Oxford, Roscoe Radford, Registrars of Terrell County, Georgia, F. Lawson Cook, Sr., and Mrs. F. Lawson Cook, Sr., Deputy Registrars, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 442.

United States District Court M. D. Georgia, Americus Division.

January 24, 1961.

Frank O. Evans, U. S. Atty., Macon, Ga., St. John Barrett, Ben Brooks, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

Charles J. Bloch, Ellsworth Hall, Jr., Macon, Ga., Peter Zack Geer, Atlanta, Ga., Robert L. Russell, Jr., Winder, Ga., for defendants.

BOOTLE, District Judge.

Under the Civil Rights Act of 1957 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1971(c)) the United States, by the Attorney General, brought this action to obtain preventive relief against alleged acts and practices of the defendants as voting registrars and deputy registrars of Terrell County, Georgia which would deprive other persons of rights and privileges secured by subsection (a) of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971, namely, the right and privilege of citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law to vote at any election by the people in the State of Georgia to be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections without distinction of race or color. The trial of the case resulted in a finding of fact that the defendants had engaged in specified acts and practices which deprived Negro citizens of Terrell County of their right and privilege to be entitled and allowed to vote at all elections in Terrell County without distinction of race or color and a decree enjoining them from further engaging in such acts and practices and requiring specifically that four named Negroes be enrolled upon the current list of qualified voters of said county within ten days from the date of said decree, and that certain of the defendants file with the clerk of this court within a specified time their detailed report in writing of their full compliance with the provisions of the decree requiring said enrollment. The said findings of fact, appropriate conclusions of law, and said decree were signed and filed on September 13, 1960.

On September 22, 1960 the defendants so required to report filed their written report with the clerk of this court showing that the four named Negroes had been properly enrolled on the voters list and that the defendants, with the approval of their attorneys, had designed a plan for the purpose of being able to show to the court at any time that full and conscientious compliance with the court's decree is being effectuated. Further, on November 18, 1960 two of the defendants, Dixon Oxford and Mrs. Emily Cook (Mrs. F. Lawson Cook, Sr.), through their attorneys, filed with the clerk of this court their supplemental report showing that James G. Raines had resigned as chief registrar; that his resignation had been accepted by the Judge of the Superior Courts of the Pataula Circuit; that Mansfield Matthews had been duly appointed as registrar and duly named chief registrar to succeed James G. Raines and that Howard Lee had been duly appointed a registrar to succeed William P. Smith who also had resigned. Said supplemental report concluded:

"It is the intention of these defendants, along with the registrars appointed in the order aforesaid to proceed with the registration of voters in Terrell County, Georgia in accordance with the decree of this court of September 14, sic 1960, and in all respects to use it as a guide and direction in the performance of their duties."

Prior to the entry of said findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree and on August 1, 1960 attorneys for plaintiff filed with the clerk their "Notice of Motion for Finding of Pattern or Practice Under Subsection (e) of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971." Counsel for defendants promptly filed their "Partial Response" to said notice and insisted that said motion was premature in that there had been no finding by the court that any person had been deprived on account of race or color of any right or privilege secured by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971(a). Under date of August 29 the court advised counsel that said motion could be heard at some later date and not at that time. Accordingly, on September 19, 1960 after the final decree of September 13, 1960, D.C., 189 F. Supp. 121, plaintiff's counsel filed their written request as follows:

"The Court having found in its order and decree of September 13, 1960, that certain persons had been deprived, on account of their race and color, of rights and privileges secured by subsection (a) of 42 U.S. C. 1971, it is respectfully requested that the Court make a further finding under subsection (e) of said section that such deprivations were and are pursuant to a pattern and practice. This request is based upon the evidence heretofore admitted at the trial of this action and upon all of the papers and pleadings heretofore filed by all parties."

Thereafter on September 27, 1960 the defendants filed their objections to said motion contending, inter alia, that the phrase "pattern and practice" is so vague and indefinite as to be incapable of enforcement; that the evidence would not justify a finding by the court that any deprivation was or is pursuant to a pattern or practice; that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States the Congress has not the constitutional power to impose on a district court of the United States an obligation to make findings or decisions which are not necessary to decide the case or controversy which is properly before it; that the issues forming the case or controversy before this court have been determined by the pleadings filed and the Congress has no power to impose upon this court an obligation to make a finding which is not necessary to the decision of the case before the court between the parties to said case; that the finding requested is not needed to support the original findings and decree, but, on the contrary, is separate, distinct and apart from the case or controversy before the court; that the statute 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971(e) is violative of the Constitution of the United States and particularly the 10th, 14th and 15th Amendments thereof and is not authorized by any power delegated by the states to the United States of America in that it allows the federal government to pass upon the qualifications of citizens to vote in state elections without any finding that the particular citizen has been denied the right to vote on account of his race or color; and that said subsection (e) is void, unconstitutional and of no effect for that:

"(a) It seeks to confer upon courts of the United States power to adjudicate matters which are not `cases' or `controversies' under article III of the Constitution of the United States;

"(b) It seeks to convert District Courts of the United States into registration boards;

"(c) It seeks to confer upon District Courts of the United States the power to determine who is qualified under State law to vote in all elections and so contravenes the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which provides:

"`The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people';

"(d) It is not appropriate legislation under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States;

"(e) Congress has no power under the Constitution of the United States or any amendment thereto to exercise plenary power over voting in all elections;

"(f) Congress has no power to convert Federal District Courts into registration boards to register negroes and compel the States to recognize those negroes as qualified voters in their elections;

"(g) The proceedings authorized and required by the statute to be had subsequent to the finding by the court of a `pattern or practice' lack the essential attributes of a `case' or `controversy' and therefore are not authorized by the Constitution of the United States to be carried on by a Federal Court."

Thereafter, and on October 27, 1960 the defendants filed two additional objections known as 13 and 14, 13 being that subsection (e) was approved by the President on May 6, 1960 and does not have retrospective operation and is not applicable to this action which was instituted in September of 1958; and 14 being that under the evidence in this case "no act of the remaining defendants with respect to the subject matter of the litigation occurred after May 6, 1960, and therefore the statute aforesaid is not applicable to the present action taken in connection with the undisputed evidence therein."

This pending motion for a finding as to pattern and practice has been thoroughly briefed by counsel for plaintiff and defendants and their briefs have included coverage of four questions propounded to counsel by the court by letter dated December 1, 1960 as follows:

"(1) When subsection e, added to 42 U.S.C. 1971 by the most recent amendment, says that `the court shall upon request of the Attorney General * * * make a finding whether such deprivation was or is pursuant to a pattern or practice', did Congress intend that the word `shall' was mandatory or directory and permissive only?

"(2) Under the facts of this particular case should it be assumed that the defendants are going to comply fully with this court's injunction unless and until the contrary should be made to appear?

"(3) If such presumption should be indulged, is there any

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