United States v. Ramirez

• Decision Date: 12 May 2020
• Docket Number: CRIMINAL ACTION No. 17-10328-WGY
• Citation: 459 F.Supp.3d 333
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, v. James RAMIREZ, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

459 F.Supp.3d 333

UNITED STATES of America,

v.James RAMIREZ, Defendant.

CRIMINAL ACTION No. 17-10328-WGY

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Filed May 12, 2020

Eric S. Rosen, Alathea E. Porter, Doreen M. Rachal, United States Attorney's Office, Boston, MA, for United States of America.

W. Jamiel Allen, Federal Defender Office, Boston, MA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

YOUNG, D.J.

I. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

On April 24, 2020, this Court resentenced James Ramirez under its power to grant compassionate release. See Electronic Clerk's Notes, ECF No. 119; Order, ECF No. 120. Ramirez is the first prisoner to whom this Court has granted compassionate relief since the passage of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub, L. No. 115-391, ch. II(D) § 3582(c)(1)(A), 132 Stat 5239-5241 (2018), which grants prisoners the right to appeal denials of compassionate relief made by the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Prior to the passage of the First Step Act, district courts could grant a request for compassionate relief only upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (the "Director"). See United States v. Beck, 425 F.Supp.3d 573, 578 (M.D.N.C. 2019) (citing Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. II(D) § 3582(c)(1)(A), 98 Stat. 1837 (1984)); Green v. Apker, No. 5:13-HC-2159, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94376, at *5, 2014 WL 3487247, at *2 (E.D.N.C. July 11, 2014). The First Step Act now allows federal courts, as well as the Director, to reduce the term of imprisonment "upon motion of the defendant" if the defendant has exhausted all administrative rights, or upon "the lapse of 30 days from receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier ...." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

For a defendant under 70 years of age, a court may grant compassionate release only if "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrants such a reduction," and "such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." Id. A court must also consider the general sentencing factors contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553. Id. These factors include the nature and circumstances of the offense and defendant, the necessity of the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, deter other criminals, and protect the public, the kind of sentences available, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Ramirez's request for compassionate release is motivated in part by the COVID-19 pandemic that has spread like wildfire throughout the world, and in part by his medical vulnerability. See Def.’s Mot. Reduce Sentence Pursuant 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) ("Def.’s Mot."), ECF No 111. COVID-19 is particularly contagious in prisons because inmates are forced into close quarters without access to personal protective equipment. See Savino v. Souza, No. 20-10617-WGY, 453 F.Supp.3d 441 (D. Mass. Apr. 8, 2020) (discussing COVID-19 risk to detainees in ICE facility); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html (last accessed Apr. 29, 2020) (advising people to maintain a distance of at least six feet from each other in order to reduce the spread of the disease). New York, where Ramirez is imprisoned in the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC), Brooklyn facility, is the hardest-hit state in the United States as of the time of this writing. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Cases in the U.S., https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html (last accessed Apr. 30, 2020) (reporting 290,481 COVID-19 cases and 22,275 deaths in the state of New York).

The questions in Ramirez's case are whether the risk of contracting the coronavirus, given his medical history, is the type of "extraordinary and compelling circumstance" that warrants compassionate relief, and whether this Court may waive the 30-day requirement of section 3582(c)(1)(A). This Court answers both questions in the affirmative.

1. Availability of Relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582

Ramirez's case differs from typical requests for compassionate release prior to the passage of the First Step Act because he seeks release due in part to an external threat, the COVID-19 virus, rather than solely due to an existing internal medical condition.

Such a request is outside the traditional grounds for compassionate release under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, the policy statement that governs motions filed by the Director under section 3582(c)(1)(A). Beck, 425 F.Supp.3d at 578. The official commentary provides that extraordinary or compelling reasons for relief can consist of: (1) the medical condition of the defendant; (2) the age of the defendant; or (3) the family circumstances of the defendant. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1. The description of medical conditions that warrant relief is particularly restrictive, including only terminal illness or serious deterioration that "substantially diminishes" the ability of the defendant to provide self-care and "from which he or she is not expected to recover." Id. cmt. n.1(A). The commentary also provides a catch-all provision, allowing for release upon consideration of another "extraordinary and compelling reason" as determined by the Director. Id. cmt. n.1(D). In practice, the Bureau of Prison's ("BOP") criteria for release are far more restrictive than authorized by the guidelines. See Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Department of Justice, Program Statement 5050.49 (2013); Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, The Impact of an Aging Inmate Population on the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("Impact Study") 41-46 (2015).¹

District courts have debated whether, after the First Step Act, the Director remains the sole arbiter of the catch-all provision that allows "other" factors to be considered in release. Compare United States v. Cantu, 423 F. Supp. 3d 345, 349-52 (S.D. Tex. June 17, 2019) (holding that judges, in addition to the Director, can consider factors other than those enumerated because the First Step Act superseded the policy guidelines), with United States v. Lynn, Cr. No. 89-0072, 2019 WL 3805349, at *3-5, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135987, at *6-11 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 12, 2019) (rejecting the reasoning in Cantu because the preexisting language of section 1B1.13 1(d) does not directly contradict the First Step Act).

This Court has held that it may consider unlisted factors in deciding whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances exist because such an interpretation best comports with the First Step Act. See United States v. Bucci, 409 F. Supp. 3d 1, 1-2 (D. Mass. 2019). This Court agrees with Judge Hornby of the District of Maine that "[t]he First Step Act did not change the statutory criteria for compassionate release, but it did change the procedures, so that the Bureau of Prisons is no longer an obstacle to a court's consideration of whether compassionate release is appropriate." United States v. Fox, No. 2:14-CR-03-DBH, 2019 WL 3046086 at *3, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115388 at *5 (D. Me. July 11, 2019). The language of the comment that refers to the "Director of the Bureau of Prisons" is best understood as reflecting the procedure in place at the time of its writing, rather than a substantive restriction. See Bucci, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 2.

The policy contained in section 1B1.13 serves as "helpful guidance on the factors that support compassionate release, although it is not ultimately conclusive." Id. (quoting Fox, 2019 WL 3046086, at *3, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115388, at *4 ); see also Beck, 425 F.Supp.3d at 578-80, United States v. Brown, 411 F. Supp. 3d 446, 451 (S.D. Iowa 2019), amended, 2020 WL 2091802 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 29, 2020). As the threat from the coronavirus post-dates both section 1B1.13 and the First Step Act, and this Court has the authority to consider other relevant factors, it must now look beyond the policy language in determining if "extraordinary and compelling reasons" exist.

2. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons

Ramirez is neither the first nor the last inmate to request release in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, so this Court first considers the extent to which the pandemic justifies release in general.

This Court's ability to exercise its discretion is not constrained by the language of section 3582(c)(1)(A). See Cantu, 423 F. Supp. 3d at 352. To guide their discretion, however, courts should grant relief under the catch-all provision only if the inmates’ circumstances are "comparable or analogous to what the Commission has already articulated as criteria for compassionate release." Fox, 2019 WL 3046086, at *3, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115388, at *7. The most relevant guidance from the Commission comes from section 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A)(ii), which allows for medical release when "[t]he defendant is ... suffering from a serious physical or medical condition ... that substantially diminishes the ability to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover." Even when prisoners’ circumstances fall within the guidelines, a grant of compassionate release is a "rare event." United States v. Willis, 382 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1188 (D.N.M. 2019) (listing cases). Yet worldwide pandemics are a rare event as well.

Other courts have held that the threat of COVID-19 alone is not sufficient to allow release. For example, a court in the Western District of Virginia denied compassionate release to an inmate in part because he failed to show he suffered from a medical condition that made him particularly susceptible to COVID-19. See United States v. Dungee, 2020 WL 1666470, at *2, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59511, at *5 (W.D.V.A. Apr. 4, 2020). Similarly, in United States v. Khawaja the district court found that the threat of COVID-19 to an inmate with mere "breathing difficulties" did not merit compassionate release under either the section 1B1.13 enumerated...