United States v. Ramos-Gutierrez
| Decision Date | 07 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 6:19-cr-00313-MC |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff, v. TOMÁS RAMOS-GUTIERREZ, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Both the defendant and the government have moved to dismiss the Information in this case. See ECF No.'s 36 & 57. In the best interests of justice, the Court GRANTS Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez's Motion to Dismiss Information, ECF No. 36. The Government's Motion to Dismiss Information, ECF No. 57, is DENIED as moot.
In 2017, Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez was arrested in Lane County after getting into a fight with his spouse. Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez was charged with driving while suspended and harassment constituting domestic violence, both misdemeanors. While in Lane County custody, an Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") agent filed "an I-2247(A) (Immigration Detainer) with the Lane County Jail." ECF No. 37, Ex. A at 3. Despite this detainer, Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez's attorney advised him to plead guilty to both charges. The attorney apparently believed that a quick plea would likely lead to Mr. Ramos-Guiterrez case going unnoticed by immigration authorities. In retrospect, this "under the radar" maneuver turned out to be ill advised.
As part of his guilty plea, the state court entered a no-contact order between Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez and his wife. See ECF No. 37, Ex. B (Judgement). Upon release from jail, ICE arrested Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez and transported him to the Northwest Detention Center in Tacoma, Washington.
Throughout the rest of 2017 and the beginning of 2018, Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez appeared at four removal hearings before Immigration Judge ("IJ") John O'Dell. At the first hearing in November 2017, Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez appeared with a group of detainees where the group was advised of their "right to present [their] own evidence" and that they had "the right to apply for voluntary departure," which required a showing "merit[ing] a favorable exercise of the Court's discretion." ECF No. 37, Ex C at 3-4. At this initial hearing, Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez was granted a continuance to obtain counsel. Id. at 4.
The IJ granted Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez a continuance at his second hearing in December 2017 for the same reason. Id. at 6. But Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez was financially unable to obtain counsel and subsequently agreed to proceed without an attorney at his third hearing in January 2018. During this third hearing, the IJ found that Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez could be eligible for cancellation upon application from his spouse, so the matter was once again set over. But because of the no-contact order, Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez was unable to apply for cancellation. Id. at 19. The court made no independent inquiry into the desire of Mr. Ramos-Guiterrez's spouse, nor did they request a waiver from the state court to allow Mr. Ramos Guiterrez some level of third-party contact to determine whether his spouse desired to file the application for cancellation. Certainly, the IJ was under no prescription to determine these facts, but when a fact finder is making decisions that impact a family, perhaps the facts might actually matter.
Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez's fourth and final hearing took place on March 3, 2018. At this hearing, Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez applied for voluntary departure. Id. at 19-20. While Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez tried to explain to the IJ the circumstances surrounding his guilty pleas and why he should be eligible for voluntary departure, the IJ denied his request by reducing the equities of Mr. Ramos-Guiterrez's life to the following:
Alright, um, sir, um, you do have some positive equities here but you have three criminal convictions here. You had an opportunity when you had Deferred Action as a Childhood Arrival, um, to remain in the United States and you went out and committed three different crimes including domestic violence and driving under the influence. I don't find that you've demonstrated that you merit a favorable exercise of the Court's discretion for voluntary departure so I am going to deny voluntary departure as a matter of discretion and I'm ordering you removed to Mexico. This is a deportation order. . . . [W]hen you plead guilty before a judge under oath, that has consequences and I'm not going to look behind the conviction ... I mean I can't as a matter of law at this point. Well thank you sir for providing that information. I am still going to deny your application for voluntary departure and order you removed to Mexico. Do you understand the order sir?
Id. at 21. The IJ then asked Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez whether he would like to appeal the removal order. Id. at 22. After learning that the appeals process would take another three to five months, Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez accepted the removal order "as a final decision" and the IJ noted that Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez's right to appeal was waived. Id.
Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez was removed to Mexico City ten days later. As part of his removal, Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez could not reenter the United States for ten years. See ECF No. 37, Ex. D (Form I-294: Warning to Alien Ordered Removed or Deported). In 2019, Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez was found in the United States and charged with one count of illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). See ECF No. 14.
Both parties agree that the Information against Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez should be dismissed with prejudice, with the only contention being whose motion the Court should grant. Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez originally moved to dismiss by attacking the validity of his underlying removal proceeding from 2018. See Memo in Sup. of Mot. to Dismiss Info., ECF No. 37. After oral argument, the Court allowed the parties to file supplemental motions because of new information raised at the hearing. See ECF No.'s 47-56. While the Government originally voiced strong opposition to Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez's motion and filed a supplemental response after oral argument, the Government reversed their position less than three weeks later.1 The Government alleged that given new information, without specifically citing what that information was, that dismissal was "in the best interests of justice." Gov.'s Mot. to Dismiss Info. 1, ECF No. 57.
But the Court disagrees. Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a), "The government may, with leave of court, dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint." (emphasis added). If the Court were to grant the Government's request, the "non-merits dismissal [will] circumvent a ruling on the invalidity of the 2018 removal order [and] is not in the best interests of justice." Opp'n to Gov.'s Mot. to Dismiss Info. 1-2, ECF No. 62 (quotation omitted); Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 n.15 (1977) (); see also United States v. Reyes-Romero, 327 F. Supp. 3d 855, 899 (W.D. Pa 2018) ().
For these reasons, the Court DENIES the Government's request for leave of court. The Court now turns to the merits of Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez's motion to dismiss information.
The Government originally charged Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez with illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1362(a). ECF No. 14. Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez is collaterally attacking his removal order from 2018, which he has a right to do. United States v. Zarate-Martinez, 133 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1998) . To successfully attack the underlying removal order, Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez must show that: (1) he exhausted all administrative remedies available to appeal the removal order; (2) the underlying removal proceedings at which the order was issued improperly deprived him of the opportunity for judicial review; and (3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(d)(1) - (3).
Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez can "satisfy the first two prongs of section 1326(d) together upon a showing of one of three different scenarios." United States v. Morales-Santiago, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1105, 1115 (E.D. Wash. 2019) (citation omitted).
First, both prongs are satisfied ''when the [IJ fails] to inform the alien that he had a right to appeal his deportation order to the [Board of Immigration Appeals].'' Second, both prongs are satisfied when the immigration judge fails to inform the defendant that he is eligible for a certain type of relief. Third, both prongs are satisfied if the defendant proves that his waiver of appellate rights was not considered and intelligent. Absent any of these three situations, a defendant must independently satisfy the first two prongs of section 1326(d).
Id. (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Villalobos, 724 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013)).
Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez argues that "his waiver of appeal was neither considered nor intelligent." Memo. of Law in Support of Mot. to Dismiss Info. 21, ECF No. 37. In United States v. Melendez-Castro, the court held that when an IJ denies a defendant "a genuine opportunity toapply for voluntary departure or to present evidence of the factors favoring his relief," the first two prongs of section 1326(d) are satisfied due to invalid waiver. 671 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2012). Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez raises a nearly identical argument here and, as discussed below, the IJ's failure to properly develop the record is apparent. It therefore follows that because the IJ denied Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez "a genuine opportunity" to present a compelling voluntary departure application, Mr. Ramos-Gutierrez's appellate...
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