United States v. Ramos-David

• Decision Date: 27 October 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-1144,20-1144
• Citation: 16 F.4th 326
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Darwin RAMOS-DAVID, Defendant, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

16 F.4th 326

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

v.Darwin RAMOS-DAVID, Defendant, Appellant.

No. 20-1144

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

October 27, 2021

Lydia J. Lizarribar-Masini for appellant.

Alexander L. Alum, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, and Thomas F. Klumper, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for appellee.

Before Kayatta and Barron, Circuit Judges, and Saris,^* District Judge.

SARIS, District Judge.

Darwin Ramos-David ("Ramos") pleaded guilty to two armed carjackings, armed robbery, and using and carrying a firearm in connection with a carjacking. At the sentencing hearing more than three months after Ramos' plea, his attorney requested a mental competency examination and moved to withdraw his plea pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, telling the District Court (Domínguez, J.) that the night before his change-of-plea hearing he was attacked in jail for being a "snitch" and he found out his mother had suffered a stroke. Ramos claimed he was confused at his change-of-plea hearing and felt pressure to plead as a result of these events. The District Court (Besosa, J.) denied both motions and pronounced a sentence that was nine months above the sentencing guidelines range. Ramos appealed the denial of the motions and the sentence. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

We begin with the background facts. On January 3, 2017, four individuals took a 2008 Toyota Yaris from a woman while she was opening her trunk; one individual pointed a firearm at her. She reported the incident to the police. In a lineup on March 30, 2017, she identified Ramos as the perpetrator who took the car from her at gunpoint. During cooperation discussions with the local and federal authorities, while he was in state custody, Ramos maintained that he had not participated in the carjacking. He claimed the perpetrator was his brother and they looked alike. On April 20, 2017, Ramos was charged in a two-count indictment with using, carrying and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) ; and carjacking under 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1).

He moved to suppress the identification as impermissibly suggestive on February 22, 2018. On November 26, 2018, Ramos sought a continuance of the suppression hearing because of ongoing plea discussions. Another motion to continue the suppression hearing to complete the plea negotiation process was granted in mid-December 2018. In late January 2019, Ramos' counsel advised that Ramos wanted to continue the suppression hearing, which was rescheduled for April 4, 2019.

On March 21, 2019, the government filed a superseding indictment, adding another five charges relating to a March 13, 2017 armed robbery of a business and a March 20, 2017 armed carjacking of a Toyota Tacoma. On May 16, 2019, a second superseding indictment was filed.

On the day of the arraignment on the second superseding indictment and the rescheduled suppression hearing, May 23, 2019, Ramos withdrew his motion to suppress, signed a plea agreement, and pleaded guilty before a magistrate judge to all of the charges regarding the January 3, 2017 carjacking, the March 13, 2017 robbery and the March 20, 2017 carjacking (but not to the associated gun charges or the felon in possession charge).¹ In stipulating to the facts supporting his plea and initialing the facts concerning each charge, Ramos admitted that he had participated in all three events and that he or those who aided and abetted him were prepared to cause serious bodily harm to both carjacking victims if doing so had been necessary to take the vehicles.

At his plea hearing, the magistrate judge questioned Ramos about the purpose of the hearing, and Ramos recounted that it was "to plead guilty for the aforementioned counts and to accept the time." Ramos said he was satisfied with his legal representation, and his lawyer said she had no concerns about his mental competence. The court found him competent to plead. The court also confirmed that Ramos had reviewed the plea agreement, called on the government to explain its terms, and verified with Ramos that he was, in fact, guilty of each of the counts in the plea agreement. The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation to accept the guilty plea, which was adopted by the district court on July 2, 2019.

The plea agreement provided that the parties would agree to recommend an 84-month prison term for knowingly using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm "during and in relation to" the January 3, 2017 carjacking to run consecutively to the term for all of the other offenses. The pre-sentence report ("PSR") calculated a Total Offense Level of 25 and a Criminal History Category of III, which yielded a guidelines range sentence of 70-87 months for the remaining counts. The plea agreement contained a waiver of appeal provision if he was sentenced to 162 months or fewer.

At his scheduled sentencing hearing² more than three months later, on September 10, 2019, Ramos requested the withdrawal of his plea. As the district court (Besosa, J.) later summarized, Ramos claimed that he was

innocent of the charges against him, alleged a discrepancy between his plea and the charges presented to the grand jury, asserted he was beaten up at the jail the day he signed the plea agreement, and noted he learned the day before he signed the agreement that his mother had had a stroke. He also stated that, on the day of the change-of-plea hearing, he was ready for a suppression hearing and was surprised to receive a plea offer.

The court (Domínguez, J.) postponed the sentencing. According to counsel, she met with Ramos after the hearing, and he was teary and upset. Two days later, Ramos moved for an expert determination of his mental condition pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b). In his motion, Ramos repeated the allegations underlying his request for withdrawal of his guilty plea, stating that the night before he pleaded guilty, he learned that his mother had suffered a minor stroke and inmates beat him because they believed him to be a snitch. He asserted that those circumstances made him confused and impaired his understanding during the change-of-plea hearing. Id. The case was transferred back to the assigned judge (Cerezo, J.), but it was then transferred to Judge Besosa, whose sentence and order are on appeal.

In a written opinion, the district court (Besosa, J.) denied Ramos' motions on December 11, 2019. First, the court noted that it must order a competency hearing "if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense." 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). Relying on United States v. Kenney, 756 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2014), the court found no reasonable cause for a mental competency examination based on a review of the proceedings before the magistrate judge in which Ramos articulated the purpose of the proceeding, and before the sentencing judge at the initial truncated hearing where he engaged in "extended discourse" with the judge. The court also found that Ramos was not entitled to a withdrawal of his plea because (1) Ramos' claims of innocence were not credible, (2) an alleged grand jury error (the indictment initially indicated that he had stolen the Toyota Tacoma from one woman instead of two) did not affect Ramos' substantial rights, and (3) neither the beating nor his mother's mild stroke caused coercion, duress or involuntariness.

On January 16, 2020, the district court proceeded to sentence Ramos. At the hearing, Ramos' attorney confirmed that his mother had been sick and put forward other mitigating factors (including his close relationship with his young children). The government recommended 171 months. The court, after adopting the PSR, reflected on Ramos' criminal history, which included "disorderly conduct, use of violence or intimidation against public authorities, threats, carrying and using a firearm without a license, and attempted robbery." It stated that it had considered all of the "3553(a) factors, the elements of the offenses, the plea agreement, and the need to promote respect for the law and to protect the public from further crimes by Mr. Ramos, as well as the need to address the issues of deterrence and punishment." Id. The court then pronounced the agreed-upon 84 months for knowingly using, carrying and brandishing a firearm "during and in relation to a crime of violence" to be served consecutively to the 96 months for the remaining counts. The resulting sentence of 180 months was a nine-month variance above the guideline range.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Ramos argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a mental competency examination, in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and in pronouncing a sentence that is substantively unreasonable. We consider each argument in turn.

Mental Competency . "The conviction of a person legally incompetent to stand trial violates due process." United States v. Maryea, 704 F.3d 55, 69 (1st Cir. 2013). Thus, Ramos could not plead guilty "unless he [did] so ‘competently and intelligently.’ " Kenney, 756 F.3d at 43 (quoting Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) ). To safeguard that constitutional guarantee, courts are required to order a competency hearing on a party's motion or sua sponte "if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense." 18...