United States v. Ransom, 09-5264
| Decision Date | 05 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-5264,09-5264 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SIEG RANSOM, aka J-Rock Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 11a0698n.06
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
Before: DAUGHTREY, COOK, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.
COOK, Circuit Judge. In this sentencing appeal, we must determine whether the district judge erred in applying a five-year minimum consecutive sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and whether the district judge abused his discretion in declining to vary downward from the career offender guidelines range. Concluding that the district judge applied § 924(c) correctly and that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in determining the sentence, we affirm.
Defendant-appellant Sieg Ransom pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), two counts of possession of more than five grams of cocaine base with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 924(c). The probation officer determined in a Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") that Ransom faced a total offense level of 23 and a criminal history category of VI. The probation officer then applied the career offender guidelines under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b)(A), resulting in an offense level of 34 (after the subtraction of three levels for acceptance of responsibility) and a guideline range of 262 to 327 months. The combination of the § 924(c) conviction and other drug-trafficking convictions added 60 months to Ransom's advisory range, resulting in a final advisory range of 322 to 387 months.
At sentencing, Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr., stated the recommended guidelines range and asked the parties to comment, but the parties did not dispute the calculation, the application of the five-year minimum consecutive sentence, or the criminal history as stated in the PSR. Defense counsel voiced Ransom's position that the career offender guideline should not apply because Ransom's criminal record overstated the seriousness of his criminal history. Notwithstanding counsel's arguments, the district judge expressed concern that Ransom's record might have understated Ransom's criminal history, noting that Ransom had incurred new charges for drug-trafficking crimes since the last conviction. He then sentenced Ransom to 322 months of imprisonment: 120 months for Count 1 and 262 months for Counts 2 and 4 to run concurrently, and 60 months on Count 3 to run consecutively.
Ransom filed a timely notice of appeal on March 3, 2009. He asks this court to overturn the district court's decision and to remand for resentencing, contending that the district court should nothave applied a five-year minimum consecutive sentence for the § 924(c) violation and that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to deviate from the career offender sentencing guideline.
The parties dispute whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) requires a minimum consecutive sentence of five years even where Ransom faces a greater minimum sentence for another count of conviction unrelated to using, carrying, or possessing a firearm in connection with a crime of violence or a drug-trafficking crime. "The district court's application of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is a question of law which we review de novo." United States v. Langan, 263 F.3d 613, 626-27 (6th Cir. 2001). 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) states in relevant part:
Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime—(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added). Ransom contends that the plain meaning of the phrase "otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law" encompasses all classes of laws without limit. In United States v. Almany, 598 F.3d 238, 242 (6th Cir. 2010), weendorsed this interpretation of the phrase. The Government proposes instead that "any other provision of law" refers only to laws that penalize "using, carrying, or possessing a firearm in connection with a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime."
Sometime after the parties submitted their briefs, the Supreme Court ruled on this very issue in Abbott v. United States, ____ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 18, 29-31 (2010). The Court adopted the Government's approach, clarifying that the exception in § 924(c) only applies if another count imposes a higher minimum penalty for using, carrying, or possessing a firearm in connection with a drug-trafficking crime or crime of violence. Abbott expressly rejected the interpretation that Ransom proposes, and the Supreme Court later vacated Almany and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Abbott. See Abbott, 131 S. Ct. at 23 (); United States v. Almany, 131 S. Ct. 637 (2010). The Sixth Circuit then affirmed the district court decision in Almany, following Abbott's interpretation. United States v. Almany, 626 F.3d 901, 901-02 (6th Cir. 2010).
In the instant case, none of Ransom's other counts concerns using, carrying, or possessing a firearm in connection with a drug-trafficking crime or crime of violence. As such, the exception does not apply and § 924(c) requires Ransom to serve the five-year minimum consecutive sentence.
Ransom next argues that the district court unreasonably refused to vary from the career offender guideline, which added 17 to 19 years to the 92- to 115-month guidelines range he would have otherwise received. "Regardless of whether the sentence imposed is inside or outside the Guidelines range, the appellate court must review the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard." Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We evaluate the district court's decision for procedural reasonableness and substantive reasonableness. United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 808 (6th Cir. 2006).
Significant procedural errors, "such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence," may constitute procedural unreasonableness. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. As explained in Gall, a district court should begin the sentencing proceedings with a correct calculation of the guidelines range, give both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate, and consider all of the § 3553(a) factors without presuming the reasonableness of the guidelines range. Id. at 49-50; cf. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007) (). Then, upon settling on the appropriate sentence, the district court must "adequately explain the chosensentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing." Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 (citing Rita, 551 U.S. at 357-58).
The parties do not dispute that Judge Mays calculated the guidelines range correctly or that he gave both parties an opportunity to argue their positions at the sentencing hearing. Ransom contends, however, that Judge Mays failed to treat the guidelines as advisory and failed to account adequately for the need to avoid sentencing disparities under § 3553(a)(6).
Though Judge Mays expressly acknowledged the advisory nature of the guidelines, Ransom asserts that Judge Mays nevertheless felt "constrained to apply the guidelines in a mandatory fashion." As evidence, Ransom construes Judge Mays's comments to express concern that "he would not be following the 'rule of law in this country' were he to vary from the guidelines," that "he could not pick a number out of thin air, that he was not supposed to be guessing what he might do if Mr. Ransom were somebody else, and that he could not rely on his instincts."
Ransom misreads these quotes by divorcing them from their context. When Judge Mays stated, "It doesn't work under the rule of law in this country," the "[i]t" in that comment referred to the act of selecting a sentence without "hav[ing] a reasonable basis for [his] sentence," not the act of sentencing outside of the guidelines range. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195, 205 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51) . Judge Mays acknowledged that the guidelines sentence initially seemed high to him, and he considered whether he could rationally justify imposing a sentence below the guidelines range. Finding that he could not, he concluded, "the more I look at it, the guidelines appear to be what work here, although, I think they are real heavy." Judge Mays's...
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