United States v. Rapoport

• Decision Date: 16 May 2023
• Docket Number: 22-716
• Parties: United States, Appellee, v. Ruslan Rapoport, AKA Sam Freed, AKA Alex James, AKA Al Jason, AKA Mark Berg, Defendant, Peter Liounis, AKA Mark Anderson, AKA Andrew Black, AKA James Weston, AKA Mike Sloli, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

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United States, Appellee, v. Ruslan Rapoport, AKA Sam Freed, AKA Alex James, AKA Al Jason, AKA Mark Berg, Defendant, Peter Liounis, AKA Mark Anderson, AKA Andrew Black, AKA James Weston, AKA Mike Sloli, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22-716

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

May 16, 2023

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 16^th day of May, two thousand twenty-three.

Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Glasser, J.).

FOR APPELLEE: Jo Ann M. Navickas, Jonathan P. Lax, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Breon Peace, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Peter Liounis, pro se, Glenville, WV.

PRESENT: DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge, REENA RAGGI MARIA ARAUJO KAHN, Circuit Judges.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the March 14, 2022 order of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Appellant Peter Liounis, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) compassionate release motion. The district court ruled that Liounis had failed to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying his release and that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors weighed against a sentence reduction. See United States v. Liounis, 592 F.Supp.3d 43, 46-48 (E.D.N.Y. 2022). Liounis appealed, and now moves to supplement the record on appeal. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

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A district court may, in an exercise of its discretion, reduce a defendant's term of imprisonment by granting a motion brought under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)-the "compassionate release" provision-if (1) the defendant has exhausted administrative remedies; (2) the § 3553(a) sentencing factors favor a sentence reduction and (3) the defendant's circumstances are extraordinary and compelling "such that, in light of the[] § 3553(a) factors, a sentence reduction is justified . . . and would not simply constitute second-guessing of the sentence previously imposed." United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67, 71 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam). We review the denial of such a motion for abuse of discretion, and will affirm unless the district court's ruling was based on a legal or factual error, or cannot otherwise "be located within the range of permissible decisions." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However because all three compassionate release conditions must be satisfied for a defendant to obtain relief, we have held that if one is "lacking," a court "need not address" the remaining conditions. Id. at 73.

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against granting a sentence reduction. At Liounis's initial sentencing, the district court carefully weighed the § 3553(a) factors, including Liounis's history and characteristics and the need to provide specific deterrence-especially pressing given the fact that Liounis was released from prison for a substantively similar crime shortly before the instant offense, which he committed while on supervised release. Also relevant was the serious harm Liounis's fraudulent investment scheme caused to his victims, many of whom were elderly or otherwise particularly vulnerable. [Id. at 49-54.] Then, when denying his motion for compassionate release, the court indicated that its evaluation of those factors had "not been affected by time," recalling in particular how Liounis had reoffended while on supervised release, "the emotional testimony provided at trial by victims of [his] schemes," and Liounis's "callous" and "completely indifferent" response to the harm he was causing. Liounis, 592 F.Supp.3d at 47. The district court's reasonable analysis of the sentencing factors provides sufficient reason to affirm. See Keitt, 21 F.4th at 73.

Liounis argues that the district court should have given more weight to his rehabilitative efforts since he has been incarcerated but "the weight to be afforded any § 3553(a) factor is a matter firmly committed to the...