United States v. Rayor
Citation | 204 F. Supp. 486 |
Decision Date | 16 April 1962 |
Docket Number | Crim. No. 30550. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Seymour R. RAYOR, Defendant. |
Francis C. Whelan, U. S. Atty., Thomas R. Sheridan, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chief, Criminal Section, by Richard G. Sherman, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff.
Ernest R. Mortenson, Pasadena, Cal., for defendant.
The referred-to clause under which the information was drawn reads:
shall be guilty of an offense.
A motion for a Bill of Particulars (Rule 7(f), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A.) filed by the defendant on March 1, 1962, was granted by the Court and the Bill was filed on March 15, 1962. It disclosed that the Government relied upon the fact that the defendant had made deductions for personal gambling losses which he paid with company checks. The Motion for Bill of Particulars1 and the Bill of Particulars2 are printed in the margin.
The disclosure made by the Bill of Particulars, considered as additions to the allegations of the information, reveals the following facts:
The defendant and his wife, who is not indicted, each own fifty percent (50%) of Rayor's Inc., a construction corporation located in Inglewood, California. Rayor paid personal (Las Vegas) gambling losses with corporation checks which he charged on the company books as "miscellaneous construction expenses" for the year 1955.
Subsequent to the filing of the returns for 1954, 1955 and 1956, Rayor, Inc. was audited by the Internal Revenue Service and it was then determined that included in the construction expenses of Rayor, Inc. was $17,000.00 in personal gambling losses. As a result of this audit there were additional disallowed expenses of $3,050.00 and the taxpayer received credit in the amount of $5,379.50 in entertainment expense which he had not previously deducted. These adjustments increased Rayor, Inc.'s taxable income for 1955 from $103,533.74 to $118,204.24, which would have created a tax liability of $55,966.20.
When the adjustments reflected by the Internal Revenue Service are merged with the proper accounting method, the following results are obtained for the year 1955:
Taxable Tax Liability Income or (Refund) Corrected 1955 $ 88,561.87 $ 7,785.37 Add: Gambling Loss 17,000.00 Disallowed checks 3,050.00 ___________ Total 108,611.87 Less: Allowed Entertainment Expense 5,379.50 ___________ Corrected 1955 Taxable Income and refund after consideration of the above factors 103,232.37 156.86 ============ _____________ Decrease in Refund due to the above adjustments $ 7,628.51
Contending that a proper computation of the tax would not have shown a deficiency for the year 1955, the defendant insists that no offense is charged in the information. The argument is grounded upon the contention that before a statement under § 7206(1) of Title 26 U.S. C.A. can be said to be violative of the Section, there must be falsity as to a material fact. The argument would apply to this Section the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Poonian v. United States, 9 Cir., 1961, 294 F. 2d 74.
In that case a panel of the Court, with one Judge dissenting, held that to constitute a violation of § 1001 of Title 18 U.S.C.A. the matter, the falsity of which is alleged, must be material. In this respect the ruling conforms to that obtaining in other circuits. (See, Rolland v. United States, 5 Cir., 1953, 200 F.2d 678; Freidus v. United States, 1955, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 133, 223 F.2d 598) But these cases are not decisive of the point before us because, as stated, they arose not under § 7206(1) of Title 26 U.S.C.A., but under the more general Section, § 1001 of Title 18 U.S.C.A.
A comparison of these two sections shows clearly that § 7206(1) does not make materiality a decisive factor. So the teaching of those cases does not apply.
The Government was entitled to proceed against the defendant under several sections. It could have charged him with attempt to evade the income tax in violation of § 7201 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. It could also have charged him with making a false statement to a Government agency. (18 U.S.C.A. § 1001) Or it could have charged him, as it did, with violation of the special section relating to false statement under which the information is drawn. (26 U.S.C.A. § 7206(1)) When this is the situation, the choice lies with the Government, and it is not the privilege of the defendant to say that the Government should have proceeded under a different section. In Taylor v. United States, 9 Cir., 1950, 179 F.2d 640 the Court uses this significant language:
"Congress may make each separate step in a prohibited transaction a separate offense." (p. 643)3
(See, Catrino v. United States, 9 Cir., 1949, 176 F.2d 884, 886)
When the choice is made under this principle, no constitutional norm is violated. In Albrecht v. United States, 1927, 273 U.S. 1, 11, 47 S.Ct. 250, 71 L.Ed. 505, the Court says:
prevented prosecution for a felony under § 145(b) of that Act punishing willful evasion of the tax. (See, Parmagini v. United States, 9 Cir., 1930, 42 F.2d 721, 724-725; And see the writer's opinion in United States v. Harris, 1939, D.C., 26 F.Supp. 788) And separate or consecutive acts may be prosecuted although they arose out of a single incident. (See, Ebeling v. Morgan, 1915, 237 U.S. 625, 629-631, 35 S.Ct. 710, 59 L.Ed. 1151; Blockburger v. United States, 1932, 284 U.S. 299, 303-305, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306; Gore v. United States, 1958, 357 U.S. 386, 388-390, 78 S.Ct. 1280, 2 L.Ed. 2d 1405) As the Government had the right to choose prosecution under § 7206 (1) of Title 26 U.S.C.A., the question of materiality of statements to insure verity in tax returns should be decided by reference to that Section alone and not by a narrow interpretation of what is material under some other section. The more so, as the Section does not specify the scope of the materiality, the falsity as to which it punishes.
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