United States v. Reed

Decision Date25 May 1897
Citation86 F. 308
PartiesUNITED STATES v. REED.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Wallace Macfarlane, U.S. Atty., Jason Hinman, Asst. U.S. Atty., and Max J. Kohler, Asst. U.S. Atty.

Abram J. Rose and David McClure, for defendant.

BROWN District Judge.

Gentlemen of the Jury: Most civilized governments have found it necessary to pass statutes for the protection of seamen. As a class they have been found to be persons who need special statutory protection. They are improvident for the most part and have very little learning. They go hither and thither over the world with little except the statutes and the kindness of their masters, when they do have kind masters, to give them their rights. Universally, the law has made the master a monarch upon the ship. His authority is absolute. That is a necessity of navigation. At times it has been found to lead to such lack of consideration on the part of masters or of owners, that the seamen suffer in their just right to humane treatment. Therefore statutory enactments have been found necessary to protect them. Our own government has repeatedly passed statutes for this purpose from the time of its organization.

The disease of scurvy was formerly much more prevalent than now. Latterly, as you know by this testimony, it is infrequent. The provisions of our own law were enacted the better to prevent that disease and dreadful scourge upon long voyages. The act (Rev. St. Sec. 4511, and schedule following Rev. St Sec. 4612), which has been mentioned to you, was passed, I think, first in 1872. It provided specifically for the kinds of food, and a certain variety of food, which should be furnished, and which it was believed, if furnished in sufficient quantities, would be a guaranty against this disorder. The fact that in later years this disorder has been so infrequent is proof of the wisdom of the provision, and of the good resulting from the observance of the law. Besides this statute there is a much older one (Rev. St. Sec. 5347), the one under which this indictment is framed, which provided in 1835 that if the master, or any other officer of an American vessel, should through malice, hatred or revenge, and without justifiable cause, withhold from the crew suitable food and nourishment or inflict upon them cruel or unusual punishment, he should be subjected to a penalty.

This indictment charges that the defendant did withhold suitable food and nourishment, maliciously and without justifiable cause. You are to determine this case upon the evidence before you, and upon no other considerations. The three main elements which enter into it and which you will be called upon to find, you will observe, are, first, whether there was a lack of suitable food supply; second, if you find that there was, then, whether this was withheld without justifiable cause; and finally, if so, whether this was done from malice, hatred or revenge. There is no evidence here that there was any hatred or revenge on the part of this master towards any individual of the crew, or towards the whole of the crew, and the indictment does not so charge; but the indictment does charge that it was from malice, and that is one of the three necessary ingredients which you must find. In order to convict this defendant you have to find that each of these three elements existed in this case, and beyond a reasonable doubt. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a lack of proper food, that it was withheld from the crew without justifiable cause, and from malice, then it is your duty to find for the government, and to find the defendant guilty. Nor should you have any hesitation in rendering that verdict, providing you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that these facts are true; not only from a regard to the law itself, but certainly and surely from a regard for that protection to the lives and health of seamen, which the law was designed to secure, and which humanity itself demands.

If there was unreasonable and unjustifiable treatment, a withholding of proper nourishment, without justifiable cause and if this was done maliciously, by every consideration of humanity and reason, you must say so by your verdict; but you should be satisfied of it beyond a reasonable doubt. That is a question for you to determine, honestly and truly, in view of this evidence.

Now, as regards the lack of proper food, the conclusive evidence upon which the government relies is the result. They say to you that here is a most extraordinary result, a result which cannot be accounted for in any other way; a disorder, a disease, produced by such lack of food and by nothing else; and they say that these four cases which resulted in death, and other cases of sickness of the seamen, were all cases of scurvy. I say four deaths. I do not say all the deaths were from this cause; because it is admitted that the death of the first officer was from some other cause. Now, it is for you to say whether you are satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was a most unusual prevalence of scurvy among the seamen upon this ship. There is no medical testimony opposed to that which the government has introduced from the hospital, that of the persons who received the men and examined them, who saw the disorder of the men, and who say their disorder was scurvy, and who say that the symptoms of the four seamen who died, were the symptoms of that disease also. It is contended that every one of the seamen, every man on the ship who did not eat in the cabin, had scurvy. Those cases that were milder were like the last witness, Reagan, who says that he did not have swelling of the gums; that he had no trouble with the mouth, but that the trouble began with his feet. That is the same way in which the other seamen said their trouble began. His case seems to have been quite light; he procured some asparagus water, and about that time, or soon after, the Kasbeck was hailed and furnished the ship with provisions.

Now, the government relies upon this remarkable fact, that out of a dozen or more seamen, every one who was in the forecastle, and even those two that were aft but not in the cabin, had very marked symptoms of scurvy, or the beginnings of it. If you are satisfied from the evidence that this is true, and there seems to be little to contradict it, you will find that there was some adequate cause; and unless you can find in the evidence some other cause for the prevalance of the disorder, you would naturally attribute it to the cause that has been assigned, and which has been proved to be the ordinary cause of that disorder, namely, the lack of a proper variety of food, and particularly of vegetable food.

If you find that that was the fact, and that here was scurvy produced by a lack of vegetable food, your next inquiry will be whether the vegetable food was without justifiable cause. What is justifiable cause? It might be from some unexpected contingency, or situation that deprives the master, or the owner, of the officer who may be in command, of the power to supply the necessary food. If a vessel sails on her voyage, well provisioned, with all that is required, and by stress of weather she is detained long beyond the usual passage, and there are no ports where any food can be procured, so that the allowance must be shortened in order to enable the vessel to reach a port, it is very plain that the shortening of the allowance is necessary, and the crew are therefore put on what is termed a short allowance, that is, shorter than is prescribed. That is a justifiable cause. Under those circumstances, the necessary food may be lessened, and there is no criminality in that, because it is justifiable.

But every master when sailing to or from a foreign port is bound to see before he sets sail that his vessel is properly provisioned for the intended voyage. By 'properly provisioned' is not meant a bare sufficiency for a quick passage. He is bound to make reasonable provision for what is liable to happen upon the seas, though it be unexpected. He is bound to provide for such storms, such delays, such calms as often...

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14 cases
  • State v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • November 2, 1911
    ... ... Co. v ... Railroad Com., etc. (1908), 171 Ind. 189, 86 N.E ... 328, 332; United States Express Co. v ... State (1905), 164 Ind. 196, 214, 73 N.E. 101; ... Endlich, Interp. of ... provisioned, as applied to the duty of a sailing master ... (United States v. Reed [1897], 86 ... F. 308); "proper" representative, as applied to the ... successor in interest of a ... ...
  • McClure v. Steele, 35.
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • December 7, 1949
    ...of action be based upon special malice, so that without it the action could not be maintained. * * * ‘In United States v. Reed [2 Cir.], 86 F. 308, it was held that malice consisted in the wilful doing of an act which the person doing it knows is liable to injure another, regardless of the ......
  • McClure v. Steele
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • December 7, 1949
    ...that the cause of action be based upon special malice, so that without it the action could not be maintained. * * * 'In United States v. Reed [2 Cir.], 86 F. 308, it was held that malice consisted in the wilful doing of an act which the person doing it knows is liable to injure another, reg......
  • Campbell v. Norgart
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • April 29, 1944
    ...that the cause of action be based upon special malice, so that without it the action could not be maintained. *** In United States v. Reed [C.C.], 86 F. 308, it was held that malice consisted in the wilful doing of act which the person doing it knows is liable to injure another, regardless ......
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