United States v. Reed
| Decision Date | 04 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL 1:20-00066 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JEFFREY M. REED |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
Jeffrey M. Reed (“Reed” or “defendant”) moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the government's evidence and the court reserved ruling on the motion. That motion is DENIED for the following reasons.
The two-count superseding indictment charged Reed with retaliating and attempting to retaliate against a federal law enforcement officer by false claim, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 1521, (Count One), and attempting to interfere with administration of internal revenue laws, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), (Count Two). This case was tried to a jury on August 24 and 25, 2021. After the government rested defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on both counts. As to Count One, defendant renewed his earlier argument that the indictment was defective in that it failed to allege an actual IRS employee was a victim of a false lien or encumbrance being filed. With respect to Count Two, defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law based upon the Supreme Court's decision in Marinello v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1101 (2018). The court reserved ruling on the Rule 29 motion. Reed did not offer any evidence. Defendant did not supplement his oral motion with a written submission or make any further argument.
In evaluating a defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c), the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, defendant's conviction must be sustained if, viewed in the light most favorable to the United States, there is substantial evidence to support it. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, a court does not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. United States v. Arrington, 719 F.2d 701, 704 (4th Cir. 1983). The court “must assume that the jury resolved all contradictions in testimony in favor of the Government.” United States v. United Med. & Surgical Supply Corp., 989 F.2d 1390, 1402 (4th Cir. 1993).
“‘[S]ubstantial evidence,' in the context of a criminal action, [is] that evidence which ‘a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'” United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996)). “The jury, not the reviewing court, weighs the credibility of the evidence and resolves any conflicts in the evidence presented.” United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1989) () (internal citations and quotations omitted). Furthermore, “if the evidence supports different, reasonable interpretations, the jury decides which interpretation to believe.” Murphy, 35 F.3d at 148. Therefore, a defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence “`must overcome a heavy burden.'” United States v. Palomino-Coronado, 805 F.3d 127, 130 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Hoyte, 51 F.3d 1239, 1245 (4th Cir. 1995)).
Where, as here, a defendant argues that a jury's verdict was based on insufficient evidence, “[t]he verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
Count One of the superseding indictment in this case charged that, on or about May 12, 2015, defendant filed and attempted to file, in a public record, a false lien and encumbrance against the real and personal property of Known Person, knowing and having reason to know such lien and encumbrance was false and contained materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statements and representations, to wit: that Known Person was a “lien debtor” to defendant and that defendant had a claim against Known Person for $4, 950, 000, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1521.
18 U.S.C. § 1521 provides in relevant part:
Whoever files, attempts to file, . . . in any public record, . . . any false lien or encumbrance against the real or personal property of an individual described in Section 1114, on account of the performance of official duties by that individual, knowing or having reason to know that such lien or encumbrance is false and contains materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation has committed a crime against the United States.
An individual described under Section 1114 of Title 18 includes “any officer or employee of the United States or of any agency in any branch of the United States Government . . . while such officer or employee is engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties.”
In order to be found guilty of this offense, the government had to prove that:
The evidence at trial showed that Reed's case was turned over to the Internal Revenue Service's Abusive Tax Avoidance Transactions (“ATAT”) group when earlier efforts to collect unpaid federal taxes were unsuccessful. Officers assigned to collection efforts within ATAT are often subject to harassment. For this reason, in order to protect their identity, the IRS permits these agents to use a pseudonym while performing their duties on behalf of the IRS.
T.L. Blake was a revenue officer with the ATAT group who was assigned to work Reed's collection case. T.L. Blake is a pseudonym for a real person: T.S. In January 2015, T.L. Blake traveled to West Virginia to notify defendant's employer, Holiday Lodge, of the IRS's intent to levy Reed's wages. Reed's employer complied with the wage garnishment. Thereafter, Reed filed various documents, including liens, against T.L. Blake and the owner of the Holiday Lodge.
Prior to trial, defendant moved to dismiss § 1521 charge, arguing that the indictment failed to charge a crime because T.L. Blake was a not a real federal employee. According to defendant, the statute does not reach federal employees who use pseudonyms. Defendant maintained that the IRS's practice of allowing its employees to use pseudonyms eliminated the threat to an individual agent's financial interests that § 1521 was designed to protect. The court denied the motion to dismiss.
In his Rule 29 motion, Reed argued that the statute does not apply to fictitious persons. His argument misses the mark, however, because there was a real person involved: T.S. T.S. is a federal employee who is covered by the statute. T.S. merely goes by another name, T.L. Blake, when she is working. Furthermore, defendant's argument that the use of the pseudonym in and of itself protected T.S.'s financial interests making it unnecessary for her to be covered by the statute was undermined by T.S.'s trial testimony. T.S. testified regarding difficulties she encountered when attempting to obtain financing for a home. Because she was required to report all names that she had ever used, she listed the T.L. Blake pseudonym. And, of course, the lien defendant filed against T.L. Blake showed up. The fact that T.S. used a pseudonym does not immunize defendant's conduct.
The government was not required to prove that Reed was actually successful in filing the lien as the statute expressly contemplates and the indictment charged Reed with attempting to file a false claim against a federal employee.
United States v. Davis, Criminal No. WDQ-13-0002, 2013 WL 4026969, at *4 (D. Md. Aug. 6, 2013). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that factual impossibility is not a defense to an attempt crime. See Hamrick, 43 F.3d at 885.
Although Reed argued that it was legally impossible for him to violate § 1521 because of...
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