United States v. Rentas-Felix, CRIMINAL NO. 10–433 (PAD)

• Decision Date: 14 February 2017
• Docket Number: CRIMINAL NO. 10–433 (PAD)
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Ivan RENTAS-FELIX, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

235 F.Supp.3d 366

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,
v.
Ivan RENTAS-FELIX, Defendant.

CRIMINAL NO. 10–433 (PAD)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed February 14, 2017

235 F.Supp.3d 369

Brian K. Kidd, United States Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Hector E. Guzman–Silva, Federal Public Defender's Office, Hato Rey, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Delgado–Hernández, District Judge.

This case raises issues related to discovery, evidentiary sufficiency, and the extent to which dismissal of a state charge precludes consideration of the conduct underlying the charge in a revocation proceeding for violation of a condition of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583. Defendant Iván Rentas–Félix was convicted in federal court, sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and subsequently placed on supervised release. While on supervised release, he was arrested in Puerto Rico for alleged violations of the Commonwealth's Penal Code and Weapons Law. The local court found probable cause for defendant's arrest, albeit not to indict him. Before the court are the government's requests to revoke defendant's term of supervised release for having violated the condition that he shall not commit a state crime, and that he be sentenced to the maximum statutory term of imprisonment (Docket No. 66 at p. 13; Docket No. 73 at p. 2).

Defendant opposes the government's requests because, in his view: (1) the only evidence linking him to a crime should be stricken on account of what he characterizes as the government's violation of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, and Rule 26.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ; (2) even if such evidence were not stricken, it would be insufficient to establish a violation of conditions of release; and, in any event, (3) the Supreme Court's decision in Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1863, 195 L.Ed.2d 179 (2016) requires the court to accord preclusive effect to the state court's "no-probable cause to indict" ruling respecting the offenses on account of which revocation is sought here (Docket No. 68 at pp. 12–13; Docket No. 70 at p. 3).

After a careful examination of the motions, arguments raised, supporting authorities and the record as a whole, including testimony and exhibits presented during the final revocation hearing, the court concludes that for purposes of revocation, defendant violated a condition of supervised release by engaging in aggravated battery. That he cannot be prosecuted in Puerto Rico to the point of conviction due to absence of probable cause to indict, does not preclude a finding under 18 U.S.C. § 3583 that he engaged in the conduct underlying the dismissed state charge. In the end, the condition of supervised release is that he shall not violate the law, not that there be no conviction for violating it. Under these circumstances, courts look beyond the bare fact that a charge has been dismissed and evaluate whether the evidence presented

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in the revocation hearing is sufficient to conclude that defendant engaged in the behavior underlying the dismissed charge.

The Double Jeopardy Clause, and by extension, Sánchez Valle do not require a different result, for they do not apply either to the state court hearings where no probable cause is found to indict or to revocation proceedings. The asserted discovery violations do not justify exclusion of evidence from this case. Therefore, defendant's supervised release is revoked. Nevertheless, as called for in Rule 32.1(b)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, defendant will be provided with the opportunity to address the court prior to sentencing. For the same reason, the government's requests are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 10, 2010, defendant was charged with knowingly possessing in, an affecting interstate commerce a firearm shipped and transported in interstate and foreign commerce after having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924 (a)(c) (Docket No. 3). On January 20, 2011, he pled guilty as charged (Docket No. 20). On May, 12, 2011, he was sentenced to, inter alia , a term of imprisonment of 57 months followed by a supervised release term of 3 years subject to the condition that he shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime (Docket No. 25; Docket No. 26 at p. 3). On March 5, 20115, he was released from prison, commencing the term of supervised release (Docket No. 29). The term is due to expire on March 5, 2018. Id.

On July 8, 2016, the United States Probation Officer requested that a warrant be issued for defendant's arrest so that he be brought before the court to show cause as to why his supervision term should not be revoked on account of having committed a state crime (Docket No. 29). On July 11, 2016, defendant was temporarily detained pending further proceedings (Docket No. 33). On August 2, 2016, U.S. Magistrate Judge Silvia Carreño–Coll found probable cause to revoke supervisory release, and ordered defendant detained pending the final revocation hearing (Docket No. 39).

The final revocation hearing was held on September 16, 2016 (Docket No. 57), and October 27, 2016 (Docket No. 65). On September 28, 2016, the Court of First Instance of Puerto Rico ("CFI") held a preliminary hearing, finding no probable cause to indict defendant for the offenses on account of which revocation was requested here (Docket No. 68, Exhibit D). On November 17, 2016, defendant was ordered released from custody and placed under Home Incarceration with electronic monitoring, awaiting the ruling of the CFI in a second preliminary hearing on the same offenses (Docket No. 72). On December 13, 2016, the Probation Officer informed that the CFI issued a no probable cause ruling (Docket Nos. 74 and 76).

II. DISCUSSION

As stated above, one of the conditions of defendant's supervised release is that he not commit another federal, state or local crime. However, on June 7, 2016, he was arrested after allegedly assaulting Mr. Luis Corcino. At a hearing pursuant to Rule 6 of the Puerto Rico Rules of Criminal Procedure during which the CFI heard Mr. Corcino's testimony, it found probable cause to arrest defendant as charged in the criminal complaint, for aggravated battery in violation of Article 109 of the Puerto Rico Penal Code, and for carrying and using a bladed weapon in violation of the aggravated modality of Article and 5.05 of

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the Puerto Rico Weapons Law (Exhibit to Docket No. 29 at pp. 1–2; Docket No. 68, Exhibits B, C). Based on such probable cause determination, the U.S. Probation Officer filed the motion at Docket No. 209 that initiated this revocation proceeding.

A. Discovery Obligations

During the final revocation hearing, the government presented the testimony of Puerto Rico Police Officer Luis Torres–Padilla, and Mr. Corcino. Defendant complains the government failed to provide him with the audio recording of Mr. Corcino's CFI testimony before cross examination, and as such, requests that the testimony be stricken under Brady , the Jenks Act, and Rule 26.2 of the Criminal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Docket No. 68 at pp. 3, 12; Docket No. 70 at p. 3). He argues that without that testimony, there is no evidence justifying revocation (Docket No. 68).

1. Brady v. Maryland

In Brady , the Supreme Court held that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. In Giglio v. United States , 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), it included within the category of exculpatory evidence subject to disclosure, any witness impeachment information if the reliability of the witness may be determinative of the defendant's guilt or innocence. And in United States v. Agurs , 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), it ruled that the duty to disclose operates even though there has been no request by the accused.

Because Brady applies to evidence material either to guilt or punishment and revocation proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, some courts have questioned whether Brady operates in revocation proceedings. See , United States v. Ataya , 145 Fed.Appx. 331, 333 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005) (pointing out that Brady only applies to criminal prosecutions, not to revocation hearings); United States v. Jackson , 2009 WL 1690300, *1 (E.D. Ark. June 16, 2009) ("Defendant has cited, and I can find, no authority to support his position that Brady applies to revocation proceedings-in fact, the case law is to the contrary").¹ Assuming Brady applies here, however, defendant's challenge cannot stand.

To prevail on a Brady claim, defendant must prove that exculpatory or impeachment evidence was suppressed, and suppression was prejudicial. See , United States v. Paladin , 748 F.3d 438, 444 (1st Cir....