United States v. Reyes–Vencomo

Decision Date13 February 2012
Docket NumberNo. CR 11–2563 JB.,CR 11–2563 JB.
Citation866 F.Supp.2d 1304
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Julio REYES–VENCOMO, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Kenneth J. Gonzales, United States Attorney, Norman Cairns, Raul Torrez, Assistant United States Attorneys, United States Attorney's Office, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff.

Santiago E. Juarez, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES O. BROWNING, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendant's Motion and Memorandum Brief to Suppress Evidence Recovered From the Defendants' [sic] Vehicle and Post–Arrest Statements of the Defendant, filed November 30, 2011 (Doc. 31)(Motion to Suppress). The Court held an evidentiary hearing on January 27, 2012. The primary issues are: (i) whether Defendant Julio Reyes–Vencomo's continued detention, after providing officers his vehicle registration and proof of insurance, constituted an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (ii) whether Taos, New Mexico Police Officer Virgil Vigil's request for Reyes–Vencomo's Social Security number exceeded the lawful scope of the traffic stop; and (iii) whether the inventory search was valid. The Court will deny the Motion to Suppress. The Court finds that law enforcement officers lawfully detained Reyes–Vencomo to investigate and confirm his identity. The request for Reyes–Vencomo's Social Security number did not exceed the lawful scope of the traffic stop, because Reyes–Vencomo could not provide his driver's license and the officer was attempting to confirm his identity. Furthermore, the inventory search was conducted in compliance with standardized police procedures for a non-investigatory purpose.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the Court state its essential findings on the record when deciding a motion that involves factual issues. SeeFed.R.Crim.P. 12(d) (“When factual issues are involved in deciding a [pretrial] motion, the court must state its essential findings on the record.”). The findings of fact in this Memorandum Opinion and Order are the Court's essential findings for rule 12(d)'s purposes. The Court makes these findings under the authority of rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which requires a judge to decide preliminary questions relating to the admissibility of evidence, including the legality of a search or seizure, and the voluntariness of an individual's confession or consent to search. See United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1269–70 (10th Cir.1982). In deciding such preliminary questions, the other rules of evidence, except those with respect to privileges, do not bind the Court. SeeFed.R.Evid.104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible. In so deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.”). Thus, the Court may consider hearsay in ruling on a motion to suppress. See United States v. Garcia, 324 Fed.Appx. 705, 708 (10th Cir.2009)(unpublished)(recognizing that it was not necessary to “resolve whether Crawford's1 protection of an accused's Sixth Amendment confrontation right applies to suppression hearings,” but indicating that Tenth Circuitprecedent prior to Crawford v. Washington does not provide such protection); United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d at 1269;United States v. Christy, 810 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1223 (D.N.M.2011)(Browning, J.)(“Thus, the Court may consider hearsay in ruling on a motion to suppress.”); United States v. Hernandez, 778 F.Supp.2d 1211, 1226 (D.N.M.2011)(Browning, J.) (concluding “that Crawford v. Washington does not apply to detention hearings”).

1. On August 9, 2011, Vigil and Police Trainee Officer Stephen Ortega stopped Reyes–Vencomo while Reyes–Vencomo was operating his motor vehicle near his home in Taos. See Transcript of Hearing at 13:2–19 (January 27, 2012) (Torrez, Vigil)(“Tr.”).2

2. Vigil and Ortega stopped Reyes–Vencomo and executed a traffic stop, because they observed Reyes–Vencomo failing to stop at a stop sign, and exceeding the posted speed limit. See Tr. at 13:2–19 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 82:15–83:2 (Torrez, Ortega); State of New Mexico Uniform Traffic Citation for Failing to Complete a Stop (dated August 10, 2011)(Govt's Ex. 2 at hearing)(“Stop Sign Citation”); State of New Mexico Uniform Traffic Citation for Going 40 Miles Per Hour in a 25 Miles per Hour Zone (dated August 10, 2011)(Govt's Ex. 3 at hearing)(“Speeding Citation”).

3. This traffic stop was Ortega's first stop where he would make contact with the driver. See Tr. at 14:13–19 (Torrez, Vigil).

4. While investigating the driver, Ortega, accompanied by Vigil, approached Reyes–Vencomo's vehicle and, pursuant to standard police procedure, asked Reyes–Vencomo for his driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. See Tr. at 15:18–9 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 83:16–21 (Torrez, Ortega); Grand Jury Testimony of Virgil Vigil at 5:17–23 (Vigil)(Govt's Ex. 6 at hearing)(“Vigil GJ Testimony”).3

5. Reyes–Vencomo provided the officers with his vehicle registration information and proof of insurance on the vehicle, informed the officers where he lived, and gave his full name, but indicated that he did not have a driver's license or identification.See Tr. at 17:19–23 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 85:22–86:7 (Torrez, Ortega); State of New Mexico Uniform Traffic Citation for Driver Unable to Provide Driver's License (dated August 10, 2011)(Govt's Ex. 1 at hearing)(“License Citation”).4

6. Vigil then asked Reyes–Vencomo to provide some form of identification, his name, date of birth, and Social Security number 5 to verify Reyes–Vencomo's identity. See Tr. at 18:8–20 (Torrez, Vigil).6

7. Reyes–Vencomo then provided the officers with his date of birth and produced a Social Security card, giving it to Vigil. See Tr. at 18:24–19:3 (Torrez, Vigil); Vigil Incident Narrative at 1 (Def.'s Ex. A at hearing) (“Vigil Report”); New Mexico v. Reyes, No. M–53–FR201100149, Statement of Probable Cause, dated August 11, 2011 (Def.'s Ex. B at hearing)(“Probable Cause”); Ortega Incident Narrative at 1 (Def.'s Ex. C at hearing)(“Ortega Report”).

8. Vigil noted that the card's coloring and writing did not appear to be correct, and suspected that the card was fake. See Tr. at 19:12–19 (Torrez, Vigil); Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1; Ortega Report at 1.

9. Vigil then stated to Reyes–Vencomo that he was not free to leave, as he was going to “run”—conduct a computer-assisted check on—the Social Security card. Tr. at 19:4–8 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 37:17–23 (Juarez, Vigil).

10. Vigil contacted dispatch and initiated a records check of the Social Security number that Reyes–Vencomo provided. See Tr. at 19:25–20:1 (Torrez, Vigil); Tr. at 38:11–14 (Juarez, Vigil); Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1.

11. The officers ran the card, and it could not be confirmed as a valid card. See Tr. at 20:2–3 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 38:15–17 (Juarez, Vigil); Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1; Ortega Report at 1.

12. Dispatch informed Vigil that no record existed matching the Social Security number that Reyes–Vencomo provided. See Tr. at 20:2–3 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 38:15–17 (Juarez, Vigil); Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1; Ortega Report at 1.

13. Vigil then returned to Reyes–Vencomo's vehicle and asked him where he got his Social Security Card, to which Reyes–Vencomo responded that he had received it in New Mexico, through the mail. See Tr. at 20:4–13 (Torrez, Vigil).

14. This answer set off a “red flag” for Vigil, because Vigil knew that an individual has to personally retrieve his or her Social Security card. Tr. at 20:13–14 (Vigil).

15. Vigil informed Reyes–Vencomo that he was going to detain him for further investigation, as he believed that Reyes–Vencomo was in possession of a fraudulent Social Security card. See Tr. at 20:15–20 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 38:18–39:2 (Juarez, Vigil).

16. Reyes–Vencomo became frustrated and, without the officers' prompting, exited his vehicle. See Tr. at 20:21–23 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 33:2–33:9 (Juarez, Vigil); id. at 86:11–17 (Torrez, Ortega); Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1; Ortega Report at 1.7

17. As Reyes–Vencomo was exiting the truck, Vigil noticed a large machete in the vehicle's cab and informed Reyes–Vencomo that he would be temporarily detained outside of the vehicle for officer safety. See Tr. at 21:6–18 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 39:20–40:4 (Juarez, Vigil); id. at 58:14 (Torrez, Holfelder); Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1; Ortega Report at 1.

18. Vigil was attempting to escort Reyes–Vencomo to his police vehicle when Reyes–Vencomo's cellular telephone began to ring. See Tr. at 22:3–12 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 86:24–87:6 (Torrez, Ortega); Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1; Ortega Report at 1.

19. For officer safety, Vigil instructed Reyes–Vencomo not to reach into his pockets, but Reyes–Vencomo ignored the order and attempted to retrieve the telephone from his pocket. See Tr. at 22:8–23:3 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 74:11–17 (Torrez, Reyes–Vencomo); id. at 87:12–20 (Torrez, Ortega); Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1; Ortega Report at 1.8

20. In response to Reyes–Vencomo's attempt to put his hands in his pockets, Vigil tried to physically restrain Reyes–Vencomo, and both Vigil and Reyes–Vencomo fell to the ground. See Tr. at 23:4–12 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 87:16–22 (Torrez, Ortega); Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1; Ortega Report at 1.

21. Reyes–Vencomo's telephone and wallet fell out of his pocket, and remained on the ground while Vigil attempted to gain control of Reyes–Vencomo. See Tr. at 23:14–25 (Torrez, Vigil);Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1; Ortega Report at 1.

22. The Social Security card, which Vigil had retained, also fell to the ground. See Tr. at 23:14–20 (Torrez, Vigil); Vigil Report at 1; Probable...

To continue reading

Request your trial
30 cases
  • Parsons v. Velasquez
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
    • 30 d5 Julho d5 2021
    ...he suspected had recently assaulted a person on the side of the road by threatening him with a gun); United States v. Reyes-Vencomo, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1330 (D.N.M. 2012) (Browning J.)("The use of handcuffs ... does not always elevate a detention into an arrest.").148 The Court predicts ......
  • Reeves v. Chafin
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
    • 31 d3 Março d3 2021
    ...1195 (10th Cir. 2009) ("[W]e have approved the use of handcuffs in the context of a Terry stop."); United States v. Reyes-Vencomo, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1330 (D.N.M. 2012) (Browning J.)("The use of handcuffs ... does not always elevate a detention into an arrest."). Reeves argues he was arr......
  • Reid v. Pautler
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
    • 31 d4 Julho d4 2014
    ...1195 (10th Cir.2009) (“[W]e have approved the use of handcuffs in the context of a Terry stop.”); United States v. Reyes–Vencomo, 866 F.Supp.2d 1304, 1330 (D.N.M.2012) (Browning J.) (“The use of handcuffs ... does not always elevate a detention into an arrest.”); Pierre–Louis v. Schake, No.......
  • Mocek v. City of Albuquerque
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
    • 28 d5 Fevereiro d5 2014
    ...and then parked where the girl would be required to walk past him as she continued to her home”); United States v. Reyes–Vencomo, 866 F.Supp.2d 1304, 1328 (D.N.M.2012) (Browning, J.)(stating that, in United States v. Ceballos, “[t]he Tenth Circuit did not require the officer to identify the......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT