United States v. Rice

Decision Date29 December 1911
Citation192 F. 720
PartiesUNITED STATES v. RICE et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

G. H Dorr, Abel I. Smith, and W. H. Pitkin, for the United States.

Louis J. Vorhaus, E. J. Myers, and Ernest Baldwin, for defendants.

RAY District Judge.

Prior to the commencement of this trial of the defendant Rice and others on an indictment for using the mails to carry out a scheme to defraud, the defendants had been arrested and admitted to bail on a similar charge contained in a prior indictment. Defendants appeared and pleaded not guilty to the present indictment, and the trial thereon was commenced, and is now in progress. No bench warrant was issued, and no bail fixed or applied for until December 26th, when circumstances arose which in the judgment of the United States attorney made the actual apprehension of the defendant Rice necessary. A bench warrant was issued, and Rice was apprehended thereon by the United States marshal, and the court ordered him into the custody of the marshal during the trial. His counsel ask to have bail fixed, and that Rice be enlarged on such bail during the trial. Conditions are such that in the opinion of the court the presence of Rice during the trial, and, if necessary, thereafter can only be secured and the jury protected against unlawful approaches and attempts to corrupt by holding him in actual custody.

The question presented is whether a defendant on trial for a felony (not a capital case) is entitled as matter of right to be enlarged on bail during the progress of such trial. Section 1015, R.S.U.S. (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 718) provides that 'bail shall be admitted upon all arrests in criminal cases when the offense is not punishable by death ' By section 1016, R.S.U.S. (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p 718), it is also provided that 'bail may be admitted upon all arrests in criminal cases when the punishment may be death. ' The statutes of the United States are silent as to bail during the progress of the trial. The Supreme Court of the United States, however, has placed a construction on this statute founded evidently on the rules of the common law. In Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285, 15 Sup.Ct. 450, 453 (39 L.Ed. 424), the court said:

'The statutes of the United States have been framed upon the theory that a person accused of crime shall not, until he has been finally adjudged guilty in the court of last resort, be absolutely compelled to undergo imprisonment or punishment, but may be admitted to bail, not only after arrest and before trial, but after conviction and pending a writ of error. The statutes as to bail upon arrest and before trial provide that bail 'may be admitted' upon all arrests in capital cases, and 'shall be admitted' upon all arrests in other criminal cases; and may be taken, * * * ' (citing the statute quoted).

The words 'and before trial' and 'before trial' were entirely unnecessary if the court intended to intimate or hold that bail during the progress of the trial is a matter of absolute right. It is in accord with reason that during the progress of a criminal trial for felony the presence of the defendants may be assured by having them in actual custody. At common law in cases of felony at first no bail was permitted. Then bail before trial, but no during the trial, was permitted. This was the law when the act of September 24, 1789 (1 Stat. 91, c. 20, Sec. 33), was enacted. Section 1018, R.S.U.S. (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 719), and Act Aug. 8, 1846 (9 Stat. 73, c. 98, Sec. 4), provides that:

'Any party charged with a criminal offense and admitted to bail may, in vacation, be arrested by his bail, and delivered to the marshal or his deputy before any judge or other officer having power to commit for such offense, ' etc.

This excludes the power of the bail to voluntarily surrender their principal during the progress of the trial and be exonerated, and clearly contemplates that the accused may then be taken into the custody of the court and remain subject to its order and control.

The rest of the section last quoted reads as follows:

'And at the request of such bail the judge or other officer shall recommit the party so arrested to the custody of the marshal, and indorse on the
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9 cases
  • Mello v. Superior Court
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • February 18, 1977
    ...United States v. Gilbert, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 59, 425 F.2d 490 (1969) (alleged threat to kill complaining witness); United States v. Rice, 192 F. 720 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.1911) (revocation declared only way to protect jury); Tijerina v. Baker, 78 N.M. 770, 438 P.2d 514 (1968) (principal government wit......
  • Tijerina v. Baker
    • United States
    • New Mexico Supreme Court
    • January 16, 1968
    ...power of the court was extended in Carbo v. United States,supra, until such time as the case is finally disposed of. United States v. Rice, 192 F. 720 (S.D.N.Y.1911), relied upon a power of the court to revoke bail which was said to be inherent in its duty to insure the efficient administra......
  • Rendel v. Mummert
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • September 24, 1970
    ...v. Ramsden, 20 A.D.2d 142, 246 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1963); Carbo v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 662, 7 L.Ed.2d 769 (1962) and United States v. Rice, 192 F. 720 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), noted that a court has a common law power to revoke a defendant's bail and remand him to jail after commencement of trial ......
  • Rossi v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • February 17, 1926
    ...843, No. 14,955; Lee's Case, 15 Fed. Cas. 136, No. 8,180; In re Claasen, 11 S. Ct. 735, 140 U. S. 200, 208, 35 L. Ed. 409; United States v. Rice (C. C.) 192 F. 720; Hardesty v. United States, 184 F. 269, 106 C. C. A. 411; United States v. Gibson (D. C.) 188 F. And our conclusion is that und......
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