United States v. Riley
| Decision Date | 14 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | Criminal ELH-13-0608 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DAMIEN RILEY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
In February 2015, a jury in the District of Maryland convicted Damien Riley, the self-represented defendant, of multiple drug offenses. See ECF 84. According to the Presentence Report (“PSR,” ECF 92), Riley qualified as a career offender under § 4B1.1(a) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”), based on his previous felony convictions in Maryland for robbery with a dangerous weapon and distribution of a controlled dangerous substance. See ECF 92, ¶ 22; ECF 108 (Statement of Reasons). Riley's career offender designation resulted in a substantial increase in his sentencing range under the Guidelines, from between 21 and 27 months of imprisonment to between 210 and 262 months. Judge William D. Quarles, Jr., to whom the case was then assigned, sentenced Riley to a term of 210 months of imprisonment. See ECF 104; ECF 107.[1]
Riley has filed numerous motions, pro se. They include “Motion To The Court To Exercise Its Discretion Pursuant to 18 USC 3553(A)(1), In Light of the U.S.S.G. 798 Amendment which Deleted 4B1.1's Residual Clause Crime of Violence Definition Used To Determine And Enhance Rileys [sic] Sentence.” (ECF 177); “Supplement Motion in Support of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Motion ....” (ECF 179); “Motion Requesting the Clerk To Correct The Recent December Filings To Motions Requesting A Downward Variance, Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 553(A) ....” (ECF 180); “Motion Request To Expedite Variance Motion Ruling Due To Harsh Sentence” (ECF 181); “Motion Request To Re-Assert The Previously Filed Motions ....” (ECF 187); “Motion in Support of Over-Representation of Criminal History Departure/Downward Variance . . . Pursuant to U.S.S.G. 4A1.3(B) ....” (ECF 191); “Motion To Supplement Previously Filed Motions, And To Respond To Governments [sic] Opposition ....” (ECF 192) “Supplement and Response to the Governments [sic] 9.7.21 Opposition ....” (ECF 193); “Supplement In Support Of Downward Departure Or Variance ....” (ECF 194); “Motion Request To Supplement Recently Filed Downward Departure Motions . . . Pursuant to U.S.S.G. 4A1.3; 18 USC 3553(A)(1); (A)(6)” (ECF 195); “Motion Request To Counter Governments [sic] Maryland Common Law Robbery With A Deadly Weapon, Crime Of Violence Argument ....” (ECF 209) and “Motion Request to Supplement the Previously Filed Motion ....” (ECF 210). Additional submissions and correspondence are docketed at ECF 188, ECF 190, ECF 196, ECF 198, ECF 199, and ECF 200.
As best the Court can understand, Riley's various filings boil down to a request for a “downward departure” or a “downward variance,” on the ground that the Guidelines sentencing range in his case substantially overstated his criminal history. Moreover, Riley appears to contend that one of his two career offender predicate convictions, robbery with a dangerous weapon, does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under the law.
The government's opposition is docketed at ECF 186. In response to the Court's Orders of June 28, 2022 (ECF 202) and July 5, 2022 (ECF 203), the government filed a supplemental brief on July 26, 2022. ECF 204. The government takes the position that, if Riley were sentenced today, he would continue to qualify as a career offender including in light of Dickson v. United States, 478 Md. 255, 274 A.3d 366 (2022).
The Office of the Federal Public Defender (“FPD”) has filed a “Brief As Amicus Curiae In Support Of Mr. Riley's Argument That He No Longer Qualifies As A Career Offender.” ECF 205.[2] The government filed a response (ECF 212), along with a notice of supplemental authority. ECF 214. The FPD replied (ECF 216) and also submitted supplemental authority. ECF 218. Then, on October 10, 2022, the government again responded. ECF 219. The following day, the FPD filed a reply to the government's response. ECF 220.
In sum, the FPD contends that Riley's other career offender predicate offense - distribution of a controlled dangerous substance under Maryland law - no longer qualifies as a “controlled substance offense” supporting a career offender designation, because it can be committed by the attempted transfer of drugs and because of “a categorical mismatch between the Maryland cocaine definition” in 2003 and the current definition. Id. at 2. The government argues, inter alia, that the case law on which the FPD relies is inapposite because Riley was convicted of a completed, substantive, non-inchoate felony offense. ECF 212 at 9.
No hearing is necessary to resolve the motions. For the reasons that follow, I shall grant Riley's various motions to supplement or “re-assert” his original motion. See, e.g., ECF 187; ECF 195; ECF 210. But, I shall deny the substantive motions, without prejudice, i.e., ECF 177; ECF 180; ECF 181; ECF 191; ECF 209. I. Factual Background[3]
Riley was indicted on October 31, 2013. ECF 1. In a Second Superseding Indictment filed on November 25, 2014 (ECF 41), Riley was charged in seven counts. Counts One, Three, Four, and Five charged him with possession with intent to distribute heroin, and Count Two alleged possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Count Six charged Riley with possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon. Count Seven charged the maintenance of premises for the distribution of drugs.
Following a jury trial before Judge Quarles in February 2015 (ECF 67), Riley was convicted of Counts One, Two, Three, and Four. ECF 85. The jury did not reach a unanimous verdict as to Count Five (possession with intent to distribute heroin); Count Six (unlawful firearm possession); or Count Seven (maintenance of a place for the purpose of manufacturing, storing, distributing, and using controlled substances). The Verdict Sheet, ECF 84, reflects that as to Counts Five, Six, and Seven, the jury voted 11 to 1 to convict. See also ECF 85.
Sentencing was held on May 26, 2015. ECF 104. The defendant, born in June 1980, was 34 years old. According to the PSR, defendant had an offense level of 12, based on the drug quantity. ECF 92, ¶¶ 16, 21. But, because of Riley's career offender designation, his offense level increased to 32. Id. ¶ 22. And, given that Riley proceeded to trial, he did not receive deductions under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility. Id. ¶ 23.
The defendant had 8 criminal history points, which equates to a criminal history category of IV. ECF 92, ¶ 30. However, because defendant qualified as a career offender, his criminal history category was increased to VI, under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). Id. ¶ 31.
With an offense level of 32 and a criminal history category of VI, defendant's Guidelines called for a sentence ranging between 210 and 262 months of imprisonment. Id. ¶ 54. In contrast, an offense level of 12 and a criminal history category of IV would have yielded Guidelines of 21 to 27 months of imprisonment.
Judge Quarles sentenced Riley to a Guidelines sentence, at the bottom of the range. He imposed concurrent terms of incarceration of 210 months, with credit from October 24, 2013. See ECF 107 (Judgment); ECF 92 at 2.
Riley noted an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. ECF 109. On appeal, he expressly challenged his designation as a career offender, arguing that his prior conviction for Maryland robbery with a dangerous weapon did not qualify as a predicate “crime of violence.” ECF 121 at 3. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence on May 9, 2017. ECF 121; ECF 162-1; United States v. Riley, 856 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2017). The Court said, id. at 328:
Riley subsequently filed a post conviction petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asserting multiple grounds. ECF 123. A supplement was also filed. ECF 124. Due to the retirement of Judge Quarles, the case was reassigned to Judge Marvin Garbis. In a Memorandum and Order of May 14, 2018, Judge Garbis denied post conviction relief. ECF 146. Riley's appeal (ECF 151) was subsequently dismissed. ECF 157.
On March 16, 2020, Riley filed a ECF 162. The Motion was supported by exhibits. Defendant referenced “the 798 Amendment” to the Guidelines. Id. Thereafter, on March 24, 2020, Riley filed a motion “to correct clerical error ....” ECF 164. In particular, he asserted that the Clerk “‘mistakenly'” entered his motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on the retroactive application of Amendment 782 to the Guidelines, but he asserted that his motion was not based on that amendment. Id. And, on March 31, 2020, Riley asked the Court to construe his submission of March 16, 2020, as a request for immediate release under the First Step Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(iv)(D), for “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” ECF 165 at 1. He cited, inter alia, Amendment 798 to the Guidelines, and complained about the “impact” of the “now defunct residual clauses,” which “elevated” his Guidelines. Id. at 4.
According to Riley, if Amendment 798 had been in effect at the time of his sentencing, his Guidelines range would have been 21-27 months of incarceration. ECF 165 at 4. And, he argued that the Court may use the “catch-all provision” in the First Step Act to reduce the sentence. Id. at 3.
To be clear, then, Riley sought compassionate release based on Amendment 798 to the Guidelines and 18...
To continue reading
Request your trial