United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc

• Decision Date: 04 December 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-701,84-701
• Citation: 88 L.Ed.2d 419,474 U.S. 121,106 S.Ct. 455
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. RIVERSIDE BAYVIEW HOMES, INC., et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

474 U.S. 121

106 S.Ct. 455

88 L.Ed.2d 419

UNITED STATES, Petitioner

v RIVERSIDE BAYVIEW HOMES, INC., et al.

No. 84-701.

Argued Oct. 16, 1985.

Decided Dec. 4, 1985.

Syllabus

The Clean Water Act prohibits any discharge of dredged or fill materials into "navigable waters"—defined as the "waters of the United States"—unless authorized by a permit issued by the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps).Construing the Act to cover all "freshwater wetlands" that are adjacent to other covered waters, the Corps issued a regulation defining such wetlands as "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions."After respondentRiverside Bayview Homes, Inc.(hereafter respondent), began placing fill materials on its property near the shores of Lake St. Clair, Michigan, the Corps filed suit in Federal District Court to enjoin respondent from filling its property without the Corps' permission.Finding that respondent's property was characterized by the presence of vegetation requiring saturated soil conditions for growth, that the source of such soil conditions was ground water, and that the wetland on the property was adjacent to a body of navigable water, the District Court held that the property was wetland subject to the Corps' permit authority.The Court of Appeals reversed, construing the Corps' regulation to exclude from the category of adjacent wetlands—and hence from that of "waters of the United States"—wetlands that are not subject to flooding by adjacent navigable waters at a frequency sufficient to support the growth of aquatic vegetation.The court took the view that the Corps' authority under the Act and its implementing regulations must be narrowly construed to avoid a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.Under this construction, it was held that respondent's property was not within the Corps' jurisdiction, because its semi-aquatic characteristics were not the result of frequent flooding by the nearby navigable waters, and that therefore respondent was free to fill the property without obtaining a permit.

Held:

1.The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a narrow reading of the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction over wetlands was necessary to avoid a taking problem.Neither the imposition of the permit requirement itself nor the denial of a permit necessarily constitutes a taking.And the Tucker Act is available to provide compensation for takings that may result from the Corps' exercise of jurisdiction over wetlands.Pp. 126-129.

2.The District Court's findings are not clearly erroneous and plainly bring respondent's property within the category of wetlands and thus of the "waters of the United States" as defined by the regulation in question.Pp. 129-131.

3.The language, policies, and history of the Clean Water Act compel a finding that the Corps has acted reasonably in interpreting the Act to require permits for the discharge of material into wetlands adjacent to other "waters of the United States."Pp. 131-139.

729 F.2d 391(CA61984), reversed.

WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Kathryn Anne Oberly, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Edgar B. Washburn, San Francisco, Cal., for respondents.

Justice WHITEdelivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether the Clean Water Act (CWA),33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., together with certain regulations promulgated under its authority by the Army Corps of Engineers, authorizes the Corps to require landowners to obtain permits from the Corps before discharging fill material into wetlands adjacent to navigable bodies of water and their tributaries.

I

The relevant provisions of the Clean Water Act originated in the Federal Water Pollution Control ActAmendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 816, and have remained essentially unchanged since that time.Under §§ 301and502 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311and1362, any discharge of dredged or fill materials into "navigable waters"—defined as the "waters of the United States"—is forbidden unless authorized by a permit issued by the Corps of Engineers pursuant to § 404,33 U.S.C. § 1344.¹After initially construing the Act to cover only waters navigable in fact, in 1975 the Corps issued interim final regulations redefining "the waters of the United States" to include not only actually navigable waters but also tributaries of such waters, interstate waters and their tributaries, and nonnavigable intrastate waters whose use or misuse could affect interstate commerce.40 Fed.Reg. 31320(1975).More importantly for present purposes, the Corps construed the Act to cover all "freshwater wetlands" that were adjacent to other covered waters.A "freshwater wetland" was defined as an area that is "periodically inundated" and is "normally characterized by the prevalence of vegetation that requires saturated soil conditions for growth and reproduction."33 CFR § 209.120(d)(2)(h )(1976).In 1977, the Corps refined its definition of wetlands by eliminating the reference to periodic inundation and making other minor changes.The 1977 definition read as follows:

"The term 'wetlands' means those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas."33 CFR § 323.2(c)(1978).

In 1982, the 1977 regulations were replaced by substantively identical regulations that remain in force today.See33 CFR § 323.2(1985).²

RespondentRiverside Bayview Homes, Inc.(hereafter respondent), owns 80 acres of low-lying, marshy land near the shores of Lake St. Clair in Macomb County, Michigan.In 1976, respondent began to place fill materials on its property as part of its preparations for construction of a housing development.The Corps of Engineers, believing that the property was an "adjacent wetland" under the 1975 regulation defining "waters of the United States," filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking to enjoin respondent from filling the property without the permission of the Corps.

The District Court held that the portion of respondent's property lying below 575.5 feet above sea level was a covered wetland and enjoined respondent from filling it without a permit.Civ. No. 77-70041(Feb. 24, 1977)(App. to Pet. forCert. 22a);Civ. No. 77-70041(June 21, 1979)(App. to Pet. forCert. 32a).Respondent appealed, and the Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of the effect of the intervening 1977amendments to the regulation.615 F.2d 1363(1980).On remand, the District Court again held the property to be a wetland subject to the Corps' permit authority.Civ. No. 77-70041(May 10, 1981)(App. to Pet. forCert. 42a).

Respondent again appealed, and the Sixth Circuit reversed.729 F.2d 391(1984).The court construed the Corps' regulation to exclude from the category of adjacent wetlands—and hence from that of "waters of the United States"—wetlands that were not subject to flooding by adjacent navigable waters at a frequency sufficient to support the growth of aquatic vegetation.The court adopted this construction of the regulation because, in its view, a broader definition of wetlands might result in the taking of private property without just compensation.The court also expressed its doubt that Congress, in granting the Corps jurisdiction to regulate the filling of "navigable waters," intended to allow regulation of wetlands that were not the result of flooding by navigable waters.³Under the court's reading of the regulation, respondent's property was not within the Corps' jurisdiction, because its semiaquatic characteristics were not the result of frequent flooding by the nearby navigable waters.Respondent was therefore free to fill the property without obtaining a permit.

We granted certiorari to consider the proper interpretation of the Corps' regulation defining "waters of the United States" and the scope of the Corps' jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act, both of which were called into question by the Sixth Circuit's ruling.469 U.S. 1206, 105 S.Ct. 1166, 84 L.Ed.2d 318(1985).We now reverse.

II

The question whether the Corps of Engineers may demand that respondent obtain a permit before placing fill material on its property is primarily one of regulatory and statutory interpretation: we must determine whether respondent's property is an "adjacent wetland" within the meaning of the applicable regulation, and, if so, whether the Corps' jurisdiction over "navigable waters" gives it statutory authority to regulate discharges of fill material into such a wetland.In this connection, we first consider the Court of Appeals' position that the Corps' regulatory authority under the statute and its implementing regulations must be narrowly construed to avoid a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

We have frequently suggested that governmental land-use regulation may under extreme circumstances amount to a "taking" of the affected property.See, e.g., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank,473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126(1985);Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631(1978).We have never precisely defined those circumstances, seeid., at 123-128, 98 S.Ct., at 2658-61; but our general approach was summed up in Agins v. Tiburon,447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106(1980), where we stated that the application of land-use regulations to a particular piece of property is a taking only "if the ordinance does not...