United States v. Roberson

• Decision Date: 28 September 2022
• Docket Number: 1:21-CR-66-HAB
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SPENCER O. ROBERSON
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SPENCER O. ROBERSON

No. 1:21-CR-66-HAB

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division

September 28, 2022

OPINION AND ORDER

HOLLY A. BRADY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Following a search of Defendant Spencer O. Roberson's (“Roberson”) vehicle that uncovered a variety of drug contraband, the Government charged him with possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, a fentanyl analog heroin, and cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) (ECF No. 1). Roberson now moves to suppress this evidence claiming that the search and his seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. (ECF No. 17). On May 17, 2022, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. After the filing of the transcript from that hearing, the Defendant filed an opening brief (ECF No. 25), to which the Government responded (ECF No. 27) and the Defendant replied (ECF No. 28). Because the Court determines that neither the search nor Roberson's arrest violated the Fourth Amendment, the Court will DENY the Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A little before midnight on October 2, 2021, Fort Wayne Police Department (FWPD) officers Anthony Krock and Mark Bell were dispatched to the area of 1100 E. Lewis Street in Fort Wayne Indiana to investigate a 911 call. (Hr'g Tr., ECF No. 26 at 12-13; 82-83). The anonymous caller had advised that he heard a female screaming for help in that area and provided a street address of 1138 Lewis Street. Both Officers Krock and Bell described this area (the Southeast quadrant) as a high-crime area, in which they respond to calls of fights shootings, robberies, and other crimes during their regular patrols. (Tr. at 10-12, 81). They also testified that they often observe the presence of drugs in this area.

Dispatch reported the call as a “signal 20” meaning “problem unknown.” (Tr.. at 13). As Officer Krock explained, “.a problem unknown is exactly, you know, what the code is. It can be any number of things. Usually comes in from an anonymous party, and maybe a neighbor or bystander. But we usually have very little detail...” (Id.) When further questioned about the scope of a problem unknown call, Officer Krock testified, “the scope of a problem unknown is much larger than - could be larger than just a specific address...” (Id. at 55).

Officer Krock, driving a fleet vehicle that was not equipped with a vehicle in-car camera, responded to the scene within three minutes of the dispatch. (Tr. at 70). He did not activate his car lights and sirens because he was close to the dispatched area. As he arrived, he observed a white van with the door open and an occupant inside. A few moments later, the van's door closed and it drove away. Officer Krock was not suspicious of the van because he observed one of the occupants in the van, they did not appear to be in distress, and the van did not pull away quickly. (Tr. at 4748: “They were not alerted by my presence.they didn't jump in the vehicle and take off . I saw one individual close the door, and they slowly drove away.”).

Next, Officer Krock observed a gray Lexus sedan parked on the street with its lights on and engine running. He parked his police vehicle a few houses away from the address identified by the 911 caller as the possible location of the screaming woman. (Id. at 14). He exited his parked vehicle and proceeded in the direction of the Lexus and the house associated with the address. Around this time Officer Bell arrived on scene and also parked his police vehicle a few houses down the street. He observed the Lexus with its lights on and running.

Neither Officers Krock or Bell heard a woman screaming and neither knew whether the Lexus was linked to the 911 call. The officers approached the Lexus and Officer Krock called in the license plate to dispatch. Officer Bell observed that the Lexus was properly parked but “the engine was running or on and the headlights and taillights were on. There was a person seated in the vehicle.” (Tr. at 94). Officer Krock approached on the sidewalk next to the Lexus and used his hand-held flashlight to illuminate the driver's compartment. (Id. at 19). Both officers observed a male sleeping in the driver's seat and a baggie of what appeared to them to be marijuana or “spice.” (Tr. at 16-17, 85). Officer Krock also observed a hand-rolled cigarette or “blunt” in an ashtray on the center console. (Id.). Based on their narcotics related training the officers testified that they believed the substance in the baggie was either spice or marijuana. (Id. at 17-19, 85-86). The vehicle's occupant, later found to be Roberson, did not initially awaken when Officer Krock shined his flashlight inside.

While Officer Krock remained with the Lexus, Officer Bell and other responding officers tried to contact someone inside 1138 Lewis Street but did not succeed. (Tr. at 20, 96). Officer Bell then returned to the Lexus to assist Officer Krock in waking Roberson. Before he did, so, Officer Krock used his flashlight to scan the interior compartment for weapons. (Id. at 29). He did not see any.

At some point, Roberson woke up on his own, having apparently been alerted from another officer's flashlight who was standing at the front of the vehicle. Roberson was directed to exit the vehicle. (Tr. at 29). Officer Krock described Roberson's movements as “very slow” as he responded to commands. (Id. at 30). Roberson unlocked the door and turned to step out of the vehicle. He reached with his right hand towards his foot near the driver seat. (Id. at 30). Officer Krock told Roberson to stop reaching and exit the vehicle. Roberson complied and exited the vehicle. Officer Krock performed a pat down of Roberson and felt a large bulge in one of his pockets. (Id.at 31). Officer Krock received permission to remove the contents from Roberson's pockets and located a large sum of money.^[1] Roberson then was asked to step to the curb with another officer and wait.

Officer Krock returned to the vehicle and checked the area where Roberson had been reaching. Officer Krock located a black bag and a COVID mask on the floorboard area of the driver seat. Officer Krock opened the black bag and located a Ziploc bag containing seven small bags of narcotics and a digital scale. (Tr. at 34-36).^[2] At that point, Officer Krock left the vehicle, handcuffed Roberson, and placed him under arrest. The Lexus was towed pursuant to the policy and procedures of the Fort Wayne Police Department and an inventory search of the vehicle was completed. (Gov't Ex. 7).

Based on these facts, Roberson asserts that the officers' actions violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

DISCUSSION

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is tested under different levels of suspicion depending on the type of police-citizen encounter at issue. United States v. Johnson, 910 F.2d 1506, 1508 (7th Cir. 1990). These interactions are not static events, but often progress through the various categories of encounters as the intrusiveness or length of the police activity increases. For this reason, the Fourth Amendment divides police-citizen interactions into three levels, justified by correspondingly increasing levels of suspicion: (1) the consensual encounter, which may be started without any objective level of suspicion, see Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); (2) the investigative detention, which, if non-consensual, must be supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); and (3) the arrest, valid only if supported by probable cause, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964). “As this formulation makes clear, not every police encounter implicates the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir. 2015).

Roberson asserts that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment notions above when they approached his vehicle and initiated an encounter with him without reasonable suspicion that the Lexus was connected to the 911 call they were investigating. Although Roberson concedes the general principle that “officers may approach a willing person in a public place and ask that person questions without violating the Fourth Amendment,” United States v. Adeyeye, 359 F.3d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 2004), he suggests the lines become blurred once he awoke and was asked to step out of the vehicle. At that point, he believes the encounter morphed into something different requiring at least reasonable suspicion. In response, the Government argues that the initial approach of the vehicle needn't be supported by any suspicion and, by the time Roberson awakened, the officers had obtained reasonable suspicion that he may possess illegal substances to warrant his removal from the car to keep investigating. The Court agrees.

The Seventh Circuit has explicitly found that an encounter that would otherwise be consensual is not a seizure just because the individual is seated in an automobile at the time of the encounter. Shields, 789 F.3d at 744 (“These principles do not change when an individual is seated in an automobile.”); United States v. Douglass, 467 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that the officers' presence on each side of the defendant's car, where the officers were standing with flashlights, did not “convert the encounter into a seizure because [the defendant] still could have declined to answer their questions and driven away”). Neither does the fact that the driver is asleep in the vehicle when officers approach change the encounter from consensual to a seizure. See Long v. United States, 847 F.3d...