United States v. Robinson
| Decision Date | 08 November 2019 |
| Docket Number | 16-CR-545 (S-4)(ADS) |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. TYRONE ROBINSON |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
United States Attorney's Office, Eastern District of New York
610 Federal Plaza
By: Allen Lee Bode, Assistant United States Attorney, Of Counsel.
By: Megan Elizabeth Farrell, Assistant United States Attorney, Of Counsel.
Gary Schoer, Esq.
6800 Jericho Turnpike
Syosset, NY 11791
On March 15, 2017, the Defendant Tyrone Robinson (the "Defendant") was charged in a third superseding indictment with 32 counts relating to nine gunpoint robberies and attempted robberies that occurred in Nassau County, as well as accompanying conspiracy and firearm charges.
Presently before the Court are several motions by the Defendant: to dismiss the alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) ("Section 924(c)") for failure to state a claim; for sanctions against the Government for alleged spoliation of exculpatory evidence; and to reopen a suppression hearing concerning a cellphone recovered by New York State parole officers on June 10, 2016 (the "Parole Cellphone").
For the following reasons, the Court denies the Defendant's motions in their entirety
On October 9, 2016, the Government filed a complaint against the Defendant charging him with alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), Hobbs Act robbery, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence.
On January 11, 2017, the Government filed a 22-count indictment against the Defendant.
On March 10, 2017, the Government filed a superseding information adding additional charges for Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy and violation of Section 924(c).
On March 15, 2017, the Government filed a 32-count third superseding indictment charging the Defendant with multiple counts of Hobbs Act robbery, Hobbs Act attempted robbery, and Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), 2 and 3551 et seq.; brandishing one or more firearms during crimes of violence, 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), 2 and 3551 et seq.; possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) and 3551 et seq.; discharging one or more firearms during crimes of violence, 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), 924(c)(1)(C)(i), 2 and 3551 et seq.; firearm-related murder, 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(j)(1), 2 and 3551 et seq.; and possession of ammunition by a felon, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(A)(2) and 3551 et seq..
On May 8, 2017, the Defendant filed several motions relating to the third superseding indictment, in relevant part seeking dismissal of the Section 924(c) charges and suppression of the evidence recovered from the Parole Cellphone.
On November 1, 2017, the Court denied the motion to dismiss, but referred the motion to suppress regarding the seizure of the Parole Cellphone for an evidentiary hearing.
On January 8, 2018, United States Magistrate Judge Anne Y. Shields conducted a suppression hearing and recommended denial of the Defendant's motion to suppress on January 16, 2018.
On February 17, 2018, the Court adopted the recommendation of Judge Shields over the objections of the Defendant's then-counsel Kevin Keating ("Keating").
On March 9, 2018, the Court appointed Robert LaRusso ("LaRusso") as defense counsel after the Defendant terminated his representation by Keating.
On April 27, 2018, LaRusso orally argued for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to suppress the Parole Cellphone, which the Court denied.
On August 16, 2018, after obtaining leave from the Court to submit additional suppression motions on the Defendant's behalf, LaRusso filed another set of motions which, inter alia, sought: suppression of evidence seized from a 2016 black Chrysler van located on March 26, 2016 by the Suffolk County Policy Department ("SCPD") near the crime scene (hereinafter, the "Rental Van"); suppression of evidence from a cellphone allegedly recovered on the roof of the crime scene by SCPD (the "Roof Cellphone"); reopening of the Parole Cellphone suppression hearing; and renewal of the Defendant's motion to dismiss all Section 924(c) firearms charges.
On November 13, 2018, the Court referred the motions to suppress evidence seized from the Rental Van and Roof Cellphone for an evidentiary hearing to Judge Shields and denied the remainder of the Defendant's motions.
On February 5 and 7, 2019, Judge Shields conducted a suppression hearing regarding the Rental Van and Roof Cellphone.
On February 9, 2019, the Defendant moved to reopen that hearing so he could introduce evidence that the SCPD arrested him on March 26, 2016 under false pretenses.
On February 18, 2019, the Court denied the Defendant's motion to reopen the suppression hearing, and subsequently ruled that a renewed motion to suppress on the basis of the Defendant's false arrest would be untimely on March 1, 2019.
On February 27, 2019, Judge Shields issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") recommending that the referred motions to suppress be denied.
On March 14, 2019, the Court adopted the R&R and denied the Defendant's motion to suppress.
On March 22, 2019, the Defendant terminated LaRusso's representation of him due to a potential conflict of interest.
On June 21, 2019, the Court appointed current counsel, Gary Schoer ("Schoer"), as primary counsel. The Court granted Schoer leave to submit additional motions, without prejudice to arguments by the Government that such motions were untimely.
On September 9, 2019, the Defendant submitted the instant motions.
Pursuant to Rule 12(c)(1), the Court may "set a deadline for the parties to make pretrial motions and may also schedule a motion hearing." Rule 12(c)(3) states that Relatedly, Local Criminal Rule 49.1 provides that: "[a] motion for reconsideration or reargument of a Court orderdetermining a motion shall be filed and served within fourteen (14) days after the Court's determination of the original motion."
The Government does not appear to object to the timeliness of the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Section 924(c) charges, but argues that the remainder of the Defendant's motions are untimely collateral attempts to relitigate the Court's prior decisions. The Court agrees. As the Court already explained, the analysis of whether new evidence can justify filing of motions outside the court-mandated deadlines largely turns on the extent to which that evidence was available to the movant when the deadline passed. ECF 199 at 4-5. All of the information underlying the present motion was available to the Defendant at the time of the hearings at issue. As to the Subway restaurant surveillance recordings, the Defendant cited the Government's failure to recover the entire recording in his February 10, 2019 motion to reopen the suppression hearing with regard to the March 26, 2016 incidents. As for the pole camera, the Government informed the Defendant that the video images at issue no longer existed in response to a discovery demand on May 30, 2018. And the New York State Division of Parole Policy and Procedures Manual (hereinafter the "Policy Manual") is a published document that has been publicly available since 2004. Considering that the Defendant's primary contention is that the introduction of these pieces of evidence would have changed the outcome of the relevant proceedings, the Court finds no reasonable justification for the Defendant's failure to either introduce the arguments underlying the present motions at those hearings or, at the very least, within fourteen days of those hearings.
However, as it did with the Defendant's previous omnibus motion, the Court will excuse the Defendant's tardiness out of recognition that he is now represented by different counsel. See United States v. Santillan, No. 13-CR-138, 2015 WL 6115865, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2015) (). The Court will therefore proceed to the merits of the Defendant's motions, but advises the Defendant and counsel that it may not so leniently extend the same courtesies for future motions.
Section 924(c)(1)(A) provides, in pertinent part:
18 U.S.C. § 924(c). "Crime of violence" is defined in two subparts: the elements clause, § 924(c)(3)(A), and the residual clause, § 924(c)(3)(B). The elements clause defines a "crime of violence" as a felony that "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another," whereas the residual clause defines it as a felony "that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense." Ibid.
The third superseding indictment indicated that the crimes which formed the basis of the Section 924(c) violations are...
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