United States v. Rodella

• Decision Date: 06 February 2015
• Docket Number: No. CR 14-2783 JB,CR 14-2783 JB
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. THOMAS R. RODELLA and THOMAS R. RODELLA, JR., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. THOMAS R. RODELLA and THOMAS R. RODELLA, JR., Defendants.

No. CR 14-2783 JB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

February 6, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Objections to United States' Requested Jury Instructions, filed September 14, 2014 (Doc. 77)("Objections"). The Court did not have a hearing solely on the Objections, but heard arguments on the Court's proposed jury instructions, which incorporated some of the United States' Requested Jury Instructions, filed September 10, 2014 (Doc. 60)("U.S. Instructions"), during trial. See Transcript of Trial at 2:23-12:21 (taken September 23, 2014)("2d Day of Trial Tr.")(Peña, Gorence, Court);¹ 2d Day of Trial Tr. at 334:16-341:14 (Peña, Gorence, Oliveros, Court); Transcript of Trial at 1:9-4:19 (taken September 24, 2014)("3d Day of Trial Tr.")(Gorence, Clerk, Court); 3d Day of Trial Tr. at 308:6-329:9 (Peña, Gorence, Court); Transcript of Trial at 3:1-6:2 (taken September 25, 2014)("4th Day of Trial Tr.")(Peña, Court); 4th Day of Trial Tr. at 72:5-76:2 (Peña, Oliveros, Court); 4th Day of Trial Tr. at 130:20-146:15 (Neda, Peña, Oliveros, Court); 4th Day of Trial Tr. at 247:15-252:10 (Neda, Peña, Oliveros, Court); 4th Day of Trial Tr. at 257:4-260:6 (Peña, Oliveros, Court); 4th Day of Trial Tr. at 261:11-264:2 (Peña, Court); 4th Day of Trial Tr. at297:7-299:13 (Neda, Peña, Gorence, Oliveros, Court); 4th Day of Trial Tr. at 301:2-307:18 (Neda, Peña, Gorence, Court); Transcript of Trial at 77:3-78:16 (taken September 26, 2014)(Peña, Gorence, Clerk, Court). The primary issue is whether the Court should use the proposed jury instructions from the U.S. Instructions, in the Court's final jury instructions. Because some of Plaintiff United States of America's proposed jury instructions deviate significantly from the Tenth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, and because some of the proposed instructions may mislead the jury, the Court will not include them in the Court's final jury instructions. The Court will, however, use other requested instructions that accurately state the law and will not mislead the jury. Accordingly, the Court will sustain the Objections in part and overrule them in part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Superseding Indictment, filed September 9, 2014 (Doc. 55)("Indictment"), alleges that, on March 11, 2014, in Rio Arriba County, New Mexico, Defendant Thomas R. Rodella, while acting under color of state law, subjected a person -- Michael Tafoya -- to "unreasonable seizure by a law enforcement officer." Indictment at 1. Specifically, Rodella allegedly used unreasonable force and caused an "unlawful arrest by deputies of the Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Office." Indictment at 1. "This offense resulted in bodily injury" to a person, and included the "use and threatened use of a dangerous weapon." Indictment at 1. The Indictment further alleges that Rodella carried and brandished a firearm "during and in relation to a crime of violence for which the defendant may be prosecuted in a court of the United States," and that, "in furtherance of such crime, possessed and brandished said firearm." Indictment at 1-2.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 10, 2014, the United States and Rodella filed proposed jury instructions to which they stipulated that the Court should include in its final instructions. See Stipulated Jury Instructions, filed September 10, 2014 (Doc. 59). That same day, the United States filed additional jury instructions. See U.S. Instructions at 1. Rodella objects to these additional instructions. See Objections, passim.

The United States' Requested Instruction Number 1 states:

You have heard the testimony of [name of witness], who was a witness in the [government's] [defense] case. You also heard testimony from others concerning [their opinion about his character for truth-telling] [his reputation, in the community where he lives, for telling the truth]. It is up to you to decide from what you heard here whether [name of witness] was telling the truth in this trial. In deciding this, you should bear in mind the testimony concerning his [reputation for] truthfulness.

U.S. Instructions at 3. Its Requested Instruction Number 2 states:

You have heard evidence of other [crimes] [acts] [wrongs] engaged in by Mr. Rodella. You may consider that evidence only as it bears on Mr. Rodella's [e.g., motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident] and for no other purpose. Of course, the fact that the defendant may have previously committed an act similar to the one charged in this case does not mean that the defendant necessarily committed the act charged in this case.

U.S. Instructions at 4.

Rodella objects to both of these two instructions by arguing that they "are not applicable to this case." Objections at 1. He asserts that they are appropriate only if the evidence at trial warrants their inclusion, and that they are irrelevant and prejudicial if they are given without any character or similar-acts evidence being introduced at trial. See Objections at 1.

The United States' Requested Instruction Number 3 states:

Rio Arriba Sheriff's Office policies and procedures have been introduced into evidence. These are the sheriff's department's rules governing the conduct ofvehicle pursuits by members of the department. Likewise, you have heard evidence regarding generally accepted police practices, and the training Mr. Rodella personally received. This evidence has been admitted for a limited purpose. You may use it only to determine whether Mr. Rodella acted willfully, that is, with a bad purpose to violate a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. It is, of course, wholly up to you to determine whether any department rules, policies or accepted practices were violated in this case.

I caution you that not every instance of inappropriate behavior on the part of a sheriff or deputy rises to the level of a federal constitutional violation. It is possible for a law enforcement officer to violate state law or policy, or act contrary to the officer's training, without violating the United States Constitution, just as it is possible for an officer to violate the Constitution without violating a specific state law or policy.

In other words, if you determine that Mr. Rodella violated any Rio Arriba Sheriff's Office policies or generally accepted law enforcement practices or acted contrary to the training he received, you should consider that evidence only in determining whether Mr. Rodella acted willfully and not consider this evidence in determining whether his actions violated the Constitution in the first instance.

U.S. Instructions at 5.

Rodella objects to this instruction by stating that he objects to it for the reasons set forth in the Defendant's Motion to Strike Expert Testimony of Manuel T. Overby, filed September 9, 2014 (Doc. 50)("Motion to Strike"), and the Defendant's Response in Opposition to United States' Motion in Limine to Permit Evidence of Rio Arriba County Sheriff Office Procedures as Part of the Training Materials, filed September 12, 2014 (Doc. 72)("Opposition to SOPs"). Objections at 1-2. Rodella contends that, because the Rio Arriba Sheriff Department's standard operating procedures ("SOPs") and training materials are not relevant and are inadmissible, the Court should not give this instruction.

The United States' Requested Instruction Number 4 states:

Mr. Rodella is charged in Count 1 with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242.

This law makes it a crime for anyone acting under color of law willfully to deprive someone of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

To find Mr. Rodella guilty of this crime you must be convinced that the United States has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: Mr. Rodella was acting under color of law when he committed the acts charged in the indictment.

Second: Mr. Rodella deprived M.T. of his right to be free from unreasonable seizure by a law enforcement officer, which is a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Third: the defendant acted willfully.

U.S. Instructions at 6. Its Requested Instruction Number 5 states:

Element One -- Under Color of Law

The first element that the United States must prove with regard to Count 1 is that Mr. Rodella acted under "color of law." "Under color of law" means acts done under any state law, county or city ordinance, or other governmental regulation, and includes acts done according to a custom of some governmental agency. It means that the defendant acted in his official capacity or else claimed to do so, but abused or misused his power by going beyond the bounds of lawful authority. The defendant need not be on duty to act under color of law.

U.S. Instructions at 7. The United States' Requested Instruction Number 6 states:

Element Two -- Deprivation of a Protected Right

The second element that the United States must prove with regard to Count 1 is that Mr. Rodella deprived M.T. of a right secured or protected by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Specifically, the Indictment alleges that the Mr. Rodella deprived M.T. of his right to be free from unreasonable seizures and unreasonable use of force by a law enforcement officer. You are instructed that this right is protected and secured by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

A police officer violates an arrestee's Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizure if the officer makes an arrest without probable cause. Whenever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to walk away, he has seized that person. Probable cause exists if facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge and of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that the arrestee has committed or is committing an

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