United States v. Rodriguez-Ramos

• Citation: 663 F.3d 356
• Decision Date: 12 January 2012
• Docket Number: 11–1019.,Nos. 10–3769,s. 10–3769
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jose Luis RODRIGUEZ–RAMOS, Appellant.United States of America, Appellee, v. German Robles–Garcia, Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

663 F.3d 356

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

v.Jose Luis RODRIGUEZ–RAMOS, Appellant.United States of America, Appellee,

v.German Robles–Garcia, Appellant.

Nos. 10–3769

11–1019.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Sept. 20, 2011.Filed: Dec. 9, 2011.Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Jan. 12, 2012.

Priscilla E. Forsyth, argued, Sioux City, IA, for appellant Rodriguez–Ramos.

Evans D. Prieston, argued, Novato, CA, for appellant Robles–Garcia.

Robert Knief, AUSA, argued, Sioux City, IA, for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, BYE, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Appellants German Robles–Garcia and Jose Luis Rodriguez–Ramos were tried jointly by jury. Robles was convicted of conspiracy to distribute less than 50 grams of methamphetamine mixture, 50 grams or more of methamphetamine actual, and 5 kilograms or more of cocaine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A). He was also convicted of kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201. Rodriguez was convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The district court ¹ sentenced Robles to two concurrent terms of 600 months imprisonment with five years of supervised release and sentenced Rodriguez to 260 months of imprisonment with five years of supervised release. Both now appeal. We affirm.

I. Factual Background

A. Robles

Appellant Robles and Martin Garcia–Huerta, who was a cooperating witness at trial, had an agreement whereby Robles, who lived in California, would supply cocaine to Garcia for distribution in Omaha, Nebraska, and the two would split profits.² In the fall of 2009, the relationship between Garcia and Robles began to unravel, largely because Garcia owed Robles $100,000 for cocaine that Garcia had received but for which he had not paid. Garcia and his operation began hiding from Robles, while Robles and his organization began looking for Garcia.

Shortly after Garcia's dispute with Robles began, Garcia had a disagreement with Ernesto Herrera–Castro (Tito), one of Garcia's workers. Tito continued to work for Garcia, but unbeknownst to Garcia, began communicating with Robles about Garcia's whereabouts. In December of 2009, Tito arranged for another member of Garcia's group, Raul Tapia–Marroquin, to meet Tito to buy methamphetamine. Tito took Tapia to a motel and Tito, Robles, and an unidentified third person bound Tapia and held him against his will. Robles put a gun into Tapia's mouth and threatened to “blow [his] brains out” if he would not reveal Garcia's exact location. Tapia was held for several hours while Robles searched his home. Robles informed Tapia that Tapia would be forced to remain with Robles until Robles located Garcia. Fortunately, Tapia was able to escape.

Immediately after the kidnapping, Garcia and his workers—alerted that Robles had located them, unwilling to pay back the $100,000, and afraid of what Robles would do to them—again relocated their operation, this time to Minneapolis, Minnesota. There, Garcia and his associates rented homes and placed 13 kilograms of methamphetamine in a rented storage locker.

B. Rodriguez

In 2009, Garcia paid to have appellant Rodriguez smuggled into the United States from Mexico to help with Garcia's drug conspiracy. Rodriguez then worked with Garcia in Omaha, Sioux City, and Minneapolis. Rodriguez conducted several drug deals for Garcia; supplied an underage member of Garcia's organization with a handgun; lived in and had keys to the main house used by Garcia's operation to store and package drugs in Sioux City; and lived in a house paid for by Garcia in Minneapolis. Rodriguez helped Garcia unload the 13 kilograms of methamphetamine into the storage locker in Minneapolis and was with Garcia at the time of their arrests.

II. Robles

Robles appeals his conviction on grounds of sufficiency of the evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. He also argues that the trial judge considered unreliable information to support his sentence, that the judge erred in applying the leader-organizer enhancement, and that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Robles contends the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for the drug conspiracy and argues that the district court should have granted his motion for acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a). We review the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Janis, 556 F.3d 894, 897 (8th Cir.2009).

“Where a party challenges the evidence underlying his conviction, the standard of review is very strict, and the jury's verdict is not to be lightly overturned. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and we resolve any evidentiary conflicts in the government's favor.” United States v. Hayes, 391 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir.2004) (internal citations omitted).

To convict a defendant on a conspiracy charge, the Government must prove that “1) an agreement existed among two or more people to accomplish an illegal purpose, 2) the defendant knew of the conspiracy, and 3) the defendant knowingly joined and participated in the conspiracy.” Id. at 961. The Government is not required to prove that a defendant expressly agreed to join a conspiracy; a tacit agreement by the defendant is sufficient. Id. “The elements of conspiracy may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, and the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented about what the defendant's state of mind was when he did or said the things presented in the evidence.” United States v. Cervantes, 646 F.3d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting United States v. Chavez–Alvarez, 594 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th Cir.2010)).

Robles contends there was insufficient evidence to support the charge of conspiracy to distribute five or more grams of cocaine, arguing the witnesses' testimony was not credible and that the testimony failed to establish Robles intentionally and knowingly entered into a conspiracy.

Garcia testified at trial that Robles was his supplier of eight kilograms of cocaine and testified the two had an agreement to divide the profits of Garcia's sales. Ivan Rodriguez, another member of Garcia's organization, also testified that Robles was the supplier of the cocaine distributed by the organization.

Robles contests the sufficiency of this evidence, arguing that Ivan Rodriguez and Garcia were not credible witnesses because they testified against him in hopes of gaining lighter sentences for themselves. At trial, defense attorneys questioned the witnesses at length about their possible biases and motives for testifying. The jury was well aware the witnesses were coconspirators and hoped for lighter sentences in exchange for testifying against Robles. However, the jury was entitled to credit those witnesses over Robles's defense. “The jury is the final arbiter of the witnesses' credibility, and we will not disturb that assessment.” Hayes, 391 F.3d at 961.

Additionally, Robles argues Garcia's and Ivan Rodriguez's testimony failed to show that Robles had knowingly and intentionally joined the conspiracy. To convict a defendant of a conspiracy to distribute cocaine, the Government must prove “that a conspiracy to distribute cocaine existed, that [Robles] knew of the conspiracy, and that [Robles] intentionally joined the conspiracy.” United States v. Huggans, 650 F.3d 1210, 1222 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting United States v. Williams, 534 F.3d 980, 985 (8th Cir.2008)). As stated, Garcia's and Rodriguez's testimony was sufficient to establish the existence of the conspiracy. Additionally, we have found that a defendant's repeated supply of large amounts of cocaine to a cocaine conspiracy is not a typical buyer-seller relationship but instead is indicative of knowledge and intent to join a conspiracy because of the quantity and regularity of the transactions. Id. at 1222–23. Garcia testified that Robles supplied him with multiple shipments of cocaine, totaling eight kilograms, over the course of the conspiracy. Garcia also testified that he and Robles had an agreement to split the profits from the cocaine sales. This was sufficient to establish Robles's knowledge of and intent to join the conspiracy.

Similarly, there was also sufficient evidence to support the separate charge that Robles was involved in a conspiracy to distribute less than 50 grams of methamphetamine mixture. Though Robles contends he supplied only cocaine to the conspiracy, Robles's involvement with only one drug in the conspiracy does not absolve him from responsibility for the other drugs that the conspiracy sold. See United States v. Donnell, 596 F.3d 913, 924 (8th Cir.2010), cert. denied, Donnell v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 994, 178 L.Ed.2d 831 (2011). In Donnell, a defendant was charged with being a member of a conspiracy to distribute four types of drugs, though his involvement with the conspiracy was limited to a single drug, ecstasy. Id. at 923–24. The defendant argued there were multiple conspiracies at play and that the evidence failed to show that he had knowingly and intentionally joined the overarching conspiracy to sell multiple drugs. Id. Rather, he argued he was involved in a smaller conspiracy to distribute ecstasy only. Id. We noted the evidence was sufficient to show the defendant had knowingly engaged in a conspiracy to sell ecstasy and found a reasonable jury could have concluded this conspiracy was the same conspiracy that distributed the other drugs. Id. at 924. We stated “a conspiracy with multiple objectives is not the same thing as multiple conspiracies.” Id. (quoting United States v. Santisteban, 501 F.3d 873, 882 (8th Cir.2007)). “One conspiracy may exist despite the involvement of multiple groups and the performance of separate acts.” United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1230 (8th Cir.1998) (quoting United States v. Dijan, 37 F.3d...