United States v. Rosa, 29457.

• Decision Date: 17 November 1970
• Docket Number: No. 29457.,29457.
• Citation: 434 F.2d 964
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ralph Pineda ROSA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

434 F.2d 964 (1970)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ralph Pineda ROSA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 29457.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

November 17, 1970.

Samuel S. Forman, Miami, Fla., court-appointed, for defendant-appellant; Ralph Pineda Rosa, pro se.

Robert W. Rust, U. S. Atty., Miami, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, DYER^* and INGRAHAM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In a return bout before this Court Appellant Rosa contends that his 1960 three count conviction¹ for the purchase and sale of a narcotic drug must be reversed because (i) a transcript of the proceedings in the Trial Court was unavailable at the time that he was preparing his appeal, and because (ii) the Trial Court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing as ordered by the previous mandate of this Court.²

Appellant's first ground of error falls squarely within the rule announced in Hardy v. United States, 1963, 375 U.S. 277, 84 S.Ct. 424, 11 L.Ed.2d 331, and United States v. Atilus, 5 Cir., 1970, 425 F.2d 816, which requires a criminal conviction to be reversed if there is no transcript of the Trial Court proceedings available for the Defendant's use when he is preparing his appeal. Accordingly Appellant's 1960 conviction for the purchase and sale of a narcotic drug is reversed. Since the sentence imposed has already been completed, "a retrial would be pointless". 425 F.2d at 817. Therefore the case "is remanded for the entry of appropriate orders to expunge the records of the 1960 conviction." 425 F.2d at 817. Under these circumstances we find it unnecessary to reach the merits of Appellant's second complaint.

I. Background

In 1960 Rosa received concurrent sentences of 5 years on each of the counts in his three count indictment and conviction. The same year he began filing pro se pleadings in which he steadfastly maintained that (i) he was entrapped by Eugene Marshall, then the Chief Federal Narcotics Agent in Miami, Florida, and that (ii) Marshall, the Government's star witness at Appellant's trial, perjured himself in order to get Appellant convicted. After completing three and one-half years of his 1960 concurrent sentences Rosa was released. Approximately one month after his release he was arrested, convicted, and sentenced to a ten-year term on another narcotics offense.³ In 1965, about 5 years after Rosa had commenced his pro se accusations against Marshall, the Agent was convicted of unfaithfulness to his trust as a federal narcotics agent and he was sentenced to a prison term of 14 and one-half years.⁴

At the present time, Rosa has already served 6 and one-half years of his second conviction, and presumably he is presently eligible for mandatory release benefits.⁵ He contends that he had suffered disabilities and disadvantages during his second sentence because of the first conviction.⁶ Rosa claims that "a reversal of his first conviction would greatly affect the restrictions he is currently on and that if the first conviction is reversed he will be able to have the sentence on the second conviction reduced."

II. Lack of Transcript

As a consequence of our earlier opinion⁷ the District Court held an evidentiary hearing. It found that "through the fault of no one" the testimony at trial was never recorded and that the court reporter's notes are unavailable. Appellant, represented in this proceeding by a new court-appointed counsel, submits that his appeal "cannot be properly perfected without the transcript" that was developed in the Trial Court. In United States v. Atilus, supra, this Court unmistakably held that the absence of a trial transcript would be fatal to the Government's case on appeal.

"Jerome Atilus was convicted in 1964 for illegally possessing and transporting marihuana in violation of 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 4744(a) and 4742(a). His appeal from that conviction was delayed, and as a result the propriety of this 1964 conviction is now before us for the first time on direct appeal.

It appears that through no fault of the defendant a transcript of the trial proceedings is no longer available. Under these circumstances this court has no choice but to reverse the conviction. The Supreme Court has made it clear beyond question that a criminal defendant has a right to a complete transcript of the trial proceedings, particularly where, as here, counsel on appeal was not counsel at the trial. Hardy v. United States, 1963, 375 U.S. 277, 84 S.Ct. 424, 11 L.Ed.2d 331. Since no transcript is here available, the conviction must be reversed. Further, since Atilus has already completely served the sentence imposed as a result of the conviction, a retrial would be pointless.

The judgment of the court below is reversed and the cause is remanded for the entry of appropriate orders to expunge the records of this conviction."

425 F.2d at 816-817.

Actually the Government does not challenge this. First, it did not even file a brief in response. It merely informed the Clerk of this Court by letter that it did not intend to file a brief in the case because "the appellant has completed serving the sentence which is the subject of his appeal and we, therefore, feel that the appeal is moot. We do not, however, contest the argument nor the law cited in the appellant's brief." Second, and more significant, in answering a Court-directed inquiry, the Government, by supplemental, subsequent letter made it clearer by stating "it does not contest the arguments and law in the * * * case and interposes no objection to the relief sought by the Appellant." While ostensibly a concession of error, the Government gave up nothing. It did, however, impose unnecessary burdens on the judicial structure of the Fifth Circuit.⁸

We hold that Hardy and Atilus leave no room for doubt. Accordingly, Rosa is entitled to the relief he seeks.

III. Evidentiary Hearing

In our previous order, Rosa v. United States, 5 Cir., 1968, 397 F.2d 401, we said:

"Rosa has never had an evidentiary hearing to establish any of the facts which he has alleged in his petition. Such an evidentiary hearing would receive all evidence of the facts surrounding the alleged failure of his counsel to take an appeal or of the trial court to advise him of his right to appeal and right to counsel on appeal. See Baker v. Wainwright, 5 Cir., 1968, 391 F.2d 248; Dodd v. United States, 9 Cir., 1963, 321 F.2d 240; Doyle v. United States, 9 Cir., 1966, 366 F.2d 394. It would also provide an opportunity to

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