United States v. Rosenthal
Decision Date | 17 March 1903 |
Citation | 121 F. 862 |
Parties | UNITED STATES v. ROSENTHAL et al. (three cases). |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Syllabus by the Court.
The Attorney General, the Solicitor General, nor any officer of the Department of Justice, is authorized by sections 359, 367, or other provision of the Revised Statutes of the United States (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 207, 209), to conduct, or to aid in the conduct of, proceedings before a grand jury, nor has a special assistant to the Attorney General such power.
A special assistant to the Attorney General is not an officer of the Department of Justice, within the meaning of such sections.
A special assistant to the Attorney General, appointed to investigate and report concerning alleged fraudulent importations of Japanese silks at the port of New York, and to prepare and conduct such civil and criminal proceedings as may result therefrom, is not authorized by law to conduct, or to aid the conduct of, proceedings before a federal grand jury, and indictments based upon such proceedings so conducted should be quashed upon motion.
The Merchants' Association of the City of New York assured the Attorney General that, if necessary, it would furnish funds to compensate the special assistant who should be appointed for such purpose. This arrangement was inter alios and did not disqualify the appointee, who became an employe of the United States, to whom alone he could look for compensation, and for whom he performed his duty with fidelity and probity.
Henry L. Burnett, U.S. Atty., and W. Wickham Smith, Special Asst atty. gen.
Dittenhoefer Gerber & James (A. J. Dittenhoefer and Frank H. Platt, of counsel), for defendants Rosenthal and Cohn.
Judson G. Wells, for defendant Browne.
'THOMAS District Judge.
On January 9, 1902, the Attorney General issued to W. Wickham Smith, the following commission:
In the previous December the Merchants' Association of the City of New York asked Mr. Smith, after examination, to determine whether there was reasonable ground for reopening a former inquiry concerning such importations. Mr. Smith, after an interview with Mr. Wakeman, appraiser, reported that there should be a thorough investigation, and suggested that the proper federal officer should designate Association, by letter, conveyed Mr. Smith's suggestions to the President, with whom, as well as with the Attorney General, two officers of the association later conferred. Thereupon Mr. Dresser, the president of the association, and Mr. Mead, its secretary, or one of them, informed Mr. Smith Association, in its official organ or otherwise, appropriated the credit for his selection. Mr. Smith was neither a member of its board, nor was he ever its general counsel, although he states that on two or three different occasions since 1897 The evidence produced upon these motions fully sustains the statement made by Mr. Smith The association undoubtedly expects to pay for his services, and will probably do so, pursuant to its promise to the Attorney General. It is natural that Mr. Smith should recognize these probabilities, and with candor express himself accordingly, if there were occasion. But he was in no wise responsible for the arrangement. It placed him under no obligation to the Merchants' Association, inasmuch as the government alone retained him, and is liable to make proper compensation for his authorized services. His relation to the matter is highly honorable, and independent, as becomes an attorney of this court, employed by the United States as its sworn official.
The next question is, what authority did the appointment vest in Mr. Smith? After receiving the appointment and duly qualifying, Mr. Smith pursued vigorously and fairly the investigation of the alleged offenses, and with the sanction and co-operation of the District Attorney appeared before the grand jury, and chiefly conducted the proceedings that resulted in the indictments, whose validity is now accused on account of Mr. Smith's action with reference to them. Should the indictments be quashed? A survey of the powers of the District Attorney and the Attorney General and his authorized officers and assistants is necessary. The Revised Statutes provide: 'There shall be appointed in each district * * * a person learned in the law, to act as attorney for the United States in such district' (section 767 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 599)); and 'it shall be the duty of every district attorney to prosecute, in his district, all delinquents for crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States' (section 771 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 601)). But the Attorney General is the head of the Department of Justice (section 346 (U.S Comp. St. 1901, p. 202)), the legal adviser of the President (section 354 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 206)), and to him the officers of the other departments of the government may resort for legal advice (section 356 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 206)). During almost a century of the government the Attorney General was, as he remains, a member of the Cabinet, the law officer to the President and the Executive Departments, and in 1861 he was given supervisory powers respecting the officers connected with the courts throughout the federal domain; but his own participation in litigation was confined to the conduct of cases in the Supreme Court (Act Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, Section 35; 1 Stat. 92), until it was extended to the Court of Claims (Act June 25, 1868, c. 71, Section 5; 15 Stat. 75). To understand the legislation of 1870, to which attention will soon be called, this original conception of what the Attorney General was, and what he and his officers were...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
United States v. Crispino
...The right of the special attorneys to appear before grand juries was not questioned until 1903 when in the case of United States v. Rosenthal, 121 F. 862 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.1903), the Court held that the power of the Attorney General to conduct and argue any "case" in any court did not authorize ......
-
U.S. v. Prueitt
...to appear before grand juries was not seriously questioned until the Second Circuit decided United States v. Rosenthal in 1903. 121 F. 862 (2nd Cir. 1903). In Rosenthal, the Court held that a "special assistant to the Attorney General" was not empowered by statute to "conduct proceedings be......
-
Persico, In re
...contemporaneous district court cases provide a background for consideration of the 1906 Act, now section 515(a). United States v. Rosenthal, 121 F. 862 (S.D.N.Y.1903), the case section 515(a) was designed to deal with, is Merchants in New York were disturbed about the possible fraudulent im......
-
United States v. Badalamenti
...Attorney for a special case, see e. g., United States v. Twining, 132 F. 129 (D.N.J.1904) (specific case named); United States v. Rosenthal, 121 F. 862 (S.D.N.Y.1903) (fraudulent importations of Japanese silks); United States v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 163 F. 66 (M.D.Tenn. 1908) (fe......