United States v. Rountree

• Decision Date: 27 May 1966
• Docket Number: 63 Cr. 501.,No. 65 Cr. 1055,65 Cr. 1055
• Citation: 254 F. Supp. 1009
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, v. Johnny ROUNTREE.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

254 F. Supp. 1009

UNITED STATES of America, v. Johnny ROUNTREE.

Nos. 65 Cr. 1055, 63 Cr. 501.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

May 27, 1966.

Richard Owen, New York City, for defendant.

Edward M. Shaw, Asst. U. S. Atty., for the United States.

MEMORANDUM

TYLER, District Judge.

Pursuant to Article V of the Criminal Justice Act Plan of this court¹ and the relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 (18 U.S.C. § 3006A (d)), Richard Owen, Esq. of the New York Bar has made claim for fees and expenses for services in "extraordinary circumstances" or for "protracted representation" on behalf of defendant who was indicted and tried in this court.

In sum, his claim amounts to a fee of $947.50, plus disbursements of $7.00. On the basis of meticulously kept time records, Mr. Owen certifies that he spent 58 hours in preparation for one trial and a later probation revocation proceeding and other out-of-court time related to these two proceedings; in addition, he certifies that he spent a total of 24½ hours "in open court" upon the trial, the hearing on probation revocation and related motions and hearings.

Counsel was appointed by the undersigned on December 3, 1965 in Crime Part I of this court. Thereafter he represented his client in a trial upon charges of obstruction of justice consuming two court days, December 28 and 30, 1965 before Judge Weinfeld. On February 3 and 4, 1966, he represented the defendant in a hearing upon a charge of violation of conditions of probation before Judge Wyatt.

Although I do not question the accuracy of the time which Mr. Owen certifies that he spent in these two matters, and notwithstanding my opinion that the true comparative value of his services exceeds even the amount which he here claims, I am unable to approve compensation for him in any amount beyond the basic limit of $500 set by the Congress. This is so because I do not believe that the extent and nature of the services rendered can be said to constitute "protracted representation" or "extraordinary circumstances" within the meaning of the statute.

Both as a matter of the plain language of the statute and its legislative history, it is clear that Congress in enacting the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 did not mean that the $500 limit was to apply in every case where the hours spent computed at the maximum rates permitted would give a total exceeding the sum of $500.² In short, there is little doubt that Congress intended to provide an exception to the $500 limit only in the unusual case. See United States v. James Hall Whitney, 65 Cr. 160, S.D.N.Y., March 30, 1966, by Lumbard, C. J. Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, U. S. Senate, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., on S.63, S.1059, May 13, 1963.

Rountree's two day trial upon obstruction of justice charges was not by any sensible standard a protracted or unusual case. Assuming, as I do, that Rountree's subsequent probation revocation proceeding was a "criminal case" and thus within the coverage of the Act, see United States v. Boyden, 248 F.Supp. 291, S.D. Calif., decided December 20,...