United States v. Rubio-Mendoza
| Decision Date | 02 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-41270,14-41270 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee v. MARIA GUADALUPE RUBIO-MENDOZA, Defendant - Appellant |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
Before BARKSDALE, CLEMENT, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
*
Maria Guadalupe Rubio-Mendoza claims the evidence was insufficient to support her jury-trial convictions for: conspiracy to possess, with intent to distribute, one kilogram or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846 (count one); and possession, with intent to distribute, one kilogram or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (count two). In support, she asserts the evidence fails toestablish for either conviction her requisite knowledge and participation. AFFIRMED.
After entering the United States at Roma, Texas, on 28 October 2013, Rubio and her husband, Ruben Luis Camberos-Magallon, were arrested later that day when Border Patrol Agents at a checkpoint near Hebbronville, Texas, discovered approximately 17 kilograms of heroin and cocaine in hidden compartments in Rubio's vehicle. She was the owner and driver; Camberos, the passenger. The drugs' value was estimated to be, at the high end, over $700,000. Three cell phones found in the vehicle helped link the couple to a drug conspiracy: Rubio's pink-and-white phone; Camberos' black phone; and a ZTE-brand phone, used for contacting other members of the conspiracy.
Rubio and Camberos were indicted for: conspiracy to possess, with intent to distribute, heroin (count one); and possession, with intent to distribute, heroin (count two). Camberos pleaded guilty to count two, testified for Rubio at her trial, and subsequently was sentenced to 135 months' imprisonment. A jury found Rubio guilty on both counts. For count two, she was convicted under the theory that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2, she aided and abetted the possession, with intent to distribute, heroin. She was sentenced to 151 months' imprisonment.
By presenting her insufficiency challenges in motions for judgment of acquittal after the close of the Government's case and after both sides rested, Rubio preserved them for de novo review. E.g., United States v. Mitchell, 792 F.3d 581, 582 (5th Cir. 2015). Reversal is warranted only if the Government cannot establish that: "after viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [Government], any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond areasonable doubt". United States v. Vargas-Ocampo, 747 F.3d 299, 301 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original)), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 170 (2014). In that regard, "[t]he evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be completely inconsistent with every conclusion except guilt, so long as a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt". United States v. Terrell, 700 F.3d 755, 760 (5th Cir. 2012).
Both direct and circumstantial evidence are considered, of course, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Rounds, 749 F.3d 326, 333 (5th Cir. 2014). Moreover, jurors are "free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence", United States v. Smith, 739 F.3d 843, 847 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Bliss, 491 F. App'x 491, 492 (5th Cir. 2012)), and "retain[ ] the sole authority . . . to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses", United States v. Grant, 683 F.3d 639, 642 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Loe, 262 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 2001)). In other words, for the latter, "it is not our [court's] role . . . to second-guess the determinations of the jury as to the credibility of the evidence". United States v. Guidry, 406 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2005). Concerning credibility evaluations, and as noted, Camberos and Rubio testified at her trial.
Rubio maintains the evidence was insufficient to establish she knew about, or voluntarily participated in, the conspiracy, possession, or distribution of heroin. In that regard, she claims she was merely an unknowing transporter, as owner and driver of the vehicle in which the drugs were found. She also contends the Government failed to show she was connected to her husband's actions or to the ZTE cell phone, which, as stated, was used to communicate with others involved in the conspiracy.
For evidence to be sufficient for a conspiracy-to-possess-with-intent-to-distribute-heroin conviction (count one), the Government must prove thefollowing elements beyond a reasonable doubt: "(1) the existence of an agreement between two or more persons to violate narcotics laws[;] (2) [Rubio's] knowledge of the agreement[;] and (3) [her] voluntary participation in the conspiracy". United States v. Patino-Prado, 533 F.3d 304, 309 (5th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). As noted, Rubio challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the knowledge and participation elements.
"Knowledge of the presence of narcotics often may be inferred from the exercise of control over the vehicle in which the illegal drugs are concealed." United States v. Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d 907, 911 (5th Cir. 1995). Rubio was the owner and driver of the vehicle containing the concealed drugs; but, "in secret-compartment cases[,] we have required additional circumstantial evidence to support knowledge because of the possibility . . . that a third party could conceal drugs in the vehicle of an unwitting defendant". United States v. Gil-Cruz, 808 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 2015). Other United States v. Vasquez, 677 F.3d 685, 694-95 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
For the participation-in-the-conspiracy element, Rubio's "presence" is a "probative . . . factor to be considered" along with the surrounding circumstances. United States v. Dean, 59 F.3d 1479, 1486 (5th Cir. 1995).
For count two, possession with intent to distribute heroin, the Government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Rubio had: "(1) knowledge, (2) possession, and (3) intent to distribute the controlled substance [ ]". United States v. Delgado, 256 F.3d 264, 274 (5th Cir. 2001). Again, Rubio claims insufficient evidence of knowledge and participation. As discussed, forthis count, she was also charged with aiding and abetting, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2.
To prove Rubio "aided and abetted 'both the possession of the drug and the intent to distribute it'", the Government is not required to show she personally did every act constituting the offense. United States v. Delagarza-Villarreal, 141 F.3d 133, 140 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Williams, 985 F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 1993)). Instead, she must have "associated with the criminal venture, purposefully participated in the criminal activity, and sought by [her] actions to make the venture succeed". United States v. Moody, 564 F.3d 754, 758 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Jimenez, 509 F.3d 682, 689 (5th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). For the association element, she must have "shared in the criminal intent of the principal". United States v. McDowell, 498 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 2007) (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Smith, 546 F.2d 1275, 1284 (5th Cir. 1977)). And, participation requires her acting in some affirmative manner to aid the venture. Id.
The following is part of the evidence presented at trial. (Again, Rubio and Camberos testified.)
At around 2:30 p.m. on 28 October 2013, Rubio drove her white 2007 Ford Mondeo across the United States-Mexico border at the Roma, Texas, port of entry, across from Miguel Aleman, Mexico. About an hour earlier, her husband, Camberos, had entered separately, allegedly because the couple (married two months previously) had quarreled; he walked across the pedestrian bridge at Roma; and Rubio picked him up on the United States side.
Later the same day, based on the records in the United States Customs database, Rubio re-entered the United States, on foot, at the Rio Grande City, Texas, port of entry at 4:10 p.m. She testified she did not cross the border a second time, but only visited that port of entry because, when she left Roma toproceed to San Antonio, she had mistakenly set her GPS for the opposite direction, despite directions to San Antonio in her handwriting in a spiral notebook found in her vehicle ("83/359/16 a San Antonio"). She stated she had forgotten to obtain a Department of Homeland Security I-94A form (permitting travel over 25 miles from the border), which she purchased at Rio Grande City. The testimony was undisputed that: Rubio had been to the United States before; and Camberos had never been to the United States and "felt lost" there.
From Rio Grande City, Rubio drove west toward Zapata, Texas (passing Roma, where she and Camberos originally entered), then north on Highway 16 toward San Antonio. Approximately two miles south of Hebbronville, Texas, they stopped at the United States Border Patrol checkpoint at which they were arrested. (Hebbronville is nearly 80 miles northeast from Roma.) Rubio testified that she was traveling to San Antonio (through Hebbronville) to seek treatment for cancer, but without making any appointments with oncologists. In that regard, Camberos testified he told Rubio to find...
To continue reading
Request your trial