United States v. Russell, 7687.
| Decision Date | 24 June 1930 |
| Docket Number | No. 7687.,7687. |
| Citation | 41 F.2d 852 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. RUSSELL et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
Alex C. Birch, U. S. Atty., and D. R. Coley, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Mobile, Ala.
Robert T. Ervin, Jr., and Jere Austill, both of Mobile, Ala., for defendants.
The indictment charged a conspiracy, and in this case it was shown that one party to the alleged conspiracy was engaged in selling whisky on the east side of Mobile river, opposite the city; that another operated a launch, and frequently bought whisky from him and charged the others $2 a gallon extra for bringing the whisky across the river and delivering it to such two, who sold it at retail, each fixing his own price and retaining all of such price. There was no evidence showing that any one of such law violators aided or assisted any other one, or agreed to do so, and there was no division of profits, nor was there any agreement that the whisky should be bought from any one. At the conclusion of the evidence a motion was made to dismiss the case because no conspiracy was shown.
A criminal conspiracy may be briefly described as an agreement express or implied between two or more people to do an illegal act, or to do a legal act in an illegal manner. This necessarily implies that the two or more conspirators shall collaborate in the doing of such act. The knowledge by one that another is doing, or contemplates the doing of, such act, without any aid or assistance by such one in the doing of the act, does not make him a coconspirator. Nor does the fact that a number of people, each of whom is engaged in illegal acts, and is so known to be by each of the others, become coconspirators, unless some aid or assistance be given by one to another in the illegal act done by such other. It is not a community of crime by several that makes them conspirators, but a community of interest in some crime. Many men may be engaged in committing the same sort of crime, each knowing that the others were so engaged, without becoming conspirators. They may come in contact one with another in an act where such act is not itself a crime on the part of each, without becoming conspirators.
To illustrate, the buyer of intoxicating liquor commits no crime, although the seller does. Now, the fact that the seller knows that the buyer intends to resell such liquor would not make the seller guilty of a conspiracy with the buyer, unless such seller do some act aiding the buyer to make...
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U.S. v. Huezo
...the "slight evidence" phrase to describe what was "probably" needed to permit a jury to find a conspiracy, see United States v. Russell, 41 F.2d 852, 853 (S.D. Ala. 1930), an observation happily not since repeated. 8. Despite the rejection of the "slight evidence" formulation by the Fifth, ......
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United States v. Harrison
...United States v. Pandolfi, 2 Cir., 110 F.2d 736. 7 The minority: Di Bonaventura v. United States, 4 Cir., 15 F.2d 494; United States v. Russell, D.C., 41 F.2d 852; Young v. United States, 5 Cir., 48 F.2d 26; United States v. Peoni, 2 Cir., 100 F.2d 401, noted in Application of Conspiracy St......
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United States v. Direct Sales Co.
...which they were purchased is not enough to save the indictment, and cites United States v. Kerper, D.C., 29 F.2d 744, and United States v. Russell, D.C., 41 F.2d 852. These cases reiterate a well established principle of law, that is, that mere knowledge of one that another contemplates vio......
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Williams v. State, 6 Div. 299
...does not make one a coconspirator unless he assists other." The language is precisely the language of headnote 2 in United States v. Russell, 41 F.2d 852 (S.D.Ala.1930). Except for the grammar flaw to be found in the use of the word "other" instead of the words "the other," the charge conta......