United States v. Rutherford
| Decision Date | 02 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 3:20-cr-111 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. KYLE RUTHERFORD, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECUSAL (DOC. NO 55)
On December 15, 2022, the Court rejected Defendant's plea agreement made pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C). Doc No. 46. Thereafter, defense counsel moved to recuse the undersigned. This case is now before the Court on Defendant's motion for recusal. Doc. No. 55. The Government responded, and this matter is now ripe for review. Doc. No. 57.
On October 7, 2020, Defendant was indicted on two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of minors who had not yet attained twelve years of age, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c). Doc. No. 9. He pled guilty-pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C)-to two counts of sexual abuse, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(A), on September 28, 2022. Doc. Nos 37, 38. The parties stipulated to a sentence not to exceed 60 months imprisonment. Doc. No. 37 at PageID 101. The Court deferred a decision on the plea agreement until sentencing. Doc. No. 39.
Defendant's base offense level, under the Sentencing Guidelines, was 30. See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1; Doc. No. 43 at PageID 157. Because both minor victims were five and six years old at the time of the offense, Defendant's base offense level increased to.
34. U.S.S.G § 2A3.1(b)(2); Doc. No. 43 at PageID 158. It then increased to 41, due to the application of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1)-warranting a five-level increase because Defendant qualified as a repeat and dangerous sex offender against minors. Doc. No. 43 at PageID 159. Ultimately, his total offense level rested at 38, after decreases under U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1(a) and (b) for accepting responsibility and timely notifying authorities of his intent to plead guilty. See id.
Defendant's criminal history featured two relevant offenses-a traffic offense in 2019, involving Defendant's intoxicated driving; and failing to comply with a police order in 2020. See id. at PagelD 160-61. He committed the 2020 offense while on probation, leaving his criminal history score at four. Id. at PageID 161-62. That meant that his criminal history category was III, and his term of imprisonment, under the Guidelines, ranged from 292 to 365 months. Id. at PageID 172.
On December 15, 2022, the Court opened the sentencing hearing by hearing victim impact statements from the mothers of the minor victims. See Doc. No. 53 at PageID 190. The Court then heard from counsel for the Government and Defendant. Id. at PageID 196-201. After a brief recess, the Court rejected the plea agreement. Id. at PageID 204.
In rejecting the agreement, the Court began by explaining that it “must exercise sound discretion in determining whether to reject a plea” and “must articulate . . . sound reasons . . . for rejecting a Plea Agreement, including relying on the Sentencing Guidelines and the factors set forth in . . . 18 U.S.C. [§] 3553(a).” Id. at PageID 202. It then explained the relevant materials to consider, including: (1) the Sentencing Guidelines; (2) the recommendations of the parties and the Probation Department; and (3) the § 3553(a) factors, which it then listed. Id. at PageID 203-05.
Next, the Court structured its analysis in three ways. First, the Court examined comparable sentences for offenders sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 2242 in the Sixth Circuit and nationwide. Id. at PagelD 205-06. It noted that the average sentence length in 2021 was 214 months. Id. Second, “[g]iven the large disparity between Defendant's agreed-upon proposed term of imprisonment- 60 months-and what judges across the county have imposed in sexual abuse cases,” the Court noted that “there must be a substantial justification for the parties' proposed downward departure under Section 3553(a).” Id. Third, the Court found that the § 3553(a) factors did not support the parties' proposed departure from the Guidelines range, given the seriousness of the offenses, the nature of the victims (including their age and the harm they have suffered, as reflected in the victim impact statements), and the need for adequate deterrence. Id. at PageID 206. Moreover, Defendant's characteristics and history of alcohol abuse were not sufficient justifications for that proposed departure, so the Court factored those considerations into its conclusion to reject the plea. Id. It noted that these characteristics did “not outweigh the other Section 3553(a) factors that favor a sentence that hews closer to the sentencing range established under the Guidelines-most prominently, the need to provide just punishment for the gravity of these offenses.” Id.
In conclusion, the Court emphasized that the parties did “not identify any relevant factor” under § 3553(a) that supported Id. at PageID 207. The Court then formally rejected Defendant's plea agreement. Id. at PageID 206-07.
The Court informed Defendant that if he did not withdraw his plea after the rejection, it did not have to follow the terms of the plea agreement, so it could sentence him to a longer term of imprisonment. Id. at PageID 207. It also indicated that Defendant could proceed to trial or choose to plead guilty in the future, noting that “[b]ecause this is such a serious issue, and because I want to make sure that the Defendant has an opportunity to think clearly and carefully and meet with his attorney, . . . I do not think we should proceed to that discussion today.” Id. at PageID 208.
Counsel for the Government then informed the Court that the plea agreement represented a sentence that the parties deemed fair and “would help to ensure the safety of the community.” Id. at PageID 211. The Court responded that the victims' mothers, in their testimony, indicated their dissatisfaction with the plea: another factor suggesting that the proposed term of imprisonment did not reflect the seriousness of Defendant's conduct. Id. at PagelD 211-12. Defendant, through counsel, then informed the Court that he “would like to withdraw his plea and set this matter for trial.” Id. at PageID 213. The Court gave Defendant more time to contemplate his decision before it concluded the hearing. Id.
After the hearing, Defendant filed his motion for recusal on December 29, 2022. Doc. No. 55. The basis for his motion is 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which requires recusal if a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Id. at PageID 222. Defendant contends that this Court's impartiality might reasonably be questioned based on its rejection of the plea agreement. Id. Particularly, he alleges that the Court violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure-prohibiting judicial involvement in plea negotiations-because, in his view, it committed itself to a term of imprisonment within the Guidelines range; it relied on information in the presentence investigation report (“PSR”) to reject the plea agreement; and it commented that the victims' mothers were unhappy with the terms of the agreement. Id. at PageID 228-29. In turn, Defendant contends that this requires the undersigned's recusal. See id.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” “[E]xtrajudicial source[s] [are] the only bas[e]s for establishing disqualifying bias or prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).” United States v. Howard, 218 F.3d 556, 566 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Liteky, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994)). This means personal bias or extrajudicial conduct; “[p]ersonal bias is prejudice that emanates from some source other than participation in the proceedings or prior contact with related cases.” United States v. Nelson, 922 F.2d 311, 319-20 (6th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The critical test is whether the alleged bias stems from an extrajudicial source and results in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wheeler v. Southland Corp., 875 F.2d 1246, 125152 (6th Cir. 1989)).
When deciding recusal motions under § 455(a), the undersigned applies an objective standard, asking whether his impartiality may be questioned from a reasonable person's perspective. See Burley v. Gagacki, 834 F.3d 606, 615-16 (6th Cir. 2016). “This requires recusal ‘if a reasonable, objective person, knowing all of the circumstances, would have questioned the judge's impartiality.'” United States v. Prince, 618 F.3d 551, 561 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Johnson v. Mitchell, 585 F.3d 923, 945 (6th Cir. 2009)).
Defendant's motion merits denial for two reasons. First, Defendant does not identify an extrajudicial source or personal bias, as required for recusal motions under § 455(a). Second, the Court did not involve itself in plea negotiations when it explained why it rejected the plea agreement.
Defendant's motion targets only the Court's rejection of his plea agreement. See Doc. No. 55 at PageID 229-30. He “makes no allegation” that the undersigned “had knowledge resulting from any extrajudicial activities or exposure[,]” considering his sole argument is that the Court violated Rule 11. United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 405 (...
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