United States v. Ruzicka
| Decision Date | 28 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | Criminal No. 16-246(1) (JRT/SER) |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JEROME C. RUZICKA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELEASE PENDING APPEAL
Erica H. MacDonald, United States Attorney, and Benjamin F. Langner, Craig R. Baune, and Surya Saxena, Assistant United States Attorneys, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, 300 South Fourth Street, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55415, for plaintiff.
John C. Conard, John C. Conard PLLC, 310 Fourth Avenue South, Suite 5010, Minneapolis, MN 55415, for defendant.
Before the Court is Defendant Jerome C. Ruzicka's Motion for Release Pending Appeal. (Mot. for Release, June 14, 2019, Docket No. 693.) Because the Court will find that Ruzicka has not shown that his appeal presents a substantial question, the Court will deny the motion.
Ruzicka was found guilty by a jury of four counts of mail fraud, three counts of wire fraud, and one count of making and subscribing a false tax return. (Verdict, Mar. 8, 2018, Docket No. 417.)1 On December 19, 2018, the Court sentenced Ruzicka to 84 months' imprisonment. (Minute Entry, Dec. 19, 2018, Docket No. 627.) On July 8, 2019, Ruzicka will report to the Bureau of Prisons to begin serving his sentence. (Am. Sentencing J. at 2, May 31, 2019, Docket No. 688.)
Ruzicka has challenged the evidentiary support of the jury's verdict as well as the legal soundness of various rulings made by the Court numerous times. Nevertheless, the Court has repeatedly upheld the verdict and denied Ruzicka's requests for a new trial. Ruzicka has now filed an appeal with the intent to raise many of the same arguments that he previously raised before the Court. (Notice of Appeal, May 29, 2019, Docket No. 676.) In the interim, Ruzicka filed the present motion for bail pending his appeal, and asks the Court to postpone the beginning of his sentence until his appeal is fully decided. (Mem. in Supp. at 1, June 14, 2019, Docket No. 693-1.)
18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) provides that, ordinarily, a person "found guilty of an offense and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and who has filed an appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari, be detained." However, the Court may order the release of such a person if several perquisites are met. First, the Court must find that "the person is not likely toflee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community." Id. at § 3143(b)(1)(A). Second, the Court must find that "the appeal is not for the purpose of delay." Id. at § 3143(b)(1)(B). Finally, the Court must find that the appeal "raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result" in a reversal, an order for a new trial, a sentence short of imprisonment, or a sentence "less than the total of the time already served plus the expected duration of the appeal process." Id.
The Eighth Circuit defines a "substantial question" as a "close question or one that could go either way." United States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 1227, 1233-34 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Once a defendant shows that he or she is raising a substantial question, the defendant must then show that "the substantial question he or she seeks to present is so integral to the merits of the conviction that it is more probable than not that reversal or a new trial will occur if the question is decided in the defendant's favor." Id. at 1234. Following these principles will "carry out the manifest purpose of Congress to reduce substantially the numbers of convicted persons released on bail pending appeal, without eliminating such release entirely or limiting it to a negligible number of appellants." Id.
The United States does not argue that Ruzicka is likely to flee or pose a danger to the community, nor does it argue that Ruzicka's appeal is for the purposes of delay. The Court agrees. Thus, the only question before the Court is whether any of Ruzicka's arguments on appeal present a substantial question and, if so, whether a resolution in his favor would result in a new trial, reversal, or a significant decrease in his imprisonment. While the entire scope of Ruzicka's appeal is not yet known, his present motion puts fortha number of grounds that he believes raise substantial questions and support his motion for release. The Court will discuss each in turn.
Ruzicka first argues, as he did in his post-trial motions, that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on the Northland counts. Ruzicka acknowledges the Court's prior ruling that Bill Austin's lack of knowledge about the 2013 Northland stock redemption supports the verdict by itself. However, he now argues that Austin had constructive knowledge about the redemption because the redemption was reported to individuals with a fiduciary duty to Austin. Ruzicka further argues that the jury could not have found an intent to defraud based on the evidence presented because Ruzicka made individuals with a fiduciary duty to Austin aware of the alleged fraud. Therefore, he asserts, Ruzicka's Northland fraud convictions are unsustainable.
"In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence," the Eighth Circuit "view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and sustain[s] the jury's verdict if there is substantial evidence in the record to support it." United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521, 525 (8th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). A conviction is reversed "only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Wells, 706 F.3d 908, 914 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Yang, 603 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir. 2010))
To prove mail and wire fraud, the United States needed to show that Ruzicka "participated in a scheme to defraud another out of money or property by means of materially false representations or promises" and that he did so "with the intent to defraud."(Jury Instrs. at 32, Mar. 9, 2018, Docket No. 396.) Essentially, Ruzicka argues here that there was insufficient evidence of his intent to defraud because those with a fiduciary duty to Austin knew of the 2013 stock redemption in part because Ruzicka made them aware of the redemption.
However, as the United States points out, Ruzicka made this same argument to the jury, which nevertheless found him guilty. At trial, the United States presented significant evidence regarding Ruzicka's attempts to conceal the stock redemption from Austin. Ruzicka does not contest that evidence, instead he puts forth one alternative explanation based on other pieces of evidence. But the Court's role, and the Eighth Circuit's role, is not to decide which explanation of the evidence is more credible, but to look at the jury's determination and decide whether it is based on sufficient evidence. Given the evidence presented by the United States that Ruzicka consistently attempted to conceal the stock redemption, the Court makes such a finding—that there was sufficient (or substantial) evidence to support the jury verdict on these counts. Further, given the extremely deferential nature with which the Eighth Circuit must view sufficiency challenges, the Court does not find that Ruzicka's sufficiency argument presents a "close question or one that could go either way." Powell, 761 F.2d at 1233-34. Accordingly, the Court does not find that a substantial question exists as to the sufficiency of the evidence on the Northland convictions.
Ruzicka next argues that the Court erred in denying his post-trial Brady/Giglio motions that were based on the non-disclosure of a pre-trial reverse proffer meeting withRuzicka's co-defendant Nelson. (See Order Denying Brady Mot., Mar. 15, 2019, Docket No. 654; Order Denying Mot. for Reconsideration, May 15, 2019, Docket No. 665.) Ruzicka spends considerable time in the present motion once again attacking the United States' failure to disclose the meeting and highlighting the various instances at which he argues the United States should have disclosed the meeting. The Court is well aware of the factual circumstances regarding the meeting, and has already ruled that the meeting and the materials shown to Nelson at the meeting should have been disclosed to Ruzicka before the trial. (Order Denying Mot. for Reconsideration at 6-7.) Accordingly, the Court required the United States to turn over the materials. (Id.)
However, the Court denied Ruzicka's overall Brady motion because, even considering the United States' failure, Ruzicka had not shown prejudice. In order to establish a Brady violation, Ruzicka needed to show that "(1) the evidence at issue is material and favorable to the defendant; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the government; and (3) the defendant was prejudiced by the suppression." United States v. Parker, 267 F.3d 839, 846 (8th Cir. 2001).
Now, Ruzicka argues that—because the ultimate plea deal between Nelson and the United States was more favorable to Nelson than the one presented at the undisclosed meeting—the nondisclosure deprived him of knowing the evolution of Nelson's deal. He asserts that this knowledge would have allowed him to impeach Nelson's testimony and show the jury the power that the United States had over Nelson. The Court is unpersuaded and is unsure how evidence that Nelson turned down a lesser deal would have impeached Nelson any more than evidence that Nelson accepted a better deal, a deal of which the jurywas aware. Further, even if the nondisclosed meeting was introduced at trial, the Court does not believe that the result would have changed.
Ruzicka has still not shown how he was sufficiently prejudiced by the nondisclosure to justify his Brady requests, and the Court therefore does not find that he has presented a substantial question. Accordingly, the Court will deny his motion for release as to this argument.
Also related to the above...
To continue reading
Request your trial