United States v. Ruzicka
| Decision Date | 05 January 1946 |
| Docket Number | No. 8759.,8759. |
| Citation | 152 F.2d 167 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. RUZICKA et al. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
William Parker Ward, of Chicago, Ill., for appellants.
J. Albert Woll and John P. Lulinski, U. S. Atty., both of Chicago, Ill., W. Carroll Hunter, Sp. Asst. to the Atty. Gen., James A. Doyle, Regional Atty., Office of the Solicitor, Department of Agriculture, of Chicago, Ill., Katherine A. Markwell, Atty., Department of Agriculture, of Washington, D. C., Wendell Berge, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Stephen Doyle, Jr., Sp. Asst. to the Atty. Gen., and John J. Toohey, Atty., Department of Agriculture, of Chicago, Ill., for appellee.
Before EVANS, SPARKS, and KERNER, Circuit Judges.
Defendants, by this appeal, assail the validity of a decree entered in this suit, which was brought to collect payment of sums allegedly due the Market Administrator under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 601, and to enjoin defendants from violating an order of the Secretary of Agriculture known as Order No. 41. The decree was entered upon the pleadings. The attack is directed to the court's failure to permit defendants to present evidence which would show error in the Market Administrator's "verification" of defendants' reports.
Defendants are co-partners operating a dairy business in Chicago. The Market Administrator, checking the reports of these defendants, claims to have discovered errors which resulted in a finding by him of indebtedness of substantial sums which the defendants owed the Administrator's "producers-settlement milk fund." Defendants in their answer denied the existence of such errors and also denied that any sum was by them owing the Milk Fund established by the Market Administrator. They assert the verification was erroneous, improper, incomplete, and inaccurate.
Order No. 41, the order involved, is a comprehensive one made by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 601 et seq. It "regulates the handling of milk in the Chicago, Illinois marketing area." Among its provisions is one which calls for the payment, by the handler, of sums based upon the amount and quality of milk "produced or received" by him within seventy miles of the Chicago City Hall.
This order also creates an official called a Market Administrator, who, with employees whom he selects, administers the order.
Among other duties, said Market Administrator "shall verify all reports and payments of each handler, by an audit of such handler's records." "Each handler shall keep adequate records of receipts of milk and shall * * * make available to the Market Administrator * * * such records * * *" as will enable the Market Administrator to perform his duties and particularly to verify the receipts and disposition of the milk by him handled and verify payments to producers and weigh samples and test the butter fat content of the milk so handled in the Chicago area.
The Market Administrator "may maintain a suit in his own name against any handler for collection of such handler's pro rata share of expense * * *." The Market Administrator is required to establish and maintain a separate fund known as the "Producers Settlement Fund" into which he shall deposit all payments made by handlers and out of which he shall make all payments to handlers pursuant to Paragraphs (f) and (g) of this section. It also provides that the Market Administrator shall offset any such payment due to any such handler against payment due from such handler.
Important is the provision governing verification of reports and payments. "The Market Administrator shall verify all reports and payments of each handler by audit of such handler's records, and of the record of any other handler or person upon whose disposition of milk such handler claims classification * * *." Most significant is the provision of the statute which permits the handler to appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture for a modification of the Administrator's decision as to the amount due from or to the handler.
Determination of the instant appeal turns upon the correctness of the District Court's ruling that defendants were limited in their redress efforts to an appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture. In other words, the court held that no relief through appeal to the courts to secure a correction of the Market Administrator's verification of the handler's report was permitted.
Defendants did not pursue their right to seek a review of the Administrator's order by the Secretary of Agriculture, under Sec. 608c(15), prior to the commencement of this action. Defendants did file such petitions with the Secretary of Agriculture, October 28, 1943, and April 29, 1944, after the commencement of this action. No hearing was had at the time defendants petitioned the trial court on June 28, 1944, for a stay of the instant proceeding pending such administrative determination.
Since the determination of this appeal turns upon the construction to be given the controlling statute, we quote it at length:
Our problem presents the difficult question of the interpretation of a statute and the ascertainment of Congressional intent. Did Congress intend, when it inserted Sec. 608 in this act, to grant an exclusive relief and bar all other remedies?
The provisions of the statute contemplate (1) a remedy by the Government, in the district court, to enforce an order and to restrain violation of an order (Sec. 608a(6); (2) the right of the Government to institute enforcement proceedings is made not exclusive of other statutory or existing legal or equitable remedies (Sec. 608a(8)); (3) a handler feeling aggrieved by an order may seek review thereof with the Secretary of Agriculture, who shall give a hearing and his ruling is "final, if in accordance with law," and review is provided of his order by the District Court, in a suit in equity. If the Court finds the Secretary's decision is not in "accordance with law" it remands the proceeding with instructions; (4) a proceeding to enforce may be instituted by the Government, notwithstanding the pendency of an administrative proceeding under subsection (15), instituted by the handler, but the proceeding to enforce is to abate if a prior final decree is rendered in the proceedings growing out of the administrative proceeding.
It is argued in favor of an interpretation of the statute making the administrative proceeding the sole remedy to settle factual disputes: (1) The specific statutory set up is provided for the speedy and expert solution of those technical matters of administration of a specialized agricultural problem, and it must be inferred therefrom that it was intended that the administrative agency thus provided was to be exclusive. (2) Subsection 15 states the ruling of the Secretary "shall be final" subject to the review on questions of law therein provided. (3) The only limitation on the finality of his decree is that it must be in "accordance with law," thereby eliminating review on issues of fact. Such limitation means determination in accordance with procedure provided by law and compliance with the substantive statutory law. It indicates there is not to be a review of fact issues.
On the other hand, (1) it is clear that by Subsection 608a(8) Congress did not intend to wipe out any existing equitable or legal remedy (at least in favor of the Government) despite the fact it provided specifically for enforcement proceedings. This saving clause of existing remedies tends to substantiate the belief that Congress did not mean to make the...
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United States v. Ruzicka
...Court, ruling that the validity of the demand by the Secretary of Agriculture may be contested in an enforcement proceeding under § 8a(6). 152 F.2d 167. Thus the question before us is whether a handler may resist a claim against him by the Secretary of Agriculture, made according to the pro......