United States v. Ryan, No. 758

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Citation91 S.Ct. 1580,29 L.Ed.2d 85,402 U.S. 530
Docket NumberNo. 758
PartiesUNITED STATES, Petitioner, v. Raymond J. RYAN
Decision Date24 May 1971

District Court's order denying respondent's motion to quash a grand jury subpoena duces tecum requiring the production of records under his control in Kenya was not final and therefore not appealable, Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783; nor was it rendered an appealable temporary injunction by inclusion of a provision requiring respondent to seek permission from Kenyan authorities to remove some documents from Kenya and if such permission was denied to grant United States agents access to the documents in that country. Pp. 532 534.

9 Cir., 430 F.2d 658, reversed.

Jerome Feit, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Herbert J. Miller, Jr., Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

In March of 1968, respondent was served with a subpoena duces tecum commanding him to produce before a federal grand jury all books, records, and documents of five named companies doing business in Kenya. He moved, on several grounds, to quash the subpoena. The District Court denied the motion to quash and, in light of respondent's claim that Kenya law forbids the removal of books of account, minute books, and lists of members from the country without consent of its Registrar of Companies, ordered him to attempt to secure such consent and, if unsuccessful, to make the records available for inspection in Kenya.1 The Court of Appeals, 430 F.2d 658 (CA9 1970), held that by directing respondent to make application to a Kenyan official for release of some of the records, the District Court had done 'more than deny a motion to quash; it in effect granted a mandatory injunction.' Id., at 659. The Court of Appeals therefore concluded that the order was appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) 2 and, reaching the merits, reversed.

Ibid. We granted certiorari, 400 U.S. 1008, 91 S.Ct. 564, 27 L.Ed.2d 620 (1971). We conclude that the District Court's order was not appealable, and reverse.

Respondent asserts no challenge to the continued validity of our holding in Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940), that one to whom a subpoena is directed may not appeal the denial of a motion to quash that subpoena but must either obey its commands or refuse to do so and contest the validity of the subpoena if he is subsequently cited for contempt on account of his failure to obey. Respondent, however, argues that Cobbledick does not apply in the circumstances before us because, he asserts, unless immediate review of the District Court's order is available to him, he will be forced to undertake a substantial burden in complying with the subpoena, and will therefore be 'powerless to avert the mischief of the order.' Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 13, 38 S.Ct. 417, 419, 62 L.Ed. 950 (1918).

We think that respondent's assertion misapprehends the thrust of our cases. Of course, if he complies with the subpoena he will not thereafter be able to undo the substantial effort he has exerted in order by comply.3 But compliance is not the only course open to respondent. If, as he claims, the subpoena is unduly burdensome or otherwise unlawful, he may refuse to comply and litigate those questions in the event that contempt or similar proceedings are brought against him. Should his contentions be rejected at that time by the trial court, they will then be ripe for appellate review.4 But we have consistently held that the necessity for expedition in the administration of the criminal law justifies putting one who seeks to resist the production of desired information to a choice between compliance with a trial court's order to produce prior to any review of that order, and resistance to that order with the concomitant possibility of an adjudication of contempt if his claims are rejected on appeal. Cobbledick v. United States, supra; Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 26 S.Ct. 356, 50 L.Ed. 686 (1906); cf. United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966); Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 82 S.Ct. 654, 7 L.Ed.2d 614 (1962); Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 77 S.Ct. 1332, 1 L.Ed.2d 1442 (1957). Only in the limited class of cases where denial of immediate review would render impossible any review whatsoever of an individual's claims have we allowed exceptions to this principle. We have thus indicated that review is available immediately of a denial of a motion for the return of seized property, where there is no criminal prosecution pending against the movant. See Di Bella v. United States, supra, at 131—132, 82 S.Ct. 654. Denial of review in such circumstances would mean that the Government might indefinitely retain the property without any opportunity for the movant to assert on appeal his right to possession. Similarly, in Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S., at 12—13, 38 S.Ct., at 419 420, we allowed immediate review of an order directing a third party to produce exhibits which were the property of appellant and, he claimed, immune from production. To have denied review would have left Perlman 'powerless to avert the mischief of the order,' id., at 13, 38 S.Ct., at 419, for the custodian could hardly have been expected to risk a citation for contempt in order to secure Perlman an opportunity for judicial review. In the present case, however, respondent is free to refuse compliance and, as we have noted, in such event he may obtain full review of his claims before undertaking any burden of compliance...

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