United States v. Saglietto, Criminal No. 8344.

Decision Date10 September 1941
Docket NumberCriminal No. 8344.
Citation41 F. Supp. 21
PartiesUNITED STATES v. SAGLIETTO et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Sterling Hutcheson, U. S. Dist. Atty., and Russell T. Bradford, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Norfolk, Va., for the United States.

Homer L. Loomis, of New York City, and Lester S. Parsons, of Norfolk, Va., for defendants.

PAUL, District Judge.

By an indictment returned by a grand jury on May 5, 1941, the defendants were charged with a violation of a statute of the United States which reads as follows: "Whoever shall set fire to any vessel of foreign registry, or any vessel of American registry entitled to engage in commerce with foreign nations, or to any vessel of the United States as defined in section three hundred and ten of the Act of March fourth, nineteen hundred and nine, entitled `An Act to codify, revise, and amend the penal laws of the United States' section 501 of this title, or to the cargo of the same, or shall tamper with the motive power or instrumentalities of navigation of such vessel, or shall place bombs or explosives in or upon such vessel, or shall do any other act to or upon such vessel while within the jurisdiction of the United States, or, if such vessel is of American registry, while she is on the high sea, with intent to injure or endanger the safety of the vessel or of her cargo, or of persons on board, whether the injury or danger is so intended to take place within the jurisdiction of the United States, or after the vessel shall have departed therefrom; or whoever shall attempt or conspire to do any such acts with such intent, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both."

The statutory provision above quoted is a portion of an Act of Congress approved June 15, 1917, being Chapter 30 of the Public Laws of the United States passed by the 65th Congress. The act appears in 40 Statutes, page 217, and the particular portion of the act under which the indictment is laid is Section 1 of Title III of the act, 40 Stat. 221. In the United States Code, this particular section has for some reason been set aside from the rest of the statute and appears as 18 U.S.C. A. § 502.

The indictment is in three counts, the first of which charges: "That Paul Stefano Saglietto, Agostino Ratto, and Attilio Maggi, heretofore, to-wit, on or about the 29th day of March, 1941, in Hampton Roads, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, did unlawfully, feloniously, knowingly, and willfully tamper with the motive power of the Steamship San Giuseppe, a vessel of foreign registry, to-wit, of Italian Registry, while said vessel was within the jurisdiction of the United States, with the intent to injure and endanger the safety of said vessel and of persons on board; contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the United States of America."

The second count is in similar language, except that it charges a tampering with the instrumentalities of navigation of the vessel. The third count is a conspiracy count, charging that the defendants conspired among themselves and with other persons unknown to commit the acts which are charged substantively in the first and second counts.

At the time of the acts complained of the defendant Saglietto was the captain of the Italian steamship San Giuseppe, which was then at anchor in the harbor of Hampton Roads, and the defendants Ratto and Maggi were members of the crew of such vessel. As a result of a trial, a jury, on June 27, 1941, returned a verdict of guilty as to all three defendants on the first and second counts (the substantive offenses), but upon the conspiracy count Saglietto alone was found guilty.

Following the rendition of the verdict, the defendants seasonably submitted their motions in arrest of judgment and to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. It is my opinion that the motion in arrest of judgment presents no matter appropriate to such a motion that has not already been passed on in considering and overruling a demurrer to the indictment. Other matter embodied in the motion in arrest seems more fitted for consideration in the motion to set aside the verdict. Therefore, it is the latter motion only which needs discussion.

This is one of four companion cases in which indictments were returned against the masters of four Italian vessels (and in two of the cases, including this one, against members of the crew) for similar acts.

The pertinent facts in each of the cases were the same and are in substance as follows:

These vessels, which were under different ownership and sailing separately, all arrived in the harbor of Hampton Roads within a few days of each other and in each case either a few days prior to or a few days after June 10, 1940, the date on which Italy entered the war against Great Britain and France. Prior to sailing from their home ports in Italy, the captains of these ships had been instructed by their respective owners that in case Italy went to war, as then seemed probable, the vessels should be taken to the nearest neutral port and the masters of the vessels should report to and subject themselves to the orders of the highest naval authority of the Italian government in the country whose port had been entered.

It was testified that the merchant marine of Italy is a part of the naval reserve of that country and, upon a declaration of war, Italian merchant vessels and their officers and crews automatically come under the authority of the naval authorities of Italy.

The masters of these vessels accordingly reported their entry into Hampton Roads to the naval attache of the Italian government in Washington, D. C., and were instructed by him to make no attempt to go to sea, but to take anchorage and await further orders. The vessels were assigned anchorage in what is referred to as section G of the harbor, which is apparently used for vessels whose stay in port is expected to be of some length. It is in a rather remote part of the harbor where the water is comparatively shallow and the vessels were anchored from a mile to a mile and a half from any regularly used channel of navigation and approximately the same distance from the nearest pier, dock or other structure along the waterfront at Newport News, the nearest city.

The vessels remained at this anchorage with their crews and captains aboard, with the exception that Captain Saglietto, the defendant here, was directed to take up quarters in a hotel in Norfolk, which he did, leaving the San Giuseppe in command of the first officer. The reason for this was, apparently, that it was desired to have someone ashore who could look after the interests of all these Italian ships in various matters, including libel proceedings in which one or more of them were involved and who, being ashore, would be accessible to telegraph and telephone or to personal interview in connection with any matter touching the activity or welfare of these vessels. That Captain Saglietto should have been directed to assume this duty was no doubt due to the facts that he seems to have been the senior in service among these ship captains, he spoke English fluently, he had been coming to this port for many years and was familiar with the city of Norfolk and its surroundings.

Sometime in February, 1941, while this situation existed and after the vessels had been resting at anchorage for approximately eight months, the naval attache of the Italian government, Admiral Lais, came to Newport News and was entertained aboard the San Giuseppe at a lunch at which the captains of all these ships were present. During the day of this visit and before returning to Washington, the naval attache took occasion for a brief talk with each of the officers in direct command of the respective ships, apart from the others. In each instance the subject of the conversation was the same and was to the effect that it might become advisable that his ship be rendered incapable of navigation; and that in such case he (the naval attache) would transmit orders to that effect by a telegraphic message which would be sent to Captain Saglietto in Norfolk, who would communicate it to the ship captain. It was explained that the telegram would be what is referred to as a "conventional" message (a code message) and would be in the form of a request for a report on the number of men in his crew; and that upon receipt of such a message the recipient was forthwith to so disable the main engines of his vessel as to render the ship incapable of navigation under its own power. These captains were further instructed that in carrying out this order they were to create no disorder in the port and no injury to surrounding property; that no parts of their vessels except the main engines were to be injured, and that the auxiliary engines were to be left intact and unharmed. It was testified that by the use of these auxiliary or "donkey" engines the vessels could be kept heated for comfort of the crews, the anchors could be lowered and raised, and the pumps operated in case of fire, leakage or other conditions requiring their use. These ship captains testified that when they received their instructions from Admiral Lais, they took them as military orders in the obedience of which they had no choice and as to the purpose of which they were not permitted to inquire. One of them stated, however, that he understood or assumed that it was feared that in some manner the ships might come into possession of Great Britain and be used against the interests of Italy.

On March 19, 1941, Captain Saglietto, in Norfolk, received a telegram requesting a report on the number of the crews on two of the vessels in the harbor (the Giuan and the Laconia) and on March 28, 1941, a similar telegram as to the remaining vessels including the San Giuseppe. In each instance he...

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 cases
  • THE PIETRO CAMPANELLA
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • 13 Octubre 1942
    ...in other districts. Marchese v. United States, 5th Cir., 126 F.2d 671; United States v. Tomicich, D.C., 41 F.Supp. 33; United States v. Saglietto, D.C., 41 F.Supp. 21; United States v. Martini, D.C., 42 F. Supp. On July 19, 1941 the United States filed libels against both ships for the forf......
  • Stein v. United States, 10694.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 29 Abril 1946
    ...States, 1938, 68 App.D.C. 223, 95 F. 2d 352, 357; United States v. Betteridge, D.C.Ohio 1942, 43 F.Supp. 53, 56; United States v. Saglietto, D.C.Va.1941, 41 F. Supp. 21, 28; DiMelia v. Bowles, D.C.D. Mass.1944, 57 F.Supp. 710, 713; People on Complaint of Weber v. Keane, 1944, 181 Misc. 592,......
  • Finn v. United States, 7372.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • 28 Mayo 1958
    ...1908, 209 U.S. 56, 85, 28 S.Ct. 428, 52 L.Ed. 681; Powell v. United States, 4 Cir., 1940, 112 F.2d 764, 767; United States v. Saglietto, D.C.E.D.Va. 1941, 41 F.Supp. 21, 28. In dealing with a simple act like using profane language, as distinguished from a complicated course of conduct which......
  • Slater v. U.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • 22 Diciembre 1976
    ...by threatening to kill him, a conspiracy between the two might be less plausible, but that is not this case. Cf. United States v. Saglietto, 41 F.Supp. 21, 33 (E.D.Va.1941) ("compelling fear of personal harm negatives the very requisites of Only one sentence was imposed for the two offenses......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT