United States v. Salazar

• Decision Date: 16 February 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-3217,19-3217
• Citation: 987 F.3d 1248
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Shaun J. SALAZAR, Defendant - Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

987 F.3d 1248

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.Shaun J. SALAZAR, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 19-3217

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

FILED February 16, 2021

Daniel T. Hansmeier, Appellate Chief (Melody Brannon, Federal Public Defender, with him on the briefs), Kansas Federal Public Defender, Kansas City, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant.

John M. Pellettieri, Attorney, Appellate Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Stephen R. McAllister, United States Attorney, James A. Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, Kansas City, Kansas; Brian A. Benczkowski, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Cronan, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., with him on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before HOLMES, SEYMOUR, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.

MORITZ, Circuit Judge

Shaun Salazar appeals the district court's order revoking his term of supervised release and sentencing him to ten months' imprisonment. He argues that his ten-month prison sentence is illegal because—when combined with his prior 115-month prison term—it exceeds the 120-month statutory maximum for his crime of conviction. We previously rejected this argument in United States v. Robinson , where we held "that [ 18 U.S.C.] § 3583 authorizes the revocation of supervised release even where the resulting incarceration, when combined with the period of time the defendant has already served for his [or her] substantive offense, will exceed the maximum incarceration permissible under the substantive statute." 62 F.3d 1282, 1285 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Purvis , 940 F.2d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1991) ). Because we remain bound by Robinson , we affirm.

Background

In 2010, Salazar pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Section 922(g)(1), by way of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), carries a statutory maximum of 120 months in prison. In 2011, the district court sentenced Salazar to 115 months in prison and three years of supervised release. Salazar completed his prison term and began serving his term of supervised release in May 2019. Soon after, a probation officer filed a petition to revoke Salazar's supervised release, alleging that Salazar violated two conditions of his supervised release by committing battery against his brother and associating with a felon, his girlfriend.

At his revocation hearing, Salazar argued that any term of imprisonment resulting from the revocation of his supervised release could not exceed five months because anything greater would result in a total term of imprisonment that exceeded the 120-month statutory maximum prescribed by § 924(a)(2). The district court rejected this argument, revoked Salazar's supervised release, and imposed ten months' imprisonment followed by one year of supervised release.

Salazar appeals.

Analysis

I. Jurisdiction

Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we must be satisfied that we have jurisdiction. See United States v. Vera-Flores , 496 F.3d 1177, 1180 (10th Cir. 2007). Article III of the Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to "[c]ases" or "[c]ontroversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. In practice, this case-or-controversy requirement means that a party seeking relief must have an actual injury that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Vera-Flores , 496 F.3d at 1180. If a party no longer suffers from a redressable injury, the case becomes moot, and we no longer have jurisdiction. Id. Here, our review of publicly accessible Bureau of Prisons records suggested that Salazar was released from federal custody on or about November 22, 2019. We therefore ordered supplemental briefing from the parties asking whether this case—which challenges the length of Salazar's prison sentence—is moot.

In response, both Salazar and the government argue that even though Salazar has finished serving his ten-month prison sentence, his case is not moot because he has not yet served his one-year term of supervised release.¹ We agree. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist. , 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986) ("[E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to ‘satisfy itself ... of its own jurisdiction ...,’ even though the parties are prepared to concede it." (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer , 293 U.S. 237, 244, 55 S.Ct. 162, 79 L.Ed. 338 (1934) )).

The general rule in this circuit is that "a defendant's unexpired term of supervised release, which could be reduced by a favorable appellate decision, is sufficient to defeat a claim of mootness." United States v. Castro-Rocha , 323 F.3d 846, 847 n.1 (10th Cir. 2003). In Castro-Rocha , the defendant had completed his original 15-month prison sentence but continued to serve his three-year term of supervised release. Id. at 847 & n.1. Success on appeal would have decreased his sentencing range from 15–21 months to 8–14 months. Id. at 847 n.1. The court explained that because under this new sentencing range "the district court could choose to impose a term of imprisonment of less than one year, the district court could also choose to impose a lesser term of supervised release, or no term of supervised release at all." Id. This possibility of a lesser term of supervised release was sufficient to save the case from mootness.

Notably, a reduced term of supervised release need not be a guaranteed result of success on appeal—the mere possibility of a reduced term of supervised release is enough to maintain a live controversy. In Castro-Rocha , for instance, if the defendant had been successful on appeal, the district court on remand could nevertheless have chosen the high end of the newly applicable sentencing range and imposed a 14-month prison sentence, which is more than one year (and, indeed, is only one month shorter than his original sentence). See id. In so doing, it could further have chosen to impose the same three-year term of supervised release. See id. Thus, Castro-Rocha's success on the merits of his appeal would not guarantee him a shorter term of supervised release; such relief was certainly possible, but it remained within the district court's discretion. See id. And that discretion was enough to maintain a live controversy. See id. ; see also United States v. Montgomery , 550 F.3d 1229, 1231 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008) (concluding that "sentencing appeal [wa]s not moot because [defendant's] unexpired term of supervised release potentially could be reduced if we were to render a ruling favorable to him on his upward departure challenge" (emphasis added)); United States v. Westover , 435 F.3d 1273, 1277 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding it "sufficient to prevent this appeal from being moot" that district court on remand could "potentially shorten[ ] the term [of supervised release] or eliminat[e] it altogether" (emphasis added)); cf. United States v. Fields , 823 F. App'x 587, 590 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (finding sentencing appeal moot despite unexpired supervised-release term because length of that term was mandated by statute and thus could not be shortened or eliminated on remand).

Here, although Salazar has served his prison sentence, he has not yet served his term of supervised release. And critically, a favorable appellate decision could potentially reduce his term of supervised release: If we were to grant Salazar the relief he seeks and remand for resentencing, the district court "could ... choose to impose a lesser term of supervised release, or no term of supervised release at all." Castro-Rocha , 323 F.3d at 847 n.1 ; see also § 3583(h) (providing that "[w]hen a term of supervised release is revoked and the defendant is required to serve a term of imprisonment, the court may include a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment" (emphasis added)).

As the government suggests, neither United States v. Meyers , 200 F.3d 715 (10th Cir. 2000), nor Rhodes v. Judiscak , 676 F.3d 931 (10th Cir. 2012), require a different result. Meyers is not on point because it found moot an appeal by a defendant who was "out of prison, under no further terms of probation or supervised release." 200 F.3d at 718. Thus, the defendant there had no continuing injury for purposes of Article III. See Vera-Flores , 496 F.3d at 1180–81 (explaining that defendant on supervised release satisfies Article III "because the defendant's liberty is affected by ongoing obligations to comply with supervised release conditions and restrictions"; finding appeal moot despite unexpired term of supervised release because defendant had been deported and therefore was not subject to conditions of supervised release). In Rhodes , on the other hand, the defendant could "assert an actual injury" because "he remain[ed] subject to supervised release." 676 F.3d at 933. But because Rhodes was a habeas case, the court concluded that the defendant's injury was not redressable. The court explained that in this circuit, habeas courts lack jurisdiction to shorten a term of supervised release—so a favorable appellate decision could not reduce the defendant's term of supervised release. Id. In other words, even if the appellate court were to grant relief on Rhodes's claim of a too-long prison sentence, the district court would have no power to modify the defendant's term of supervised release.² See id. Such is not the case here.³

In summary, although Salazar has served his prison sentence, he has not yet served his term of supervised release. And a favorable appellate decision could potentially reduce that term of supervised release. Thus, Salazar's case is not moot.

II. Merits

Having concluded that Salazar's case presents a live controversy, we turn to the merits. Salazar argues that the district court imposed an illegal sentence following the revocation of his supervised release. A subsection of the supervised-release statute, § 3583(e)(3), enables a...