United States v. Salerno

Decision Date26 May 1987
Docket NumberNo. 86-87,86-87
PartiesUNITED STATES, Petitioner v. Anthony SALERNO and Vincent Cafaro
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus

The Bail Reform Act of 1984 (Act) requires courts to detain prior to trial arrestees charged with certain serious felonies if the Government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence after an adversary hearing that no release conditions "will reasonably assure . . . the safety of any other person and the community." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1982 ed., Supp. III). The Act provides arrestees with a number of procedural rights at the detention hearing, including the right to request counsel, to testify, to present witnesses, to proffer evidence, and to cross-examine other witnesses. The Act also specifies the factors to be considered in making the detention decision, including the nature and seriousness of the charges, the substantiality of the Government's evidence, the arrestee's background and characteristics, and the nature and seriousness of the danger posed by his release. Under the Act, a decision to detain must be supported by written findings of fact and a statement of reasons, and is immediately reviewable. After a hearing under the Act, the District Court ordered the detention of respondents, who had been charged with 35 acts of racketeering activity. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 3142(e)'s authorization of pretrial detention on the ground of future dangerousness is facially unconstitutional as violative of the Fifth Amendment's substantive due process guarantee.

Held:

1. Given the Act's legitimate and compelling regulatory purpose and the procedural protections it offers, § 3142(e) is not facially invalid under the Due Process Clause. Pp. 746-752.

(a) The argument that the Act violates substantive due process because the detention it authorizes constitutes impermissible punishment before trial is unpersuasive. The Act's legislative history clearly indicates that Congress formulated the detention provisions not as punishment for dangerous individuals, but as a potential solution to the pressing societal problem of crimes committed by persons on release. Preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal. Moreover, the incidents of detention under the Act are not excessive in relation to that goal, since the Act carefully limits the circumstances under which detention may be sought to the most serious of crimes, the arrestee is entitled to a prompt hearing, the maximum length of deten- tion is limited by the Speedy Trial Act, and detainees must be housed apart from convicts. Thus, the Act constitutes permissible regulation rather than impermissible punishment. Pp. 746-748.

(b) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Due Process Clause categorically prohibits pretrial detention that is imposed as a regulatory measure on the ground of community danger. The Government's regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty interest. Such circumstances exist here. The Act narrowly focuses on a particularly acute problem—crime by arrestees—in which the Government's interests are overwhelming. Moreover, the Act operates only on individuals who have been arrested for particular extremely serious offenses, and carefully delineates the circumstances under which detention will be permitted. Pp. 748-751.

(c) The Act's extensive procedural safeguards are specifically designed to further the accuracy of the likelihood-of-future-dangerousness determination, and are sufficient to withstand respondents' facial challenge, since they are more than "adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of at least some [persons] charged with crimes." Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2409, 81 L.Ed.2d 207. Pp. 751-752.

2. Section 3142(e) is not facially unconstitutional as violative of the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The contention that the Act violates the Clause because it allows courts essentially to set bail at an infinite amount for reasons not related to the risk of flight is not persuasive. Nothing in the Clause's text limits the Government's interest in the setting of bail solely to the prevention of flight. Where Congress has mandated detention on the basis of some other compelling interest here, the public safety—the Eighth Amendment does not require release on bail. Pp. 752-755.

794 F.2d 64 (CA 2 1986), reversed.

REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. ----. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. ----.

Charles Fried, Sol. Gen., Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Anthony M. Cardinale, Boston, Mass., for respondents.

Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Bail Reform Act of 1984 (Act) allows a federal court to detain an arrestee pending trial if the Government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence after an adversary hearing that no release conditions "will reasonably assure . . . the safety of any other person and the community." The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit struck down this provision of the Act as facially unconstitutional, because, in that court's words, this type of pretrial detention violates "substantive due process." We granted certiorari because of a conflict among the Courts of Appeals regarding the validity of the Act.1 479 U.S. 929, 107 S.Ct. 397, 93 L.Ed.2d 351 (1986). We hold that, as against the facial attack mounted by these respondents, the Act fully comports with constitutional requirements. We therefore reverse.

I

Responding to "the alarming problem of crimes committed by persons on release," S.Rep. No. 98-225, p. 3 (1983), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1984, pp. 3182, 3185 Congress formulated the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. III), as the solution to a bail crisis in the federal courts. The Act represents the National Legislature's considered response to numerous perceived deficiencies in the federal bail process. By providing for sweeping changes in both the way federal courts consider bail applications and the circumstances under which bail is granted, Congress hoped to "give the courts adequate authority to make release decisions that give appropriate recognition to the danger a person may pose to others if released." S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 3, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1984, p. 3185.

To this end, § 3141(a) of the Act requires a judicial officer to determine whether an arrestee shall be detained. Section 3142(e) provides that "[i]f, after a hearing pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f), the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community, he shall order the detention of the person prior to trial." Section 3142(f) provides the arrestee with a number of procedural safeguards. He may request the presence of counsel at the detention hearing, he may testify and present witnesses in his behalf, as well as proffer evidence, and he may cross-examine other witnesses appearing at the hearing. If the judicial officer finds that no conditions of pretrial release can reasonably assure the safety of other persons and the community, he must state his findings of fact in writing, § 3142(i), and support his conclusion with "clear and convincing evidence," § 3142(f).

The judicial officer is not given unbridled discretion in making the detention determination. Congress has specified the considerations relevant to that decision. These factors include the nature and seriousness of the charges, the substantiality of the Government's evidence against the arrestee, the arrestee's background and characteristics, and the nature and seriousness of the danger posed by the suspect's release. § 3142(g). Should a judicial officer order detention, the detainee is entitled to expedited appellate review of the detention order. §§ 3145(b), (c).

Respondents Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro were arrested on March 21, 1986, after being charged in a 29-count indictment alleging various Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, mail and wire fraud offenses, extortion, and various criminal gambling violations. The RICO counts alleged 35 acts of racketeering activity, including fraud, extortion, gambling, and conspiracy to commit murder. At respondents' arraignment, the Government moved to have Salerno and Cafaro detained pursuant to § 3142(e), on the ground that no condition of release would assure the safety of the community or any person. The District Court held a hearing at which the Government made a detailed proffer of evidence. The Government's case showed that Salerno was the "boss" of the Genovese crime family of La Cosa Nostra and that Cafaro was a "captain" in the Genovese family. According to the Government's proffer, based in large part on conversations intercepted by a court-ordered wiretap, the two respondents had participated in wide-ranging conspiracies to aid their illegitimate enterprises through violent means. The Government also offered the testimony of two of its trial witnesses, who would assert that Salerno personally participated in two murder conspiracies. Salerno opposed the motion for detention, challenging the credibility of the Government's witnesses. He offered the testimony of several character witnesses as well as a letter from his doctor stating that he was suffering from a serious medical condition. Cafaro presented no evidence at the hearing, but instead characterized the wiretap conversations as merely "tough talk."

The District Court granted the Government's detention motion, concluding that the Government had established by clear and convincing...

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