United States v. Salvucci, 79-244

• Decision Date: 25 June 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79-244,79-244
• Citation: 100 S.Ct. 2547,448 U.S. 83,65 L.Ed.2d 619
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Petitioner, v. John M. SALVUCCI, Jr. and Joseph G. Zackular
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

448 U.S. 83

100 S.Ct. 2547

65 L.Ed.2d 619

UNITED STATES, Petitioner,

v John M. SALVUCCI, Jr. and Joseph G. Zackular.

No. 79-244.

Argued March 26, 1980.

Decided June 25, 1980.

Syllabus

Respondents were charged with unlawful possession of stolen mail.The checks that formed the basis of the indictment had been seized by police during a search, conducted pursuant to a warrant, of an apartment rented by one respondent's mother.Respondents moved to suppress the checks on the ground that the affidavit supporting the application for the search warrant was inadequate to show probable cause.The District Court granted the motion.The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding, in reliance on Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, that since respondents were charged with crimes of possession, they were entitled to claim "automatic standing" to challenge the legality of the search without regard to whether they had an expectation of privacy in the premises searched.

Held:Defendants charged with crimes of possession may only claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own Fourth Amendment rights have in fact been violated.Jones v. United States, supra, overruled.Pp. 86-95.

(a) The "dilemma" identified in Jones(and given as one of the two reasons for establishing the "automatic standing" rule as an exception to the exclusionary rule) that a defendant charged with a possessory offense might only be able to establish his standing to challenge a search and seizure by giving self-incriminating testimony admissible as evidence of his guilt, was eliminated by Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, wherein it was held that testimony given by a defendant in support of a motion to suppress cannot be admitted as evidence of his guilt at trial.Pp. 89-90.

(b) The second reason given in Jones for the "automatic standing" rule that such rule would prevent the "vice of prosecutorial self-contradiction" whereby the Government would assert that the defendant possessed the goods in question for purposes of criminal liability while simultaneously asserting that he did not possess them for the purposes of claiming the protections of the Fourth Amendment, has likewise been eroded.It is now the rule that a prosecutor, without legal contradiction, may simultaneously maintain that a defendant criminally possessed the seized goods but was not subject to a Fourth Amendment deprivation.Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387.The underlying assumption for such "vice of prosecutorial self-contradiction" that possession of seized goods is the equivalent of Fourth Amendment"standing" to challenge the search creates too broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights.Rather, it must be asked not merely whether the defendant has a possessory interest in the items seized but also whether he had an expectation of privacy in the area searched.Pp. 90-93.

(c) The issue whether the prosecutor, although not permitted under Simmons v. United States, supra, to use a defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing as substantive evidence of guilt at trial, may still be permitted to use such testimony to impeach the defendant at trial, need not be resolved here, since it is an issue that more aptly relates to the proper breadth of the Simmons privilege and not to the need for retaining automatic standing.Pp. 93-94.

(d)Respondents' argument that the "automatic standing" rule should be retained since it maximizes the deterrence of illegal police conduct by permitting an expanded class of potential challengers, is without merit.Pp. 94-95.

599 F.2d 1094, 1 Cir., reversed and remanded.

Mark I. Levy, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Willie J. Davis, Boston, Mass., for respondentJohn M. Salvucci, Jr.

John C. McBride, Everett, Mass., for respondentJoseph G. Zackular.

Mr. Justice REHNQUISTdelivered the opinion of the Court.

Relying on Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697(1960), the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that since respondents were charged with crimes of possession, they were entitled to claim "automatic standing" to challenge the legality of the search which produced the evidence against them, without regard to whether they had an expectation of privacy in the premises searched.599 F.2d 1094(1979).Today we hold that defendants charged with crimes of possession may only claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own Fourth Amendment rights have in fact been violated.The automatic standing rule of Jones v. United States, supra, is therefore overruled.

I

Respondents, John Salvucci and Joseph Zackular, were charged in a federal indictment with 12 counts of unlawful possession of stolen mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708.The 12 checks which formed the basis of the indictment had been seized by the Massachusetts police during the search of an apartment rented by respondent Zackular's mother.The search was conducted pursuant to a warrant.

Respondents filed a motion to suppress the checks on the ground that the affidavit supporting the application for the search warrant was inadequate to demonstrate probable cause.The District Court granted respondents' motions and ordered that the checks be suppressed.¹The Government sought reconsideration of the District Court's ruling, contending that respondents lacked "standing" to challenge the constitutionality of the search.The District Court reaffirmed its suppression order and the Government appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that respondents had "standing" and the search warranted was constitutionally inadequate.The court found that the respondents were not required to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched or the property seized because they were entitled to assert "automatic standing" to object to the search and seizure under Jones v. United States, supra.The court observed that the vitality of the Jones doctrine had been challenged in recent years, but that "[u]ntil the Supreme Court rules on this question, we are not prepared to hold that the automatic standing rule of JONES HAS BEEN . . . OVERRULED . . . .THAt is an issue which the Supreme Court must resolve."599 F.2d, at 1098.The Court of Appeals was obviously correct in its characterization of the status of Jones, and we granted certiorari in order to resolve the controversy.²444 U.S. 989, 100 S.Ct. 519, 62 L.Ed.2d 418(1979).

II

As early as 1907, this Court took the position that remedies for violations of constitutional rights would only be afforded to a person who "belongs to the class for whose sake the constitutional protection is given."Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 160, 27 S.Ct. 188, 190, 51 L.Ed. 415.The exclusionary rule is one form of remedy afforded for Fourth Amendment violations, and the Court in Jones v. United States held that the Hatch v. Reardon principle properly limited its availability.The Court reasoned that ordinarily "it is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search as the basis for suppressing relevant evidence that he . . . establish, that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy."362 U.S., at 261, 80 S.Ct., at 731.Subsequent attempts to vicariously assert violations of the Fourth Amendment rights of others have been repeatedly rejected by this Court.Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961, 966, 22 L.Ed.2d 176(1969);Brown v. United States, 411 U.S 223, 230, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 1569, 36 L.Ed.2d 208(1973).Most recently, in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387(1978), we held that "it is proper to permit only defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated to benefit from the [exclusionary] rule's protections."Id., at 134, 99 S.Ct., at 425.

Even though the Court in Jones recognized that the exclusionary rule should only be available to protect defendants who have been the victims of an illegal search or seizure, the Court thought it necessary to establish an exception.In cases where possession of the seized evidence was an essential element of the offense charged, the Court held that the defendant was not obligated to establish that his own Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, but only that the search and seizure of the evidence was unconstitutional.³Upon such a showing, the exclusionary rule would be available to prevent the admission of the evidence against the defendant.

The Court found that the prosecution of such possessory offenses presented a "special problem" which necessitated the departure from the then settled principles of Fourth Amendment"standing."⁴Two circumstances were found to require this exception.First, the Court found that in order to establish standing at a hearing on a motion to suppress, the defendant would often be "forced to allege facts the proof of which would tend, if indeed not be sufficient, to convict him," since several Courts of Appeals had "pinioned a defendant within this dilemma" by holding that evidence adduced at the motion to suppress could be used against the defendant at trial.362 U.S., at 262, 80 S.Ct., at 731.The Court declined to embrace any rule which would require a defendant to assert his Fourth Amendment claims only at the risk of providing the prosecution with self-incriminating statements admissible at trial.The Court sought resolution of this dilemma by relieving the defendant of the obligation of establishing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an illegal search or seizure.

The Court also commented that this rule would be beneficial for a second reason.Without a rule prohibiting a Government challenge to a defendant's "standing" to invoke the exclusionary rule in a possessory offense prosecution, the Government would be allowed the "advantage of contradictory positions."Id., at 263, 80 S.Ct., at 732.The...