United States v. Sampson
| Decision Date | 08 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | Cr. No. 01-10384-MLW |
| Citation | 148 F.Supp.3d 75 |
| Parties | United States of America v. Gary Lee Sampson |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
George W. Vien, Donnelly, Conroy & Gelhaar, LLP, Mark T. Quinlivan, Dustin Chao, Zachary R. Hafer, United States Attorney's Office MA, Boston, MA, Michael S. Warbel, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for United States of America.
Danalynn Recer, Attorney at Law, Houston, TX, Miriam Conrad, William E. McDaniels, Jennifer G. Wicht, Williams & Connolly, LLP, Washington, DC, Elizabeth L. Prevett, J. Martin Richey, Federal Public Defender Office, Boston, MA, for Gary Lee Sampson.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING RECUSAL
WOLF
, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. SUMMARY ... 79
II. THE APPLICABLE STANDARDS ... 85
III. THE FACTS ... 88
IV. ANALYSIS ... 105
V. CONCLUSION ... 126
VI. ORDER ... 126
I. SUMMARY
The government has moved for my recusal because, on July 27, 2014, I moderated a panel that included Dr. James Gilligan. In June 2015, I learned that defendant Gary Sampson had recently decided to retain Dr. Gilligan as a potential expert witness at the retrial to determine Sampson's sentence in this capital case. I immediately began discussing with the parties whether there is a proper basis for my recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455
. The government acknowledges that despite my association with Dr. Gilligan, I remain impartial and that my recusal is not required by § 455(b)(1). The government argues, however, that a reasonable person could question my impartiality and, therefore, my recusal is necessary under § 455(a). It does not wish to waive that alleged ground for recusal as permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 455(e). Sampson opposes the government's motion for my disqualification.
For the reasons summarized below, and discussed in detail in this Memorandum, I find that a reasonable person aware of all the relevant facts could not question my impartiality. Therefore, the government's motion is being denied.
As discussed more fully in § II, infra , 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)
requires that a judge “disqualify himself in any case in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Because the issue is only one of an appearance of partiality, a party may waive a ground for recusal under § 455(a). See 28 U.S.C. § 455(e). In contrast, a party may not waive a ground for recusal under § 455(b), which requires disqualification in all cases in which the judge is actually biased or prejudiced. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(e).
Section 455(a)
issues must be analyzed from the perspective of an objective, knowledgeable member of the public, rather than from the perspective of a person involved in or directly affected by the case. The test asks whether a reasonable person, fully informed of all of the facts, would doubt the judge's impartiality. Under § 455(a), recusal is required even when the judge lacks actual knowledge of facts that would cause a reasonable person to question his impartiality if that reasonable person, knowing all of the circumstances, would expect the judge knew those facts.
With regard to § 455(a)
, the presumption is that a judge will impartially apply the law, as required by his or her oath. Therefore, the First Circuit has explained:
§ 455(a)
is triggered by an attitude or state of mind so resistant to fair and dispassionate inquiry as to cause a party, the public, or a reviewing court to have reasonable grounds to question the neutral and objective character of a judge's rulings or findings .... [A] high threshold is required to satisfy this standard. Thus, under § 455(a), a judge should be disqualified only if it appears that he or she harbors an aversion, hostility or disposition of a kind that a fair-minded person could not set aside when judging the dispute.
In re United States , 158 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir.1998)
(emphasis added) (quoting Liteky v. United States , 510 U.S. 540, 557–58, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
The “high threshold” for disqualification under § 455(a)
, id. is necessary because the disqualification decision must reflect both the need to promote public confidence in judicial proceedings and also the need to prevent even the appearance that parties can too easily obtain the disqualification of an impartial judge to get a preferable judge. See In re Bulger , 710 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir.2013)
. This standard also seeks to assure that judges will not misuse § 455(a) to avoid presiding in difficult or controversial cases, or to avoid possible appellate review.
In this case, a fully informed, reasonable person would know the following. In 2004, I sentenced Sampson to death pursuant to a jury verdict. In affirming that sentence, the First Circuit wrote that I had “handled the case patiently and sensitively.” United States v. Sampson , 486 F.3d 13, 51 (1st Cir.2007)
. It concluded that I had conducted the sentencing proceedings “fairly and with scrupulous attention to the process required by law.” Id. at 52.
In 2011, I vacated Sampson's sentence because of juror misconduct. In 2013, the First Circuit affirmed that decision. This case was returned to me for a new proceeding to determine Sampson's sentence.
In July 2014, while on vacation, I helped organize and moderated a program on a film concerning a prisoner in Florida, The Life and Mind of Mark DeFriest , which had been produced by a young friend, Gabriel London. As discussed in § IV.A.1, infra , my role in the DeFriest program was not a manifestation of a special interest in issues relating to prisons and prisoners. Rather, it was an example of the wide range of programs I have organized or participated in, often with young people.
I arranged for Professor Alan Dershowitz, with whom I had taught at Harvard Law School, to be a panelist. I also agreed to Mr. London's request to include Dr. Gilligan on the panel. I did not then realize that Dr. Gilligan had, in 2010, filed an expert affidavit as part of a voluminous Amended Petition for a new sentencing trial for Sampson.1 However, for the purpose of the motion for my recusal, I assume that a knowledgeable reasonable person could believe I knew that he had done that. However, such a person would also know that, as of July 2014, Dr. Gilligan had not been retained by Sampson to testify as an expert at the retrial.
The DeFriest film is about the experience of a particular prisoner. The film essentially seeks to make a case for DeFriest's parole. It depicts him as allegedly having a mental illness, possibly caused by brain damage, exacerbated by prolonged solitary confinement and violence in prison, including by prison guards. The film does not mention Sampson or this case. However, Sampson proposes to introduce at retrial evidence from several experts that he is mentally ill, has brain damage, and has been subject to violence in prison.
I invited Mr. London and Dr. Gilligan to have supper with my wife and me at our rental home before the film and program on July 27, 2014. In the approximately one hour that Dr. Gilligan, Mr. London, and I were together, the talk was almost exclusively social. I did, however, tell Mr. London and Dr. Gilligan about the organization of the panel, and asked Dr. Gilligan how he would like to be introduced. There was no discussion of Sampson, this case, or the death penalty.
On July 27, 2014, not realizing that Dr. Gilligan had filed an affidavit in 2010, I nevertheless wanted to ensure that my role in moderating the panel would not be misunderstood. Therefore, after the film was shown, I began the program by explaining that I was a federal judge and my participation should not be construed as an endorsement of the case for DeFriest's parole, as an expression of my views on any of the issues raised by the film, or as a comment by me on any other case or issue, including the death penalty, as to which DeFriest makes a brief, pejorative reference in the film.
Dr. Gilligan spoke about how the United States prison and mental health systems are “broken.” He expressed the view that violence in prisons, including violence by guards, is out of control and makes inmates more prone to violence. Dr. Gilligan also said that treatment in the right environment can end the pattern of violence by even prisoners with a long history of violence. He also criticized politicians for lacking the will to deal with these issues. Professor Dershowitz joined in that criticism. Neither Dr. Gilligan nor anyone else made any reference to Sampson or this case.
Before taking questions from the audience, I noted that the panelists had expressed “strong views.” I added that I did not “mean to sound timid, but it was not my role as moderator to express my own.” I stated that I did not necessarily agree with everything that Professor Dershowitz or Dr. Gilligan had said, but it was valuable for citizens in our democracy to hear about the issues being discussed.
I concluded the program by asking the audience to applaud Mr. London for making the film; the panelists, “Alan” and “Jim,” who were ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Penate v. Kaczmarek
... ... Civil Action No. 3:17-30119-KAR United States District Court, D. Massachusetts September 22, 2021 ... enacted, as required by his or her oath.'” ... United States v. Sampson , 148 F.Supp.3d 75, 87 (D ... Mass. 2015) (quoting In re Aguinda , 241 F.3d 194, ... ...
-
Waters v. Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc.
...creates "the presumption is that a judge will impartially apply the law, as required by his or her oath." United States v. Sampson, 148 F. Supp. 3d 75, 79 (D. Mass. 2015). The recusal statute seeks to balance the necessity that courts are perceived as free from bias and the fear that "recus......
-
Evariste v. United States
...himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); United States v. Sampson, 148 F. Supp. 3d 75, 79 (D. Mass. 2015). Under Section 455(a), "a judge has a duty to recuse himself if his impartiality can reasonably be questioned; but otherw......
-
Diaz v. Perez, CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-11860-RGS
...himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); United States v. Sampson, 148 F. Supp. 3d 75, 79 (D. Mass. 2015). Under § 455(a), "a judge has a duty to recuse himself if his impartiality can reasonably be questioned; but otherwise, h......